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State Practice Following
World War II, 1945-1990
I. Introduction
At least ten armed conflicts at sea since W orld War II have involved targeting
issues concerning enemy merchant shipping and neutral vessels that have
acquired enemy character: the Korean conflict of 1950-53 and naval actions
connected with the civil war in China, 1949-58; the Arab-Israeli conflicts of
1948-57, 1967, 1973 and 1982; the India-Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971; the
Vietnam War, with principal U.S. forces involvement between 1962 and 1973;
the Falklands/Malvinas War of 1982; and, most importandy, the Iran-Iraq
Tanker War of 1980-88. There was no global war similar to the experiences of
World Wars I and II; in all cases the arenas of attack were relatively localized.
However, to some participants the conflict was total, e.g., the Tanker War as to
the belligerents, Iran and Iraq; to neutral bystanders, involved to a greater or
lesser degree (e.g. the United States in the Tanker War), the conflict was only a
regional, second or third level affair.
Although these conflicts overlapped each other in point of beginning and
duration, they may be analyzed conveniendy in the sequence listed above. This
chapter will also attempt to interweave other major sources of state practice e.g., treaties, l in some cases like UNCLOS,2 not yet in force - that may have
impact on this area, albeit tangentially, in the future. It might be noted that other
sources of state practice or custom, the theme of this chapter, may be found in
[D]iplomatic correspondence, policy statements, press releases, the opinions of
official legal advisers, official manuals on legal questions, e.g. manuals of military
law, executive decisions and practices, orders to naval forces, etc., comments by
governments on drafts produced by the International Law Commission; state
legislation, international and national judicial decisions, recitals in treaties and
other international instruments, a pattern of treaties in the same form, and
resolutions relating to legal questions in the United Nations General Assembly.
Obviously the value of these sources varies and such depends on the circumstances.3
Most modem military manuals, e.g., NWP 9A, contain a "disclaimer clause,"
which says that although the publications cannot be considered as binding on
courts, "their contents may possess evidentiary value in matters relating to U.S.
custom and practice. ,,4 And besides customary and treaty sources, there may be
general principles of law, authoritative treatises, other research of competent
scholars, court decisions, or perhaps resolutions of international organizations,
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that may impact the law-defining process.5 Some of these sources, e.g., actions
of international organizations, may appear for the first time in the time frame of
this analysis, 1945-90, while others have been sources, perhaps subsidiary to
custom, treaties and general principles, for a long time. 6
The general format of this chapter is analysis, on a general time line when the
conflict occurred, grouping adversaries where successive conflicts have occurred,
e.g., Korea, 1950-53, and naval activity connected with the Chinese civil war,
followed by the 1948-1957, 1967, 1973, and 1982 Arab-Israeli conflicts, etc.
Within each conflict, or set of conflicts, state practice will be analyzed first. This
will be followed by other primary sources developed during the time frame, e.g.,
treaties binding on the parties, and then by other developments in international
law - e.g., treaties that would apply to future wars at sea, treaties not related to
armed conflict but whose principles may be arguably applicable in the future,
and the research results of major commentators. While this has made for a longer
chapter, it is hoped (and submitted) that the comprehensive approach may be
more useful than examination of state practice in isolation from other sources.
This chapter is limited to its topic. Full analysis of issues involving the results
of attacks on truly neutral merchant shipping, which are strictly prohibited?
attacks on enemy warships or naval auxiliaries, which are permitted;8 attacks on
warships of neutrals, which are prohibited;9 and attacks on certain protected
vessels, e.g., hospital ships, which are prohibited;10 are not always given full
analysis. For example, specific humanitarian law rules that flow from such attacks
may be discussed only tangentially, e.g., the particular rules for notification of
casualties. The same is true for claims concerning accidental attacks in peacetime,
or sea-air warfare, such as the Airbus incident during the Tanker War. The
chapter confines itself to high seas situations.

II. State Practice and Other Sources of International
Law Since World War II
The postwar era began with ratification of the U.N. Charter, whose articles
51 and 52 recognize the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense,
and the right to establish regional arrangements or agencies to deal with matters
relating to the maintenance ofinternational peace and security as appropriate for
regional action. Article 2(4) of the Charter declares that all U.N. members shall
refrain from the threat, or use, offorce against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state. Article 2(3) states the correlative principle that U.N.
members must settle international disputes by peaceful means so that "international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered." There is, of course,
an inherent tension between the principles of Articles 2(3) and 2(4) and Articles
51 and 52, in that the use offorce in self-defense, perhaps through an Article 52
agency, will almost invariably involve the territorial integrity or political
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independence of a state to which the defensive response is directed. Settlement
by peaceful means is the polar opposite to the threat or use of force permitted
under the principles of self-defense. However, Article 2(3)'s peaceful means
provision is qualified by the paramountcy of international peace and security, and
the order of listing of Purposes of the United Nations, as well as the content of
subsequent Charter provisions, supports the view that the maintenance of peace
and security is "the primary purpose of the Organization and takes priority over
other purposes."l1 Since the "inherent right of self-defense" is preserved under
article 51 in the absence of action by the Security Council, and is a correlative
of actions the Council might take,12 the right of self-defense is part of the
corrective mechanisms (albeit through self-help) the Charter contemplates.
Besides the preservation of the right ofself-defense, the Charter also provides,
in Chapter VI, for pacific settlement of disputes, including investigations,
recommendations and decisions by the Security Council of disputes "likely" to
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.13 The Charter
also gives the Security Council, in Chapter VII, authority to act to deal with
threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts ofaggression. Nonforce actions
that the Council may direct include "complete or partial interruption of
economic relations and of... sea, air and other means ofcommunications "under
Article 41. Article 42 gives the Council the option of deciding on force,
including "demonstration, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land
forces ofMembers .... " (Chapter VII also includes Article 51, with its statement
of the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense. 1 Although the
principal institution for implementing Council action, the Military Staff Committee, withered during the Cold War,lS U.N. Members remain liable to obey
the Council's "decisions,,,16 which have been issued only rarely because of that
Cold War. Thus one of the primary foci for enforcement of states' rights under
international law for 1945-90 has been self-help, through claims of self-defense,
anticipatory self-defense, nonforce reprisal and retorsion.
Self-defense has two elements, necessity and proportionality, and for U.S.
practice includes the right of anticipatory self-defense, perhaps on a global scale,
involving use of armed force where there is a clear necessity that is "instant,
overwhelming, and leaving no reasonable choice ofpeaceful means. ,,17 The basic
self-defense principles, tersely articulated in the Charter in 1945 and developed
through state practice since then, might come into play at the beginning of any
armed conflict where enemy merchant ships are at sea or are being convoyed
by enemy warships, or situations might develop during armed conflict involving
neutral vessels. Two views have developed as to the scope of self-defense after
ratification of the Charter. The U.S. position has been that a parallel customary
right of self-defense exists alongside Article 51,18 while others have argued that
the Charter comprehends the scope of the right, i.e., that the right to self-defense
occurs only when there is an armed attack. 19 And, as will be seen, the peacetime
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law of the sea declares that merchant ships have the nationality of the state whose
flag they fly, so long as there is a "genuine and effective link." between the flag
state and the vesse1. 20 Thus a violation of Charter Article 2(4) might be claimed
if there is an unwarranted attack on a neutral merchant ship as much as if a
battleship bombarded a neutral coast or an army invaded neutral territory?1
Self-defense, whether anticipatory or in response to an attack, can be asserted in
several contexts, e.g., unit self-defense, where a particular ship, aircraft or group
of units (e.g., a carrier battlegroup) responds to use, or threat of use, of force;
national self-defense, where other forces, citizens or territory are involved. 22
Those who would deny validity to the u.S. position would also say that there
is therefore no right of anticipatory self-defense, although Professor Dinstein has
taken an interesting middle view in suggesting a right of "interceptive" selfdefense, i.e., that an attack "occurs" when one party "embarks upon an
irreversible course of action, thereby crossing the Rubicon.,,23 This is close to
the u.S. position of anticipatory self-defense, which in the u.S. view is
permitted when "there is a clear necessity that is instant, overwhelming and
leaving no reasonable choice of peaceful means, ,,24 as stated above.
Beyond the case of self-defense for a single state, the Charter, Article 51,
affirms the right of collective self-defense. The result has been formation of
bilateral and multilateral treaties, which, when duly published, communicate the
existence of a critical defense zone (CDZ), perhaps of half a continent. For the
now-defunct USSR, this had been Eastern Europe. 25 The Western Europe
counterpart has been NATO, with its carefully-delineated boundaries that do
not include all the national territories of its partners as applicable for a required
collective response. 26 The existence of a formal treaty arrangement may not be
necessary to signal a CDZ,27 but it frequently is, as in the case of NATO.
There is a similar division of authority on the use ofarmed force reprisals after
1945 in situations not involving armed conflict. Reprisals are proportional
responses, illegal as a matter of international law, to a prior act illegal under
international law by another nation?S Most authorities say that reprisals involving use of force cannot be asserted as a matter ofself-defense;29 a few have taken
a contrary position.3o NWP 9A appears to take no position on the issue, but its
analysis of wartime reprisals and the severe limitations that international law and
u.S. policy would place on such reprisals31 would tend to the view that u.S.
policy opposes forcible reprisals in peacetime. Reprisals of a non-force nature,
e.g., economic sanctions directed at a nation violating international law, are valid
in the Charter era.32 Retorsions - unfriendly but legal responses to other nations'
actions, e.g. conscious refusal of a warship to respond to a dipped ensign of
another nation's merchantmen - also remain valid responses.33
The problem has been compounded by the recognition that there has been
no bright-line division between peace and war,34 and that therefore a static set
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of rules, some to be applied during wartime and others applicable during peace,
is not a useful concept for many situations.
For the particular issue of this book - attacks on merchant ships - there is
another set of issues, springing from the nature of commercial ventures at sea
for most ofthis century. Flags ofconvenience, now euphemized as open registry,
have called into question the nationality of the merchantman, whose connection
with the flag state may be nominal.35 The ship may be crewed by nationals of
several states, while its officers may have allegiance to another nation. The vessel
may be owned by a corporation whose stockholders are not nationals of the flag
state. The insurance coverage may be spread among still other states' nationals.
The cargo may be consigned to one person, or it may be beneficially owned by
many, and the same may be said of cargo insurers. The ship may be chartered
to another national, and there may be sub charterers as well, each with their own
insurance coverage. Today nonbulk cargo is frequendy lifted by sealed containers, perhaps loaded and sealed by the consigner, for which the bill oflading
may recite that the container is "said to contain" certain items, with a resulting
problem for a visiting officer searching for contraband.36 Even though the USSR
with its system ofstate ownership is collapsing, many nations operate commercial
shipping companies, for which the defense of sovereign immunity mayor may
not be available, depending on the cargo.37 Although the rule of the 1909
London Declaration that warships may rely on the flag the merchantman flies
for visit and search purposes,38 the existence of other interests, and behind them
the states whose nationals are interested, cannot be dismissed as a factor in the
problem. Given the "intermediate" status ofmost armed conflict situations today
- somewhere on the continuum between peace and total war39 - the problem
is likely to be more difficult, and claims more frequent, than in a W orId War
II-style scenario.
These preliminary remarks are generally directed at the beginning of hostilities
in the Charter era, i.e., after 1945, but they might also apply ifa neutral merchant
vessel is perceived to be on unneutral service40 or if a neutral power becomes
involved in the conflict after initial commencement of hostilities.
From the problems ofjus ad bello to problems ofjus in bello in recent armed
conflict situations41 we now tum.

A. Korea: 1950-53, and the Civil War in China, 1949-58
Immediately after the invasion of the Republic of Korea (ROK) in late June
1950, the U.N. Security Council authorized the United States to respond to the
attack and called upon all nations to assist in that effort. The Soviet Union was
not present when the Council vote was taken and hence did not veto these
resolutions. 42
As part of this response, the United States, on July 4, 1950, informed the
U.N. Secretary-General "that, in support of the resolution approved by the
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Security Council relative to the attack upon the Republic of Korea [ROK]
involving forces from North Korea, ... a naval blockade of the entire Korean
coast" had been ordered by the President of the United States. 43 Notice of the
blockade had been broadcast on July 4; its 390 35'N and 41 0 51 'N limits "were
established to keep all sea forces well clear of both Russian and Chinese
territory," thus allowing access to territory of nonbelligerents. Both the USSR
and the People's Republic of China (PRC) protested the blockade and refused
to acknowledge its existence or legality although both observed it. All warships
except North Korean vessels were allowed to enter North Korean ports; all other
ships were barred. Although blockading forces were meager at first, the blockade
was soon set and became effective along 500 miles of the Korean peninsula. Mter
initial attempts to break the blockade, there was no active surface or submarine
and little air opposition. Mines laid by North Korea with Soviet assistance were
employed, however. 44
The blockade of Korea had several important ramifications for international
law. First, it was part of the first major peacekeeping operation authorized by
the Security Council under the Charter. Second, the Council authorization for
U.S. leadership in the defense of Korea began the practice of the "agency
principle,,45 used in subsequent operations directed by the Council - e.g.,
Rhodesia46 _ or recommended by the General Assembly.47 Third, practice under
the blockade conformed to previously-established principles of the law of
blockade and thereby reinforced them. 48
U.N. naval forces also evacuated diplomatic personnel and U.S. civilians
aboard U.S. warships after the initial North Korean attack in 1950; some
dependents were evacuated by commercial shipping. 49 Substantial numbers of
Koreans who wanted to leave North Korean-occupied South Korea or North
Korea were also evacuated by these ships when U.N. land forces later rolled
north or were pushed south.50 The evacuations were well-advertised in the
media, although there were no formal agreements between U.N. forces and
North Korea, as customary law would dictate. Adversaries to these operations
did not attack the evacuation ships, but if they had, there would have been
possible violations of the rules against attacking cartel vessels or ships performing
humanitarian missions. 51 The use of media announcements in lieu ofagreements
was an extension of the traditional rule requiring prior agreements between
belligerents.52 As such, the U.N. procedure was the beginning of incipient
custom as to the procedure.
Local convoy operations began soon after hostilities;53 no trans-Pacific
convoying was employed. 54 Vessels escorted included at least 40 Japaneseowned freighters under the control of Shipping Control Administration, Japan
(SCAJAP); U.S. Army transports and cargo ships, and Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS) vessels under command of the Chief of Naval Operations
of the U.S. Navy. SCAJAP was part of the U.S. administrative structure for the
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occupation ofJapan. MSTS vessels included commissioned naval vessels (designated U.S.S. like warships but primarily cargo carriers in nature), U.S. civil
service-manned ships (designated U.S.N.S.), and a tanker fleet under time
charter to MSTS from private companies. 55 As in the case ofships involved with
evacuations,56 there were no attacks on the convoys, which shuttled warfighting
and war-sustaining personnel and goods from Japan and elsewhere to the Korean
peninsula. Attacks on these convoys, whether the ships were under SCAJAP,
U.S. Army, or MSTS control, would have been justified as military convoys for
the warfighting/war-sustaining effort.57 Since some of the same merchantmen
may have been employed for law-protected voyages (e.g., cartels or evacuations),
and at other times in carriage of warfighting or war-sustaining efforts, the
dilemma of the 1907 Hague Convention (VII) on conversion of merchant ships
to warships58 is apparent and illustrates the Convention's possible supersession
in practice.59 (The United States is not a party to Hague VII.)60
U.N. forces took the position that since fish was an important source offood
for North Korea, including its armed forces, destruction of all fishing boats,
inshore and offihore, was strategically necessary.61 Commander Fenrick has
stated that
the anti-fishing campaign appears to have been an extension beyond previous
practice. It must, however, be conceded that ... contraband lists in World War
II specified food as conditional contraband.... Although all the naval weapons
were used, neither nuclear weapons nor submarines in the commerce destruction
role were used during the conflict.62

Although a naval blockade of the PRC was considered after the Chinese
intervention in the Korean peninsula land campaign, those plan "folders stayed
on the shel£" Throughout the conflict, "In the northern Sea ofJapan the ...
Soviet Far Eastern Fleet maneuvered, undisturbed and undisturbing.,,63 Later in
the war, on September 27,1952, U.N. Commander (and U.S. General) Mark
W. Clark proclaimed a Sea Defense Zone (SDZ), "for ... preventing attacks
on the Korean Coast; securing the [U.N.] Command sea lanes of communications and preventing the introduction of contraband or entry of enemy agents
into [the] Republic ofKorea.64 Paralleling the "Peace Line" proclaimed by ROK
President Syngman Rhee earlier in 1952 to claim continental shelfand exclusive
fishing rights for South Korea,65 the Clark Line was rescinded August 25,1953
as part ofthe armistice negotiations. 66 Although Professor O'Connell has asserted
that the SDZ "was operationally successful because in the circumstances the law
could be overlooked, ,,67 his position, taken in 1975, was not correct in 1952
when the Clark Line was proclaimed, or today. As analyzed in the contexts of
the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas war and the 1980-88 Tanker War, Parts ILF and
ILG, such war zones are legal so long as they are limited in time and geographic
scope proportional to the conflict. As sources for those conflicts illustrate, such
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zones have a history of state practice going back to at least the Russo-Japanese
War of 1904-05.68 And to the extent that the Clark Line area coincided with
the Security Council decisions authorizing defense of Korea, the SDZ was legal
for that reason as well. 69 The geographic coincidence of the Rhee Line, which
ran up to 200 miles off the ROK coasts and was primarily aimed at excluding
fishermen from Japan, then emerging from postwar occupation,70 illustrates a
problem common to the postwar world of relatively limited naval warfare and
the seaward extensions of claims of national sovereignty, such as the exclusive
economic zone (EEZ), or the continental shel£71 While it might be perfecdy
valid for a state to reasonably regulate fishing and other economic activity 50
miles off its coast, as North Korea has purported to do recendy, that nation's
geographically coincident 50-mile defense exclusion zone clearly is not proportional, in duration or area, relative to whatever threat(s) North Korea might
perceive,72 and thus is illegal under international law.
The Korean conflict also saw the genesis of another source oflaw for naval
warfare. When the USSR returned to the Security Council and its vetoes
throtded further Council action on the war, the General Assembly passed the
"Uniting for Peace" Resolution (UFP) with the backing of the United States.73
UFP in effect construed the Assembly's largely non-binding authority under the
U.N. Charter74 to include recommendations to U.N. Members for further
prosecution of the war. UFP was the legal vehicle for later Assembly-approved
peacekeeping operations, most of which did not involve U.S. forces, and few
of which involved naval units. 75 The UFP process has been employed in
situations outside the arena of armed conflict, often to the chagrin of the United
States. In theory at least, UFP remains as a possible source ofclaims to the control
of naval warfare. Two important products of the UFP process include the 1970
General Assembly Resolution 2625, declaring principles offriendly relations and
cooperation among states, and the 1974 Resolution 3314, defining aggression,
both adopted by consensus?6
(1) The Civil War in China
During the same time, the U.S. Seventh Fleet had begun the Taiwan Straits
Patrol to prevent the PRC from invading Taiwan or the Republic of China
from invading the mainland as a corollary to the Korean conflict,77 rejecting
USSR claims that this was an act of aggression and a blockade ofTaiwan?8 In
1953 the United States changed the Patrol to a defensive shield for Taiwan
because of PRC entry into the Korean War?9 Although no formal mutual
defense treaty with Taiwan was ratified until 1954,80 the United States had
retained its posture as a World War II ally of Nationalist China before then. 81
Thus U.S. naval forces could legitimately protect Taiwan's territorial integrity
under a self-defense theory as long as Taiwan acquiesced in this form of limiting
an ally's freedom of movement.
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In 1949, the United Kingdom and the United States had protested the
Republic of China's declared blockade of the China coast. Several U.S. and
U.K. merchantmen were seized. 82 The practice as to the United States stopped
with advent of the Korean War and President Truman's statement directed
toward the Taiwan government.83 Seizures of Soviet bloc vessels by Taiwan
government ships occurred in 1953-54, for which the United States disclaimed
responsibility,84 and U.K. ships also were molested up through 1953, for which
Great Britain protested and declared that U.K. warships had been instructed "to
afford protection to British ships on their lawful occasions on the high seas. ,,85
From 1950 through 1953, there were 90 incidents of Nationalist Chinese
interference with international shipping destined for PRC ports. Two thirds of
these incidents involved U.K.-flag vessels. These ships were detained in
Taiwanese ports and their cargoes confiscated. 86 Nevertheless, James Cable has
rated the Nationalists' operation "not very successful" from the standpoint of
gunboat diplomacy.87 At the same time, PRC warships were successfully
employing gunboat diplomacy against Japanese fishing vessels; 158 were seized
between 1950 and 1954 "before Japanese fishermen agreed to respect Chinese
prohibited zones. ,,88 South Korea employed the same practice from 1953
through 1955. The 1958 PRC attack on the Quemoy and Matsu Islands close
to the China mainland but held by the Taiwan government, prompted a U.S.
response of 60 warships. "Smaller ships began escorting Nationalist convoys to
the offihore islands. The PRC response was the issuance of a declaration
extending China's territorial waters from 3 to 12 nautical miles, which applied
to the coastal islands ... and all other islands claimed as Chinese territory. ,,89
The United States, as a matter of policy, did not send its convoying warships
into Quemoy/Matsu territorial waters, but it did not thus imply recognition of
PRC claims to territorial seas around the islands. 90 During the 1950s PRC PT
boats developed the tactic of concealing themselves in PRC fishing fleets and
darting out of this cover to attack Nationalist ships.91 Both the U.S. tactic of
convoying and the PRC use offishing fleets to camouflage speedboats were later
employed in the Tanker War.
The United States could convoy Nationalist vessels to the offihore islands,
and the convoys, if they carried goods that did not contribute to the Nationalist
warfighting/war-sustaining effort, enjoyed legal immunity from attack. Even if
vessels did carry goods to support the Nationalists' efforts to respond to a civil
war, the United States could legitimately convoy them. Until 1979, the United
States recognized Taiwan as the legitimate government of all China and had a
self-defense arrangement with Nationalist China dating from World War 11.92
Thus the United States, as a matter of self-defense,93 could have defended its
escorting ships and any convoyed vessels from attack.
Small coastal fishing boats engaged in their trade are exempt from capture or
attack. However, if the boats aided and abetted the speedboats by concealing

130

Targeting Enemy Merchant Shipping

them or otherwise assisting in their belligerent acts, the fishing craft lost their
immunity.94 This issue was apparently never tested insofar as u.s. naval vessels
were concerned, but several Nationalist vessels were hit, and there was response
in kind.
(2) Other Trends
Writing just after the close of the Korean War, Professor Tucker confirmed
the traditional rule that small coastal fishing and trade vessels, so long as they did
. .
. t h e war euort,
cr:
. 95
not partICipate
In
were exempt fr om capture an d d estructlOn,
as did NWIP 10_2,96 the predecessor to NWP 9A. They followed the view of
Oppenheim's current treatise, published in 1952.97 All authorities agreed that
coastal steamers or relatively large, deep-draft vessels were not within the
exception.
Professors Oppenheim and Tucker, tracing the shift from the mid-eighteenth
century, when the rule was that private enemy merchant ships might be
captured, through the early twentieth century debate over capture, to the rule
following World War II and the early Fifties, concluded that such vessels could
not be captured, attacked and destroyed, with these exceptions:
(1) A ship refused to stop when summoned to do so;
(2) A ship actively resisted visit and search;
(3) A ship sailed under convoy of military ships and/or aircraft;
(4) A ship was armed with offensive weapons, and such have been used, were
intended for use, against an enemy;
(5) A ship was incorporated into or assisted the enemy's armed forces intelligence
system; or
(6) A ship acted as a naval or military auxiliary to enemy armed forces.

The merchantman's passengers, crew and papers were to be placed in safety if
circumstances permitted, and the attacking ship was required to look for
survivors and to protect them and the dead against ill treatment if the ship were
sunk. Ifa merchantman desired to surrender, the attacking vessel could not refuse
quarter. 98 NWIP 10-2 approved exclusion zones, stating that "[w]ithin the
immediate vicinity of his forces, a belligerent commanding officer may exercise
control over the communications ofany neutral vessel ... whose presence might
otherwise endanger the safety of his operations," and that "a belligerent may
establish special restrictions ... upon the activities of neutral vessels ... and may
prohibit altogether such vessels ... from entering the area. Neutral vessels ...
[failing] to comply ... expose themselves to the risk of being fired upon.,,99
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Professor Tucker, in whose Naval War College analysis appears the first edition
of NWIP 10_2,100 says that war zones directed against enemy merchantmen not
integrated into the war effort, or presumably otherwise not exempted (as being
unarmed), would not justify a shoot-on-sight policy.l0l Tucker agreed with
NWIP 10-2 that practice allowed controlling neutral vessel movements, and that
merchantmen carrying contraband were subject to seizure. 102 Oppenheim stated
that war zone declarations warning neutrals of entry only at their peril were
illegal. However, "[a]s between the belligerents only, provided that the zone is
enforced by the use of means . . . which comply with the laws of maritime
warfare, ... there can be no doubt of the lawfulness of the practice.,,103
Although negotiated during the Korean War, the four Geneva Conventions
of1949 did not come into effect for the United States until 1952. They are now
generally effective worldwide. 104 The Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition ofWounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at
Sea (GWSEA) is, in a sense, a misnomer, for its provisions apply, inter alia, to
persons wounded, sick or shipwrecked who are "[m]embers of crews, including
masters, pilots and apprentices, of the merchant marine ... of the Parties to the
conflict, who do not benefit by more favorable treatment under any other
provisions of international law."lOS An inference could be made that the
negotiators would not have included all merchant seamen, including those
aboard enemy merchant vessels, ifthey did not feel that all such ships were subject
to attack under some circumstances, which had became the norm during World
War 11. 106 GWSEA also exempts small coastal rescue craft from attack. 107
The last phrase of article 13(5) of GWSEA - "who do not benefit by more
favorable treatment under any other provisions of international law" - invites
attention to the growing body of human rights norms, typically encased in treaty
format, but perhaps applicable today as general practice of states. lOS The first of
these was the Genocide Convention,109 and there has been a veritable torrent
of them since, some regional and some worldwide in application. To be sure,
many human rights conventions contain "escape clauses" that render them
largely inoperative during times of national emergency,110 e.g., armed conflict,
but a future international tribunal might declare them articulative of a general
customary standard, as the World Court did in the Nicaragua Case,111 perhaps
ignoring the escape clause limitation. In general, future wars at sea may be largely
free ofthese constraints, owing to the targeting ofships, not people, but it would
seem that a national command authority ordering a war of genocidal extermination at sea, or an individual commander that directs execution of a rescued crew
with genocidal intent, would be as guilty of violating human rights norms as of
violating the law of armed conflict. Existence of this body of human rights law
at least creates the expectation that claims of such violations will be made in
future armed conflicts at sea. 112
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The 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention113 may also impact armed
conflict at sea. The United States is not party to this convention, although about
80 nations are. Although the primary purpose of the Convention was protection
of sites and immoveable and moveable property on land as a response to the
Nazis' looting of Europe during World War II,114 there are implications for
naval warfare. Ifa belligerent that is party to the Convention decides to transport
cultural property, that state must apply to the Commissioner General for Cultural
Property appointed under the Convention, who consults with the Protecting
Powers for each belligerent on measures for specifically protected transport and
who appoints inspectors to determine that only cultural property is being shipped
in accordance with approved measures. Parties to the Convention pledge to
"refrain from any act of hostilities, directed against transport under special
protection." The ship must display a special emblem, a pentagonal blue and
white shield. 115 In "urgent cases," particularly at the start of armed conflict, a
belligerent may "As far as possible notif[y] ... Parties," but the pentagonal shield
may not be displayed unless other belligerents expressly grant immunity. Other
belligerents must "take, so far as possible, the necessary precautions to avoid acts
of hostility directed against [the transporting ship if it displays] the distinctive
emblem.,,116 If either method is employed, the property and the carrying ship
· In
· pnze,
·
.
from seIzure,
.
pI
acmg
or capture. 117 In effcect, u nl ess t h ere
are Immune
is advance consent for emergency transfer, there would be a high risk of attack,
even if there is a shield displayed or other notice given. The dilemma for the
naval commander would be a decision whether the transporting vessel was
employing a perfidious ruse or whether it was in fact carrying only cultural
property. In any event, the Convention guarantees the right of visit and search
of ships operating under both kinds of transport. lIS The Convention also
generally excepts from its operation cases of "imperative" "military necessity"
for such time as that necessity continues.H 9 Immunity may also be withdrawn
by a belligerent ifits opponent violates the requirement that the cultural property
not be employed for military purposes,120 e.g., transporting valuable cultural
property to pledge it for purchase of war material. If a Commissioner has been
appointed, he or she must be notified of either kind of withdrawal from
.
. 121
Immumty.
As in the case of the human rights conventions, nonratifying nations may find,
after the fact, that the Convention articulates customary law norms,122 particularly ifthe state is party to a similar regional agreement such as the Roerich Pact,l23
which covers the same ground for certain Western Hemisphere nations, including the United States. At the least, there can be expectations of claims of
violations ofinternational law from Convention parties. The Convention applies
among parties bound by it, even though a co-belligerent is not bound by it. A
co-belligerent may declare its acceptance of the Convention for the conflict,
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and all are then bound so long as the nonparty co-belligerent adheres to the
Convention's tenns. 124

B. Arab-Israeli Conflicts: 1948-57, 1967, 1973, 1982
On May 15, 1948, toward the opening of the first conflict, Egypt instituted
shipping inspections at Alexandria, Port Said and Suez, the latter two being entry
ports for the Suez Canal. A May 18 proclamation provided that "munitions or
merchandise of any kind destined directly or indirectly to the institutions or
persons residing in Palestine" might be confiscated in accordance with internationallaw. (Israel had been proclaimed a state that day.) 125 On May 29 the U.N.
Security Council called upon all governments to refrain from introducing
fighting personnel, or importing or exporting war material into or to the area
during a ceasefire. 126 AJune 3 notice applied the May 18 proclamation to Israeli
exports. On July 8 Egypt established a prize court.127 Egypt further decreed
search and seizure procedures, and published a contraband list, "including arms
and armaments, chemicals, fuels, armed forces automobiles, and bullion," on
February 6, 1950. On November 28, 1953, the list was expanded to include
foodstuffi and "other commodities likely to strengthen the war potential" of
Israel. The decree applied to vessels in Egyptian territorial waters or the Canal.128
On November 14,1948 Egypt detained the U.S.-flag S.S. Flying Trader on
grounds that it was transporting war materials. Trader's cargo included 4000 bags
of rice, an ingot of tin and 38 "trucks." The rice was released; the fate of the tin
is unknown. 129 The Egyptian prize court later said the "trucks" were "in fact
guns, etc. [, i.e.] ... armored cars each capable of carrying a dozen soldiers."
Trader had received the vehicles in Bombay; they were part of a consignment
of 50 originally sent on Trader's sister ship, S.S. Flying Arrow, from the United
States to Tel Aviv. Twelve vehicles were offioaded at Tel Aviv before the war
began, but more could not be discharged because of attacks in this port. Arrow
then proceeded to Bombay, India, where the 38 vehicles were transshipped to
Trader, which sailed for New York via Genoa, Italy, a port allegedly "a principal
base for contraband traffic destined for" Israel. Genoa was on the Egyptian
blacklist of ports. Trader was stopped at Port Said. Two bills oflading for the
vehicles were offered to the court, the original "to order" and a copy naming
an individual. The vehicles were condemned as lawful prize. 130 Perhaps equally
important was the prize court's ruling that the seizure was legal despite conclusion of a General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel before the
seizure. 131 Although this aspect of the holding has been criticized,132 the Trader
case is illustrative of the potential for legal approval ofclaims to commit "warlike"
acts while there is a technical "peace.,,133
The United States protested Egypt's oil tanker regulations requiring a ship to
certify it was heading for a neutral port and to obtain an Egyptian certificate that
the cargo was for local consumption in a neutral port in late 1950. The Egyptian
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regulations also provided that if a tanker did not comply, it would be denied
facilities. The protest "stated that these regulations would work undue hardship
on normal shipping operations" and reserved the right to protest on legal
grounds. Egypt responded by blacklisting vessels whose manifests showed they
had carried to Israel "any material considered contraband by ... Egypt.,,134
The United Kingdom, on the other hand, had "compromised the position"
of straits passage (through the Straits of Tiran) to the Israeli port of Eilat
by agreeing to contraband search at Adabiya or Suez, a" concession to belligerency ... to prevent hostilities from spilling over on to the high seas, but the British
agreement carried with it the implication of a recognition that Egypt had
belligerent rights, and it claimed no reservation as to rights of passage through
the straits." 135 Although Egypt claimed the United States and Denmark had also
acquiesced in such searches,136 the record is less than clear but would indicate
that the United States protested some, if not all, of the Egyptian procedures, and
that probably Denmark did too. 137 Indeed, after an Egyptian corvette stopped,
plundered and damaged a U.K. merchantman on July 1, 1951 in the Gulf of
Aqaba as part of the attempted blockade ofIsrael, and British protests and Security
Council discussion were unavailing, a British destroyer flotilla was sent to the
Red Sea "to prevent further incidents of this kind." On July 26, Egypt and
Britain reached agreement on future procedures for U.K. ships. From late 1951
to March 1952 British warships - usually two cruisers - were employed to keep
the Canal open when Egyptian labor was withdrawn and clearance was denied
U.K. vessels. The cruisers provided a protected labor force to keep the Canal
·
138
open until E gypt resume d operattons.
After the Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission reported its belief
that it did not have the right to ask Egypt to stop interfering with goods passage
through the Canal,139 the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution on
September 1, 1951, finding that Egypt's interference with neutral shipping's
passage was "an abuse of the right of visit, search and seizure" that could not be
justified on the basis of self-defense and was a violation of freedom of the seas.
The Council called upon Egypt to end the restrictions. 140 The resolution went
unsupported,141 and the result was more seizures and protests. 142 A second
Council resolution was vetoed by the USSR in 1954.143 Professor O'Connell
has inquired whether the 1951 resolution applied to the Gulf of Aqaba. 144 After
Egypt nationalized the Canal, Israel's 1956 attack on Egypt, a ceasefire and
establishment of the U.N. Emergency Force, the Canal was reopened under
management of the Suez Canal Users' Association with right of passage guaranteed. 145 From February - April 1957, U.S. destroyers had patrolled the Straits
ofTiran to successfully prevent Egyptian interference with U.S. merchantmen
bound for Israel. Other U.S. naval vessels evacuated U.S. citizens and "friendly
nationals," on a space-available basis, from Haifa and Alexandria. 146
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Dr. von Heinegg has summarized the decisions of the Egyptian prize courts
from 1949 through the Fifties:
... [T]he Egyptian prize court in its jurisdiction very often referred to the decisions
of prize courts of the two World Wars. Whereas in a number of cases neutral
cargo was released, the principle that a neutral flag covers enemy cargo was
acknowledged only if the neutral did not cooperate with the enemy. Enemy
destination was assumed in conformity with, e.g., British prize jurisdiction of the
two World Wars, black lists playing an important role. All goods labelled "Produce
ofIsrael" were considered to be of enemy character. The notion of contraband
was interpreted extensively comprising, e.g., tea, coffee, onions, [and] spices.
The judgments of the Egyptian prize court bore a strong resemblance to the prize
jurisdiction of the two World Wars. It is, however, remarkable that all ships and
goods affected had been captured in Egyptian ports. Partly the goods had been
unloaded before the outbreak of hostilities in 1948. In the ... Inge Toft the court
expressly indicated that Egypt did not exercise its rights on the high seas but
restricted itself to territorial waters and ports. Even though the Security Council
in September 1951 [had] characterized the Egyptian practice as an "abuse of the
exercise of the right of visit, search and seizure Egypt more or less regularly
147
maintained it until the conclusion of the peace treaty of 1979.
In 1949 an armistice to the first round of fighting had been declared, and it was
in response to this that the Security Council in Resolution 95 had declared that
Egypt had indulged in "an abuse of the right ofvisit, search and capture;" Egypt
considered the armistice ended due to Israeli "aggressions," including a high seas
148
attack on Karim, an Arab vessel.
The important point is that the precedent of
seizing ships during an armistice was deemed legal by Egypt,149 although
denounced by the Security Council, when there was an alleged breach of the
armistice. The Council had made no "decision" requiring U.N. Members to
assist in ending the seizures, as it had during the Korean conflict. ISO The second
point is that Inge Tift does not indicate that Egypt felt compelled, as a matter of
international law, to limit its seizures to its territorial waters:
... The United Arab Republic does not exercise her rights of belligerency on
the high seas, but limits herself to exercising them within the confines of her
territory, ports and territorial waters. Article 10 of the [Constantinople] Convention of October 29, 1888 [governing use of the Suez Canal], gives Egypt the right
to take all necessary measures for the maintenance ofpublic order in time ofpeace
and for her defence in time of war. It is natural that the requirements of such
protection are left entirely to the United Arab Republic, just as are the requirements oflegitimate self-defence. The policy of the economic boycott ofIsrael has
been part of the public order of the United Arab Republic since 1948. To
renounce this ?olicy would be to compromise this public order in all the Arab
and Islamic States. 151
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The case should not be read as lending support to the questionable view that
belligerent naval operations, which may include seizure of merchantmen, can
be conducted only near the belligerents' coasts. 152
Although Israel attempted to characterize the seizures as a blockade, and
therefore violative of the 1888 Constantinople Convention's prohibition ofsuch
in the Canal, the Egyptian actions were not, technically, that form of interdiction. During the Security Council debate on the seizure, Egypt asserted in 1951
that they had been relatively few in number and were essential if the nation were
to "survive.,,153 This seems to be a vague reformulation of a claim of the right
of anticipatory self-defense - i.e. seizure of war material before it could be used
against Egypt - qualified by the principles ofnecessity and proportionality154 that
Egypt had asserted in earlier Security Council debates. 155 In any event, the
Council condemned such actions in its September 1,1951 resolution. 156
In the 1967 Six Day War, Egyptian submarines sank two innocent Greek
freighters in the Mediterranean Sea, one off Alexandria and the other further
west in the Mediterranean. 157 A sidebar aspect of this war was a U.K. statement
that it would join with other nations to assure right of passage through the Straits
ofTiran. A British carrier group and the U.S. Sixth Fleet were concentrated in
the Eastern Mediterranean, but "[t]his threat of purposeful force ... was not
pursued and ... did more harm than good to British and American interests."
The U.S.S. Liberty, which was monitoring Israeli transmissions during the
Egyptian phase of the war, was damaged in an attack by Israeli PT boats, for
which compensation was paid to the United States by Israel for loss of life and
injuries among the crew and for damage to Liberty, without admission of fault.
Liberty was configured like a merchant cargo ship but £lew the U.S. ensign, was
painted haze grey like all U.S. warships in the Mediterranean Sea, and had
traditional pendant numbers on the bow and stem. Israel had declared a very
imprecise exclusion zone, warning all ships to keep away from "the coasts of
Israel during darkness." As to what coasts were meant (e.g., conquered territory
also?) was less than clear. There was also an informal, private warning to the
United States. As Commander Jacobsen has analyzed it, the public exclusion
zone as a matter of law failed because of vagueness; in any event, the attack
occurred in daylight (2 p.m.). The second, privately-warned zone was not
legitimate either because it was not publicly announced in such a manner that
Liberty would have been aware of the risk. 158 Although Liberty was a warship,159
if she had been a merchantman, the same result would have obtained as to the
legality of the attack so long as the ship was not engaged in work that assisted a
belligerent, e.g., gathering intelligence. The attack on the Liberty might be
contrasted with the sinking of the Israeli destroyer Eilat, a warship of one of the
belligerents, during a resumption of hostilities in October 1967. During the next
month, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 242 which "Affiml[ed]
further . . . the necessity for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through
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international waterways in the area, .. 160 which undoubtedly meant the Suez
Canal but may have included the Gulf of Aqaba. 161
During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, international shipping was warned about
entering the region of conflict, which first comprised Egyptian and Israeli
territorial waters, but later further parts of the sea plus Egyptian, Libyan and
Syrian ports. In October 1973 the Syrian navy captured and diverted a Greek
liner, Romantica, but released her the next day after the Italian ambassador
intervened. No furth~r such incidents occurred, perhaps because ofinternational
protests, although Egypt regularly stopped, visited and searched neutral merchantmen. Third states' reactions varied: African nations unilaterally suspended
or terminated diplomatic relations with Israel; Arab nations boycotted oil exports
to Israel and the United States; Great Britain embargoed arms, largely affecting
Israel; except for Portugal, other West European nations refused to allow use of
their territories for supply or assistance to any belligerent, thereby cutting down
the black-list potential of the 1948-57 war. Arab navies adopted the tactic of
taking shelter beside merchant ships in their harbors after firing missiles at Israeli
warships. Egypt declared a blockade in the Red Sea and attacked but missed an
Israeli-bound tanker. In the Gulf of Suez, Egypt acted to blockade the Abu
Rudiers-Eilat route used by Israeli-chartered tankers carrying oil from the
Israeli-occupied Sinar fields to Eilat. In response to Egypt's blockade ofthe Straits
ofBab el Mandeb, Israel counter-blockaded the area. 162 The rationale of Egypt
in the Bab el Mandeb operation was obscure:
blockade was maintained in the Straits of Bab el Mandeb. Whether this was
conducted by units of the Egyptian navy or not was apparendy deliberately
obscured, perhaps because the Egyptian government had not made up its mind
whether the appropriate concept was that ofdistant blockade ofIsrael as an enemy
with whom Egypt was at war; or the exercise of belligerent rights in the territorial
seas of an allied State engaged in a collective self-defence operation; or the right
of a coastal State (in this case Southern Yemen) to close its territorial seas to
enemy-destined traffic, even though the territorial seas lie within straits. Egypt's
only official announcement on the subject referred to the 'legitimate right of the
Republic ofSouth Yemen', which also by decree unilaterally asserted sovereignty
over the seaway. South Yemen, with only two ex-Russian submarine chasers,
two minesweepers and a total naval complement of200 men, was in no position
to prevent the passage of ships in the face of any resistance, and it seems that units
of the Egyptian navy did, in fact, fire warning shells, visit and search foreign ships
and warn off those bound for Israel.

When the destroyer U.S.S. Charles Francis Adams intercepted the radio message
of the S.S. LA Salle, a U.S.-flag merchantman, that she was being fired on in the
Straits, Adams' sailing was delayed by French authorities until such time as LA
Salle had turned back to Massawa, Ethiopia. A U.S. Seventh Fleet task force
entered the Indian Ocean from the Pacific, and was believed to have orders to
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protect American neutral traffic in the Straits. This ended the blockade, at least
insofar as U.S.-flag shipping was concerned. 163 The naval war had no decisive
influence on the final outcome of the conflict. 164 The 1979 Egypt-Israel peace
treaty, ending the 1973 war, provided that Israeli ships, and cargoes coming to
or from Israel, enjoyed free passage rights through the Suez Canal and its
approaches on the basis of the Constantinople Convention,165 which had
internationalized the Canal. Israeli nationals, vessels and cargoes, as well as
persons, vessels and cargoes going to or from Israel, would be given non-discriminatory treatment in use of the Canal. Egypt and Israel declared the Straits
of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba "open to all nations for unimpeded and
non-suspendable freedom of navigation and overflight." They also agreed to
respect the other's right to these rights in the Straits and the Gu1£166 A protocol
recognized the rights of vessels of the parties to innocent passage through the
other's territorial waters "in accordance with the rules of international law." 167
During the 1982 campaign in Lebanon, Israel imposed a naval blockade on
the Lebanese coast to prevent weapons from reaching the Palestine Liberation
Organization, then based in Lebanon. 16B Any ships or boats running guns to the
PLO were subject to interdiction, capture and condemnation or destruction
under the traditional rules of blockade. Weapons have always been considered
absolute contraband. 169
(1) Trends in the Arab-Israeli Conflicts
The 1948, 1973 and 1982 conflicts saw the declaration of traditional close-in
blockades, with the typical problems ofvisit, search and capture. 170 The eventual
result of the 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty was recognition ofIsrael's right to
use the Suez Canal, internationalized by the 1888 Constantinople Convention,
a further limitation on the opportunity to visit, search and capture merchantmen. 171
Various high seas attacks by Egypt on neutral freighters were clearly illegal
under international law, 172 as was the Israeli attack on the Liberty, a U.S. Navy
warship marked as such. 173 The high seas attacks by Egypt on neutral merchantmen was an ominous portent of things to come in the Tanker War.
(2) Other Trends
During these conflicts the four 1958 law of the sea treaties were negotiated
and have come into force. 174 All save the 1958 Fisheries and Conservation
Convention have been accepted as restatements of customary law. 175
The 1958 High Seas Convention in particular has provisions that relate to
this study. It declares that the high seas are "open to all nations, [and] no State
may validly purport to subject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of
the high seas is exercised under [the Convention] and by the other rules of
international law," e.g., the law of armed conflict. Thus as between belligerents,
the convention would be modified by the law of naval warfare. However,
non-belligerents can claim rights under the Convention, except insofar as the
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law of war affects them, e.g., exclusion zones. The Convention does state the
rights of freedom of navigation and freedom of fishing, but these and others
"recognized by the general principles of international law," must be exercised
by states "with reasonable regard to the interests of other States in their exercise
of the freedom of the high seas.,,176 The Territorial Sea Convention provided
for a contiguous zone as part of the high seas to allow littoral states to police
such an area for, e.g., smugglers, but the negotiators did not include any
••
fcor sh
· d e secunty
. zones. 177
prOVIsIons
oreSI
All states have the right to sail ships under their flag, to fix conditions for
granting nationality to ships, for registering ships, and for flying tile flag.
However, "there must exist a genuine link between the State and the ship," e.g.
effective jurisdiction and control of the flag state in administrative, technical and
social matters over ships flying its flag. 178 The latter provision responded to the
flag of convenience phenomenon. 179 Warships and vessels owned or operated
by a state and "used only on non-commercial service" have complete immunity
except for the flag state. 180 States must prevent oil pollution or the release of
radioactive waste from ships.181 The 1958 Fisheries and Conservation Convention reaffirms the above-stated right to fish on the high seas, but adds that states
must adopt or cooperate in adopting conservation measures for the seas' living
resources. 182 The influential Restatement (Second), Foreign Relations LAw if the
United States adopted the genuine link theory in 1964;183 it did not address
directly the sovereignty and navigation issues. 184 Professor Wolfrum has interpreted the 1960 decision of the International Court ofJustice concerning the
membership of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization
(1M CO, now IMO, the International Maritime Organization) to imply that only
registration, and not the "genuine link" postscript to Article 5 of the High Seas
Convention, governed for nationality ofvessels. 18S He concludes that "the right
of each State to establish its own conditions for the grant ofits flag is not limited
by international law. Consequently, no State may challenge or refuse to
recognize the registration of ships by another State. Moreover, no State has the
right to look behind a ship's flag.,,186
Prominent treatise writers of the time generally approved the traditional rules
applicable to enemy merchant ships. Professor McDougal and Florentino
Feliciano in 1961 summarized the exceptions for protected vessels such as
hospital ships and small coastal fishing boats, but that "in the practice of both
sides in [World War II], merchantmen were in fact regarded as regular combatants and subjected to sinking at sight.,,187 Although one later commentator
has said McDougal and Feliciano equate the law of war zones with the law of
blockade188- as applied to neutrals - it is reasonably clear that McDougal and
Feliciano would approve war zone treatment for enemy merchant ships,189 the
object of this study. Therefore, the legitimacy of attack on enemy merchantmen
- subject to the usual protection and exclusions - would apply to war zone
,
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situations too. McDougal and Feliciano also preserve the distinction between
neutrals carrying contraband, which in their view would be subject to capture
and condemnation of the goods. 190 There was apparently no analysis of the
problem of war-sustaining cargo aboard neutral vessels.
C. John Colombos came to the same conclusions in 1967, noting 11
exceptions, among them protected vessels such as hospital ships, or small coastal
fishing or trading boats when not used for military operations, stating that enemy
character must be determined by the flag flown. 191 Destruction of the enemy
merchant ship required that all on board be placed in safety and that the ship's
papers be removed and preserved. Since it was difficult under modem warfare
conditions to accomplish this, "destruction must be treated as an exceptional
measure." Colombos acknowledged, however, that NWIP 10-2 and World War
II practice by France, Great Britain, Italy and the United States permitted
destruction in case of military necessity when the merchantman could not be
captured and sent or escorted in for adjudication. Capture was seen as the normal
modality for neutrals carrying contraband; there is no clear statement concerning
attack and destruction of a contraband carrier, but if the merchantman was
integrated into the war effort, World War II practice and NWIP 10-2 would
permit destruction. The capturing officer had the duty of taking all possible
measures to provide for the safety of passengers, crew and ship's papers. 192
Colombos also seemed to approve a measure of control over the high seas by
belligerents for their own protection, provided they could control the area. 193
In 1968, Professor Mallison traced the history of the law of naval warfare on
capture or destruction ofenemy merchant vessels and approved the NWIP 10-2
list,194 but added:
The provisions of this article are accurate as far as they go but are inadequate in
covering this one particular situation. During the past general wars enemy cargo
ships were attacked without warning even if they did not participate otherwise in
the enemy war effort. They were attacked without warning because they were
cargo vessels carrying cargoes of military importance. There is, unfortunately, no
reason to believe that such cargo ships which comply rigorously with the
requirements of Article S03(b)(3) will be immune from attack without warning
in future general wars. This article, however, could provide specific grounds for
claims and counterclaims based upon charges of illegality. If this occurs, the next
steps could involve the invocation ofreprisals and counter-reprisals so that a future
general war could be conducted, thereafter, without regard to this article of the
LAw oj Naval Warfare.

Professor Mallison also recognized the traditional list of vessels immune from
capture or attack - e.g., hospital ships and coastal fishing or trading boats. 195
Although primarily concerned with attacks on neutrals in war zones, he declared
that attacks on enemy merchantmen in declared war zones was and would be
legal, subject to the usual exceptions, e.g., hospital ships, etc. The rule on neutral
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ships integrated into the enemy war effort was that they should be treated like
enemy merch ant ships. 196
Writing in 1962, Professor McDougal and his associates noted that the law
of naval warfare, conditioned by the norms of the U.N. Charter, was an
exception to the general principles of freedom of navigation of the seas. 197 They
severely criticized the genuine link theory of the 1958 High Seas Convention.198

C. Other Merchant Ship Interdictions and Diversions, 1956-66
From 1956 through 1966, other incidents involving merchant ship interdiction occurred without conflict erupting on the high seas, although there was
sometimes parallel fighting on land.
(1) The Civil War in Algeria
During the civil war in Algeria, the French navy sought to visit and search
ships that were suspected ofrunning war materials to the rebels in Algeria. France
declared a 20 to 50 kilometer (11-28 mile) customs zone off Algeria for small
craft. 199 High seas interceptions occurred off Algeria but also 45 miles off
Casablanca, in the Atlantic Ocean, and in the English Channel, far from the high
seas adjacent to Algeria. In 1956, 4775 vessels were visited; 1330 were searched;
192 were re-routed, i.e., diverted; and 1 was arrested. Diversion was ordered if
weather made boarding impossible, if the cargo's nature was such that a thorough
at-sea search could not be conducted, or if cargo was arms, ammunition and
explosives. Ships flying flags of a dozen nations were involved, and the flag states
protested vigorously. France justified her actions on self-defense grounds. 2OO
Although a large-scale operation, the French interdiction program did not
seriously affect freedom of navigation, since those few ships whose cargoes were
seized were clearly engaged in smuggling arms to Algeria. 201 Compensation was
paid for some vessels wrongfully detained?02 Although some arms were imported directly from the seas off the Algerian coast, others were brought in
overland through Morocco, Tunisia or Libya. In some instances arms were sent
to a third state, e.g., Egypt or Libya, and then transported through another
country, e.g., Tunisia, and across the Algerian border. In some cases, states
friendly to the rebels were buying vessels, vesting nominal ownership in
third-country nationals, for the traffic. In other cases, bogus shipping documents
were used. Some arms were smuggled in by fishermen?03
(2) The Iceland-United Kingdom Cod War
In 1958-59 British warships escorted and protected British trawlers fishing in
waters claimed as territorial sea by Iceland. Great Britain eventually withdrew
from the "Cod War," and the issue was resolved by diplomacy?04
(3) The Cuban Quarantine
In 1962 the United States, acting in concert with other Western Hemisphere
states under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty),
imposed a maritime quarantine against Soviet introduction ofmissiles, components
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and delivery systems, into Cuba. The action was claimed to be proper under
Article 52 of the U.N. Charter, which allows interim security arrangements such
as the Rio Treaty. The quarantine was undoubtedly legal under Article 52 of
the Charter. The U.S. presidential proclamation establishing the quarantine,
besides citing the Rio Treaty-based resolution, also relied on a U.S. Congressional resolution that recognized the threat. The U.S. proclamation was specific
as to the type of cargoes to be halted, e.g., missiles, bombs, bomber aircraft,
warheads, and support equipment, "and any other classes of material hereafter
designated by the Secretary of Defense [to] effectuate" the proclamation. The
proclamation exempted other cargoes, e.g., foodstuffi and petroleum, and
declared neutral rights would be respected. No blockade was declared, and the
proclamation limited use of force to situations where directions under the
quarantine were disobeyed if reasonable efforts had been made to communicate
directions to an interdicted vessel, "or in case of self-defense." (The Rio Treaty
authorized "partial or complete interruption of economic relations or of ... sea
... communications; and use of armed force[,]" among other measures, thus
paralleling the language of Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter.) Some commentators have seen the quarantine as a self-defense measure, pure and simple.2os
Self-defense as a proper rationale for the quarantine after the Nicaragua Case has
been questioned, although the possible limited precedential value of that case
should be noted?06 Moreover, to the extent that action was taken under Article
52 of the Charter, as noted by the United States and others, the Nicaragua Case,
which dealt with the parallel customary right of self-defense alongside Article
51, the case carries even less weight. Moreover, no one would question the right
of individual and collective self-defense, e.g., under customary law or Article 51
of the Charter, if a warship maintaining the quarantine had been attacked by,
e.g., a Soviet warship, while enforcing the quarantine or in other circumstances,
e.g., in the Pacific Ocean.
(4) The Rhodesian Interdiction Operation
In 1965-66, as part of the transition of governance from Southern Rhodesia
to independent Zimbabwe, the U.N. Security Council passed a series of
resolutions denouncing the white Rhodesian government as illegal, and calling
upon all states to refrain from assisting the white minority regime and to institute
an oil embargo, and upon the United Kingdom in particular to enforce such
an embargo?07 H.M.S. Berwick, on patrol off Beira, a Mozambican port
employed for offioading oil bound for Rhodesia, stopped and visited S.S. Joanna,
an inbound Greek tanker, which refused to divert from Beira. Because the
operative Council resolution spoke only in terms of embargo and not blockade
or similar measures, Berwick had to let Joanna enter Beira. A later resolution
specifically authorized such action, and the next blockade-runner, Manuela, was
diverted after boarding. Oil companies and tanker owners began to supply lists
of innocent tankers manifested for Beira, and except for one French tanker
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(Artois) not on the list but in fact innocent, the system worked well. "[O]utsiders
as possible blockade-runners ... did not reappear. ,,208 When France protested
H.M.S. Minerva's signalling "Stop or I will fire," and then shooting one round
across Artois' bow, the U.K. response was that Minerva was acting in accordance
with Council Resolution 221.209 The Council also passed a series of decisions
under Chapter VII of the Charter beginning in 1966 "which imposed"
economic and other sanctions on Rhodesia; those were not terminated until
1979 when Zimbabwe majority rule was assured. 210
(5) The Trends
The seaward aspects of the Algerian civil war developed the concept of
diversion of merchantmen to other ports, away from their destinations in
rebel-held parts of Algeria, rather than the traditional visit, search and capture
procedure. The customs zone idea was not new and roughly parallelled the
exclusion zones under World War II and earlier practice. The high seas
interdictions far from Algeria, justified by France on self-defense grounds, came
close to the line of an international law violation, if they did not cross over into
illegality. Under today's standards of proportionality, 211 and in view of contemporary protests, such actions were probably illegal, given the localized nature of
the conflict.
The U.K. Cod War convoying continued the trend oflegitimating peacetime
convoying of a nation's own vessels to protect them against assaults by others, a
theme that had been restated during the civil war in China and later during the
Tanker War of 1980_88.212
The 1962 Cuban Crisis started another trend for maritime naval operations,
use of a quarantine under Article 52 of the Charter, rather than employment of
the more traditional declaration of blockade, which carries with it a connotation ofwar. 213 In reality, the Cuban quarantine continued the practice of the
Algerian civil war of a proportional exclusion zone, but in an international
confrontation situation as distinguished from the internal conflict circumstances
of civil war.
The Rhodesian transition was the second example of use of the agency
principle to effect control ofmerchant ship traffic by the U.N. Security Council,
the first being Korea.2 14 Employment of diversion instead of traditional visit,
search and capture followed the Algerian civil war model, but this time in the
context of a U.N.-approved action.

D. India-Pakistan: 1965, 1971
During the first of these wars, Pakistan seized 50 Indian cargoes on neutral
ships and adjudicated them before a prize court. The cargoes consisted mainly
of tea, with some manifests of coal and general cargo; the High Court of Dacca
held that because the tea was "produce of Indian soil," grown by Indian
companies, it was lawful prize.215 Pakistan had previously published lists of
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absolute and conditional contraband; India responded with a list of absolute
contraband. India asserted that because a fonnal state of war did not exist,
Pakistan could not constitute a prize court. Pakistan responded that the maritime
measures were a lawful exercise of the right of sel£..defense under the U.N.
Charter.216 India's ultimate response to the initial Pakistani seizure was impoundment of three Pakistani ships in Indian waters and ordering offloading
contraband before proceeding to Pakistan as "reprisals." When Pakistan continued to offload cargoes in neutral bottoms bound for India, India infonned
foreign shipping companies that no India-bound cargoes should be shipped in
Pakistani-flag vessels and that neutral-flag vessels bound for either nation should
stop first at an Indian port, despite a cease-fire in effect. If the cargo was not
contraband, it would not be seized. Thirty-eight vessels complied; 16 did not.
After the end of contraband control by both belligerents, they first agreed to
permit U.S. aid vessels to land their cargoes. Eventually both states heeded the
International Federation ofInsurance's request for release of neutral vessels. 217
Late in 1966, the U.N. General Assembly belatedly called upon the belligerents
to observe the rules of warfare.2 18 Under the traditional view of Charter law,
the resolution was nonbinding, although it was some evidence of the interna.
219
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In the 1971 war, India successfully isolated East Pakistan Qater Bangladesh)
by "contraband control and blockade." After dark, neutral vessels were not
allowed to approach the Pakistani coast closer than 75 miles. Besides ensuring
safety of Indian vessels at sea through naval control and protection of shipping,
the Indian Navy sought to capture or destroy Pakistani merchant vessels. More
than 115 neutral ships were inspected, and India diverted neutral ships to Calcutta
if they carried cargo of military significance, after India discovered that vessels'
markings and names of many ships had been changed. Three Pakistani merchantmen were captured.22o A Liberian-registered ship and a Spanish vessel were
also sunk; Professor O'Connell has asserted that "[t]he naval operations conducted by India against ... Karachi and on the Bay of Bengal took no account
of international law, which was ... deliberately put to one side by the Indian
naval staff." In these operations, two merchantmen were destroyed by surfaceto-surface missiles from Indian patrol boats while the ships were at anchor in the
Karachi roadstead, i.e., in territorial waters. The neutral in-bound Venus Challengerwas hit and sunk by a missile 26.5 miles off Karachi and was lost with all
hands; a Pakistani destroyer 20 miles off Karachi also went down to a Styx missile
attack that night; the cause was probably "[c]apricious behavior of the missiles
and malfunction or inadequate operation of the guidance systems. ,,221 Venus
Challenger's destruction on the high seas was a classic case of indiscriminate use
of weapons. Significantly, a week later, but apparently before the Pakistanis
discovered her wreck, the Bengal Chamber of Commerce published its 40-mile
dusk-to-dawn warning.222 Professor O'Connell was correct with respect to the
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Venus Challenger; the Pakistani destroyer was fair game, however. On the other
hand, the economic warfare aspects of the conflicts - visit, search, seizure,
diversion, capture contraband and prize procedures - proceeded along traditional
lines223 and thereby reinforced the traditional norms. The war was over in two
weeks,224 thus ending the potential for a more significant trend in state practice
on the issues.

E. Vietnam: 1962-73225
During the Vietnam conflict, North Vietnam employed small coastal fishing
vessels as logistic craft to support its military operations226 in violation of the
obligation to use these vessels, normally exempt from capture or destruction, for
fishing only.227 The patrol areas developed for Operation Market Time, originally part of a 12-mile defensive sea area, eventually extended to over 30 miles
off the South Vietnamese coast.228 The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff considered
a blockade of North Vietnam in 1965 but took Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific's advice against such because it woul,d indicate the United States was
performing a belligerent act. 229 At the same time that the United States and
South Vietnam (RVN) were intercepting southbound North Vietnamese
supply boats, South Vietnamese were operating aJunk Force that was not part
of its navy, also to prevent the very kinds of craft attempting to filter from the
north. They performed other military tasks as well. 23o In 1965 the Junk Force
was integrated into the R VN Navy.231 The patrols did not interfere with local
fishing and trading boats, even though Vietnam was not party to Hague
Convention XI. 232
The United States used Military Sealift Command ships, U.S.-flag charters,
and occasionally foreign-flag vessels to deliver war materials. Several of these
ships were attacked, and two were sunk, due to attacks by the Viet Cong while
the ships were in South Vietnamese internal waters, i.e., during river transit.
There seems to have been no discrimination between vessels carrying war
material and civilian-oriented cargoes, e.g., cement.233 The United States did
give antisubmarine protection to valuable cargoes, e.g., troop carriers.234 As it
had done during the Korean War, the U.S. Navy evacuated refugees - over
300,000 of them, mostly civilians - from North to South Vietnam, and 721
French wounded, including prisoners of war, were taken aboard the hospital
ship U.S.S. Haven, bound for Morocco and France. 235 Soviet-flag vessels
carrying war supplies to North Vietnam initially were not interdicted.236 In 1972
a mine quarantine program in North Vietnamese territorial waters sought to seal
off North Vietnamese ports;237 its antecedent had been an attempted quarantine
by South Vietnam of Communist seaborne supplies coming to the Viet Cong
through the Gulf of Siam and the Mekong Delta.238 A RVN destroyer did
succeed in sinking a North Vietnamese trawler, believed to be carrying ammunition, in 1972, however. 239
.
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(1) Analysis of Trends
Although the small-boat interdiction240 and the mine campaign have been
justified,241 there is no evidence of North Vietnam's justification of its antiship
interdiction campaign. If an interdicting ship's wake overturned a junk, a
GWSEA issue of the duty to stop and pick up survivors would have arisen,
according to Professor O'Connell.242 The civilian evacuations followed the same
pattern as those of the Korean conflict, with at least media announcement of the
process, and were justified under international law as a defacto cartel operation.243
The hospital ship was also protected from attack,244 even though the United
States was not in an international armed conflict at the time.
(2) Other Incidents of the Era
Two incidents involving naval force and merchant-type vessels occurred after
the United States withdrew from Vietnam.
On January 20-21, 1974, the PRC loaded 11 "warships" with 660 amphibious assault troops and took the disputed Paracel Islands in the South China
Sea, fending off South Vietnamese naval gunfire with a superior naval force.
Press reports indicated that the first PRC convoy, which was driven off by
Vietnam, had been "fishermen" who had raised a PRC flag.24s
The second was the Mayaguezincident, May 12-15,1975. Cambodian naval
forces fired on and seized S.S. Mayaguez, a U.S.-flag unarmed merchantman in
the Gulf of Thailand, 7-8 miles off an island claimed by Cambodia and Thailand
but 60 miles off the coast of the mainland. Cambodia claimed Mayaguez was on
a spy mission in her territorial waters. The United States asserted that the vessel
was on a regular run between Hong Kong and Thailand and in the usual shipping
lanes. The United States issued a Notice to Mariners, warning of the danger and
intimating other incidents. U.S. Marine and Navy units cooperated to rescue
the 40-member U.S.-national crew and the ship fromKoh Tang Island, 15 miles
off Cambodia. After receiving small arms fire from Cambodian patrol boats and
attempting to block Mayaguez ' movement toward the mainland, U.S. carrierbased aircraft had fired on and sunk three boats and damaged others. Because of
the "profoundly negative" attitude of Communist states toward the ICJ, no
possibility was seen for Cambodia's submission to the World Court, and that
avenue of redress was not followed. 246
The convoy of "fishermen" aboard fishing craft was, of course, yet another
example of misuse of a protected class of commercial ships. When these vessels
were employed for the attack on the Paracels, they lost their protected status and
could be treated like any warship.247 South Vietnam was legally justified in its
attack. Moreover, one might question whether the vessels in question were local
coastal craft, as contemplated by Hague Convention XI, since the Paracels are
over 100 miles off the Asian mainland.
The Cambodian seizure of Mayaguez also violated international law. The
Cambodians had full opportunity to search for espionage evidence after they
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boarded, and no report of such has been found. It is true that ships may use
transit passage to the high seas in sea lanes that are in territorial waters, but the
passage must be innocent in nature. Passage is innocent so long as it is not
prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state, and such
nations may take steps to prevent passage which is not innocent, which may
include temporary suspension if such is essential for the protection of the coastal
state's security. In other respects, coastal states cannot hamper innocent passage.248 There was no showing of any danger to the security of Cambodia, nor
was this a temporary suspension; it was an outright seizure. If the Cambodian
action occurred outside territorial waters, in the contiguous zone as part of the
· h seas, t h ere was no Jusn
. ·ficanon
. fcor stoppmg
• lVlayaguez.
11 ...
249 Itwas appropnate,
.
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as a matter of international law, for the United States to respond proportionally
to defend !'Jayaguez and to recover the crew and the ship. The incident illustrates
the interplay of peacetime principles of maritime operations, today articulated
in UNCLOS in addition to other treaties and customary law, and the law of
anned conflict, i.e., the principles of self-defense.
(3) Other Trends
Treaty regimes concluded during or following the Vietnam conflict have
affected the law of naval warfare tangentially.
The 1971 Seabed Treaty's prohibitions on planting or placing nuclear
weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on the ocean floor250 in effect
declares that enemy merchant ships may not be attacked by devices of that type,
in that if the placement is illegal, then use would also be illegal.251 Similarly, the
1972 Bacteriological Convention's prohibition on development, production,
stockpiling, acquiring or maintaining bacteriological agents or toxins252 implicates their nonuse against enemy merchant ships.253 The 1972 Convention does
not derogate from the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol;254 in effect, it "perfects the
prohibition on the use of biological and toxin weapons begun in the 1925
Protocol." Probably the 1972 Convention does not articulate customary law,
but the 1925 Protocol does. 255 "[T]here appears to be no role for biological
ship-to-ship weapons,,256 at present, but the analysis has been included for the
sake of trends in future naval weapons development and the law to accompany
it.
The 1977 Environmental Modification Convention parties have pledged
"not to engage in military or any other hostile use ofenvironmental modification
techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of
destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party." The range of the
Convention includes the whole Earth.257 The Convention does not directly deal
with the problem of an attack on a merchant vessel, being concerned with
techniques that change the environment,258 but it would seem that a method of
attack whose ultimate environmental effect might be construed as the impact
desired, rather than the initial result on the object, would be within the scope
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of the Convention. A torpedo attack on a tanker, which results in a large oil
spill, the intent being to destroy the tanker, would not be denounced by the
Convention. On the other hand, if the intent of the attack was to cause the spill
so that enemy naval vessels' injection scoops, steam plant condensers or intakes
to desalinization plants would become fouled, thereby causing engineering plant
casualties and loss of movement capability, such action would be within the
Convention if "widespread, long-lasting or severe" environmental effects also
ensued.
Negotiated with the law of land warfare, land-based air war and naval
bombardment of land in mind,259 the 1977 Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions explicitly declares as much in Article 49(3).260 Nevertheless, the
Protocol has strong overtones for objects of attack and methods and means of
warfare that may influence the law ofnaval warfare.261 Some provisions explicitly
refer to rules for naval warfare. The Protocol is not in force for the United States.
Protocol I, Article 52, declares that civilian objects, which are all objects that
are not military objectives as defined in the Protocol, shall not be the object of
attack or reprisal; attacks must be limited strictly to "military objectives. . . .
" [M]ilitary objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location,
purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total
or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstance ruling at the
time, offers a definite military advantage." If there is doubt as to whether an
object, normally thought of as civilian - e.g., "a place of worship, a house or
other dwelling or a school" - is being used to effectively contribute to military
action, the presumption is that it is not so used, according to Article 52.262
This provision deserves close scrutiny. Its examples of places of worship,
houses and schools demonstrate that it is clearly directed toward land warfare.
However, there are maritime counterparts (e.g., passenger liners or cruise ships,
houseboats, school ships or university research vessels). Is the phrase, "under the
circumstances ruling at the time," appropriate for naval operations, given poor
visibility and other identification conditions at sea, perhaps poor communications conditions among belligerents, and the present differences as to what is
contraband? Should the presumption for civilian use in Article 52 be the same,
or the reverse, perhaps coupled with a list of prohibited objects for which the
presumption is as stated in Article 52 (e.g., hospital ships, other protected vessels,
and passenger liners or cruise ships), and further demarcations through exclusion
or war zones?
Protocol I, Article 53 prohibits attacks on cultural objects, their use as part of
the military effort, or the object ofreprisals, without prejudice to the 1954 Hague
Cultural Property Convention.263 For reasons noted in the Introduction, this
aspect of the Protocol as customary law may have carryover effect for naval
warfare, in that the Protocol reinforces other wartime treaty or customary
norms. 264
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Starvation of civilians as a warfare method is prohibited by Article 54(1). The
remainder of the article would be largely inapplicable to sea warfare, except for
the prohibition on attacks, destruction, removal orrenderinguseless offoodstuffi
"indispensable to the survival of the civilian population," regardless of motive.
The foregoing prohibition is inapplicable iffoodstuffi are solely for armed forces
use or in direct support of military action. In no event can such actions leave
the civil population without adequate food or water, such as to cause its starvation
or forced movement.265 This aspect ofArticle 54 has obvious overtones for naval
warfare in the context of what is and what is not contraband, and the issue of
relief ships in general.
Echoing the 1977 Environmental Modification Convention,266 Article 55(1)
of Protocol I declares:
Care shall be taken in warfirre to protect the natural environment against
widespread,long-tenn and severe damage. This protection includes a prohibition
of the use of methods or means ofwarfare which are intended or may be expected
to cause such damage to the natural environment and thereby to prejudice the
health or survival of the population.267

The same analysis for the Convention would appear to fit the Protoco1.268 Article
56,269 denouncing attacks on dams, dikes or nuclear electric generating stations
whose destruction would unleash "dangerous forces," is similar in theme but
would seem to have little or no relevance to war at sea, unless a future treaty
would denounce similar attacks on nuclear-powered merchant vessels or other
bulk cargo ships whose burthen when released due to attack would unleash
"dangerous forces." There are few if any nuclear-powered nonmilitary vessels
in service today, even if one counts certain icebreakers as such, but liquid natural
gas tankers might fall into this category. Article 56 also provides that parties to
a conflict must try to avoid locating military objectives near works or installations
that could loose dangerous forces. While this would seem to have no relevance
for naval warfare, a parallel might be belligerents' sending ships with dangerousforce potential to sea; they would be required to be kept away from legitimate
military objectives, e.g., a military convoy, if a Protocol I analogue came into
effect.
The Protocol's precautionary measures chapter includes a specific provision
for naval warfare:
In the conduct of military operations at sea .•. , each Party to the conflict shall,
in conformity with its rights and duties under the rules of international law
applicable in armed conflict, take all reasonable precautions to avoid losses of
civilian lives and damage to civilian objects.

Article 57 also has general precautions to be observed for other attacks:
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(a) Those who plan or decide upon an attack shall:
(i) do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are
neither civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject to special protection
but are military objectives within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 52
and that it is not prohibited by the provisions of this Protocol to attack them;
(ii) take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of
attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects;
(iii) refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected
to cause incidental loss of civilian life.-injury to civilians, damage to civilian
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to
the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated;
(b) [A]n attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that the
objective is not a military one or is subject to special protection or that the attack
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage
to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation
to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated;

(c) [E]ffective advance warning shall be given of attacks which may affect the
civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit.
Last, the Article provides that if a choice is possible between several military
objectives for a similar military advantage, the commander must choose the
objective that should cause the least danger to civilian lives and objectsPO
Articles 57(2)(a)(iii) and 57(2) (b), together with Article 51 (5) (b), thus represent
the first attempt at codification of the principle of proportionality,271 i.e., that
the means of attack must not be such that incidental loss of civilian life, civilian
injuries, or damage to civilian property, or a combination, cannot be excessive
relative to the military advantage sought to be gained.
Article 58 adds that belligerents must try to remove civilians or civilian objects
from the vicinity of military objectives, avoid locating military objectives within
or near densely populated areas, and take precautions to protect civil populations,
individual civilians and civilian objects under their control against dangers of
military operations.272 While all but the first-quoted clause of Articles 57 and
58 apply to land warfare, certain implications may be seen to flow from the other
provisions for war at sea. One obvious parallel is the principle for planning,
deciding, cancelling and suspending attacks. The warning rule, ifapplied to naval
warfare, would seem to contradict the customary rule of no warning for attack
on enemy merchant ships if such ship is armed, is in an armed convoy, assists
the enemy's intelligence system, acts as a naval auxiliary, or is integrated into the
enemy's war-fighting/war-sustaining effort and the warning would subject an
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attacking warship to imminent danger. (The customary rule requires - in the
absence of these factors - that the enemy ship's passengers, crew and papers be
placed in a position of safety before attack, but all this is subsumed under
"waming."l73 The Article 57(c) principle would be congruent with naval
warfare norms if the "circumstances do not pennit" exception clause would
apply to situations where the merchantman is anned, etc., on the theory that
such situations would subject the attacker to imminent danger. "Circumstances
do not pennit" might easily include submarine attacks because of the nature of
the modem submarine and its vulnerability on the surface. The same would also
apply to aircraft attacking an anned enemy merchantman.
The Article 58 requirement of removing civilians and civilian objects, if
removal be equated with placing in safety, would appear to be at variance with
the customary nonn. Protocol principles for choosing the military objective least
damaging to civilian interests and for taking other necessary precautions to
protect the civil population, etc., invite parallels for naval warfare. Article 58's
requirement for locating military objectives away from densely-populated areas,
if applied to naval warfare, would raise problems for siting naval bases in forward
areas. There are relatively few decent natural harbors, etc., today that do not
already have a port city nearby.
The Protocol also bans indiscriminate attacks, which are:
(a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective;

(b) those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed
at a specific military objective; or
(c) those which employ a method or means ofcombat the effects ofwhich cannot
be limited as required by this Protocol; and consequently, in each such case, are
of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without
distinction.

The Protocol gives two examples of indiscriminate attacks: (1) use of a large
weapon that destroys several separate discrete military targets at once when there
are intervening civilian areas or civilian objects; (2) an attack that can be expected
to cause excessive loss of civilians or civilian objects in relation to the "concrete
mili· tary advantage antICIpate
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cruise missiles employed in a scenario where neutral merchant ships close aboard
a target might be hit instead of the target (it being assumed no warnings to the
merchantmen were given), or use of shipkilling weapons directed against a
fleeing vessel suspected of violating protected status (e.g., a passenger ship
suspected of carrying troops) when under the circumstances a partially disabling
shot would serve to stop the errant vessel. In other words, as the Basic Rules of
the Protocol put it, parties do not have unlimited choice of methods or means
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of warfare; weapons, projectiles and materials and methods ofwarfare that cause
. • or unnecessary suffienng
. are pro hib·Ite.
d 275
superf1uous mJury
Four years after signature of Protocol I, the 1981 Conventional Weapons
Convention276 was signed, with three protocols elaborating upon prohibited
weaponry. It too is not in force for the United States.
Protocol I ofthe Convention denounces use ofweapons whose primary effect
is bodily injury by fragments undetectable by x_rays.2n Although usually
applicable to land warfare, the Protocol would deny use of such antipersonnel
weapons in attacks on enemy merchant ships.
Protocol III defines incendiary weapons or munitions as devices whose
primary purpose is to burn persons or objects. Munitions with incidental
incendiary effects, such as white phosphorus illumination shells, or munitions
combined with penetration, blast or fragmentation effects, such as armor-piercing shells, where the incendiary effect is not specifically designed to cause bum
injuries, are excluded from the prohibition. Protocol III forbids incendiary
attacks on the civilian population, civilians or civilian objects; or on a military
objective within a concentration of civilians, if airborne weapon delivery is
contemplated. Ifother than airborne delivery is contemplated, incendiary attacks
may be used ifthere is clear separation between the military objective and civilian
.
.
. . . co11ateral damage.278
concentrations
and precautions
are talcen to mImmIze
Protocol III should have little impact on war at sea, because incendiary weapons
as defined in Protocol III are seldom used at sea; a rare example is the napalm
attack on the U.S.S. Liberty. Protocol III would not have applied to the assault
on the Liberty, which was a U.S. warship with only service people aboard. 279
However, the Protocol would apply to attacks on merchantmen crewed by
civilians if they are not part of the war effort. Protocol III is concerned with the
effect ofincendiary weapons on civilians and civilian objects, and unless enemy
merchant ships could be classified as civilian objects, Protocol III would not
apply to the vessel. Unless the prohibitions against incendiary attack when the
military objective (the ship) is surrounded by civilians could be construed to
include the military objective surrounding civilians (the usual relationship of
crew aboard a vessel), Protocol III would not apply to the merchant crew, ifit
be assumed that they would be classified as civilians, which is unllkely.28o
Protocol II of the Conventional Weapons Convention covers mine warfare
and booby-traps but is limited to land warfare.281 Several provisions might be
cited for analogous treatment for naval warfare, however. The Protocol bans
indiscriminate use of mines; mines in civilian-concentrated areas unless close to
a military objective or warnings are given civilians; remotely delivered mines
unless used in a military objective area or an area with military objectives and
locations are recorded or a neutralizing device is used, and advance warning
is given civilians "unless circumstances do not permit" such. Belligerents
must record minefield locations. If a U.N. peacekeeping force is employed,
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belligerents must, if requested by the U.N. commander, remove or render
harmless all mines, protect the force from effects of mines, and supply information on minefields. If a U.N. fact-finding mission is involved, belligerents must
protect the mission from mines or supply minefield information if protection is
not feasible. 282 The same analysis with respect to indiscriminate use and civilian
concentrations and incendiary weapons applies to Protocol II. The provisions
governing remotely-delivered mines would have impact on enemy merchant
ships; they could only be used in a military objective area or an area with military
objectives, e.g., enemy merchantmen, e.g., a war zone or exclusion zone, and
then only iflocations are recorded or neutralizing devices are used, and if civilians
(e.g., neutral merchant ships) are warned. Given the relatively temporary nature
of zones and the availability of neutralizing devices - as much to protect one's
own forces from accidents - adaptation of Protocol II's principles to maritime
warfare would seem to pose few problems.

F. Falklands/Malvinas: 1982
The legality of the British attack on the fishing trawler Nanval duJjng this
conflict has been noted by NWP 9A. Nanval had an Argentine naval officer
aboard and had been used for intelligence-gathering~ (Nanval, as an oceangoing
trawler, arguably might also be said to have been outside the exception because
of her size, 1400 tons).283
Both belligerents attacked merchant vessels employed in the enemy's warfighting or war-sustaining effort; there is no recorded protest. The United
Kingdom employed over SO STUFT (Ships Taken Up From Trade) vessels,
privately owned ships, ranging in size from the liner Queen Elizabeth II to the
cable ship Iris, that were requisitioned from their owners. The containership
Atlantic Conveyor, lost to Exocet attack, was among the casualties of war. These
vessels should be distinguished from Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) ships such as
Sir Galahad, also lost, and RFA tankers similar in function to requisitioned
tankers. Argentina apparently used both STUFT-type ships and naval
auxiliaries. 284 The United Kingdom published the location of its hospital ships
as operating in a "Red Cross box," and Argentina respected this neutral zone.
There is nothing in GWSEA requiring or approving such, and there appears to
be no custom - apart from the cartel ship analogy - to permit such.285 Such a
neutral zone may be established for land warfare,286 and demonstrates the
possibility of adaptation ofland war norms for conflict at sea.
On April 7, 1982 the United Kingdom declared a 200-mile Maritime
Exclusion Zone (MEZ), to be effective April 12, for all Argentine shipping
around the Falklands/Malvinas. On April 23 the United Kingdom established a
Defensive Sea Area (DSA) or "defensive bubble" around its task force, warning
that approach by Argentine civil or military aircraft, warships or naval auxiliaries
would be dealt with "appropriately." On May 1, when fighting started in the
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Falklands/Malvinas, the MEZ was changed to a Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ)
for all ships supplying the Argentine war effort; MEZ coverage was extended
on May 7 to all sea areas more than 12 miles off the Argentine coast. Argentina
had declared a 200-mile defense zone (DZ) off its coast and around the
Falklands/Malvinas on April 13, after having protested the British action. MEZ
enforcement capability came on the day of its enforcement.287 Presumably
Argentina could have enforced the DZ ifit had chosen to do so, although after
the cruiser General Belgrano's sinking, Argentine naval forces, except for naval
aviation and possibly submarines, did not figure in the war. On May 11 Argentina
declared all waters of the South Atlantic Ocean a war zone, threatening to attack
any British vessel therein. Apparently the only neutral ship attacked by the
Argentines in the war zone was the Hercules, a Liberian-flag tanker in ballast that
was owned by United States interests. Although the Soviet Union belatedly
protested the lawfulness of the British TEZ, it apparently did not object to the
Argentine DZ, and did observe the U.K. TEZ.288 The United States had
published warnings to U.S. vessels and vessels beneficially owned by u.S.
interests like Hercules two days before she was hit.289 OnJuly 12, active hostilities
in the Falklands/Malvinas ended, but the United Kingdom continued the TEZ
and economic sanctions. Ten days later, the TEZ was lifted, but the United
Kingdom warned Argentina to keep military ships and aircraft away from the
islands, declaring a 150-mile Protection Zone. 290 The TEZ had been relatively
successful, although Argentina succeeded in airlifting supplies in until the last
days of the war. Apparently Argentine sealift efforts failed. 291
(1) Appraisal
Commander Fenrick proposed an analysis in 1986 for legality of the exclusion
zone in the context of the Falklands/Malvinas War and the then ongoing Tanker
War in the Persian Gulf:
If belligerents use exclusion zones, they should publicly declare the existence,
location, and duration of the zones, what is 'excluded from the zone, and the
sanctions likely to be imposed on ships or aircraft entering the zone without
permission, and also provide enough lead time before the zone comes into effect
to allow ships to clear the area. As with blockades, "paper" zones are insufficient.
Belligerents declaring zones should deploy sufficient forces to the zone to make
it "effective," that is, to expose ships or aircraft entering the zone to a significant
probability of encountering submarines, ships, or aircraft engaged in enforcing the
zone. All militarily practicable efforts should be made to employ minimum
sanctions, such as seizure instead of attack on sight. Similarly, all militarily
practicable measures should be taken to ensure proper target identification and to
ensure that only legitimate military objectives, such as military aircraft, warships,
and ships incorporated into the belligerent war effort, are attacked. The emphasis
on what is militarily practicable is important. Sometimes the minimum practicable
sanction will be attack on sight; sometimes ships or aircraft that are not legitimate
military objectives will be attacked because oferrors in target identification. There
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must be a proportional and demonstrable nexus between the zone and the
self-defence requirements of the state establishing the zone.292

He asserted, correctly, that Argentina's 200-mile zone around the
Falklands/Malvinas "was probably adequate and ... its declaration that the entire
South Atlantic was a war zone was disproportionate to its defense requirements
and would affect shipping unconnected with the conflict.,,293 Thus the u.S.
Court of Appeals was correct in assessing liability against Argentina for loss of
the Hercules, a decision reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States on
sovereign immunity grounds?94 Commander Fenrick also says that the 200-mile
British TEZ, although seemingly "an arbitrary interference with the freedom of
navigation of... ships of non-parties to the conflict," was a reasonable temporary
appropriation of a limited area of the high seas away from major shipping routes
for self-defense purposes to prevent non-party clandestine participation in the
conflict. The appropriation was accompanied by adequate notice, did not result
in any casualties to the ships or aircraft of non-parties, and was terminated after
a brief period on July 22, once the British consolidated their position in the
Falklands. The British TEZ was, in the circumstances, compatible with the law
of naval warfare for general wars and with limited warfare trends. 295 Professor
Goldie concurs with the Court of Appeals' and Commander Fenrick's views. 296
War zones as to enemy merchantmen are clearly legitimate so long as they
are proportional to the military effort. 297 Professor Goldie and Admiral Miller
have made the important point that such zones may be justified, even if illegal
in terms of size, duration, etc., if such zones are legitimate reprisals to illegal
acts of adversaries, e.g., the U.S. Pacific Ocean war zone during World War II
and the allied Atlantic war zones during both W orId Wars. Even if a zone
is legal in terms of proportionality, etc., such a lawful zone does not justify
violation of principles of humanitarian law, e.g., shooting survivors in the
water?98 The conflict also saw development of the U.K. view of self-defense in
the Charter era. 299
Besides the development of the law of exclusion zones, the war saw application of traditional principles applicable to capture or attacks on merchant
shipping. The exception to the rule against capture or destruction of coastal
fishing vessel was illustrated in the Nanval capture. The trawler had been used
for intelligence-gathering and was probably too large to be considered a coaster.
The U.K. action was similar to trends during the Korean War, the Chinese civil
war, Vietnam, and the Paracel Islands campaign.300 Use of merchantmen to carry
warfighting/war-sustaining cargoes made such ships liable to attack, and these
vessels became targets as legitimate as the RFA ships. This repeated a trend from
previous conflicts.301 On the other hand, exempted vessels, e.g., hospital ships,
continued to carry the protections they have always enjoyed.302 And the attack
on Hercules, a neutral-flag merchantmen, was illegal under prior practice.303
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(2) Other Trends
On December 10, 1982, the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) was signed. Repeating the U.N. Charter Article 2(4) pledges of
refraining from any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, "or in any manner inconsistent with the
principles ofintemationallaw embodied in the Charter of the United Nations,"
UNCLOS declares that the high seas shall be used only for peaceful purposes. 304
While UNCLOS thus does not apply to armed conflict situations, consideration
of some of its terms remains important for two reasons: UNCLOS continues to
apply to some relationships between belligerents and nonbelligerents, and some
UNCLOS concepts may be urged for law of naval warfare rules. Although
UNCLOS cannot be analyzed in detail,305 certain provisions may be mentioned
briefly. Its terms raise a number of potential issues for war at sea. UNCLOS is
not yet in force and the United States did not sign the treaty, but many of its
provisions have been accepted by the United States as a restatement of state
. 306
practIce.
The high seas are open to all states, as delimited by UNCLOS; freedom of
. . .IS guaranteed .307 "N0 state may v alidly purport to sub·~ect any part 0 f
naVIgatIon
the high .seas to its sovereignty." The 1958 High Seas Convention has similar
terms.308 How should these claims be reconciled with a belligerent's proclamation of a MEZ or a TEZ? Every state has the right to sail ships flying its flag on
the high seas and may set conditions for granting nationality to its ships, for ship
registration, and for the right to fly its flag. As with the 1958 High Seas
. a genume
. li n k b etween t h e State an d t h e SIp.
h· ..309
.
th
ere" must eXIst
C onventIon,
The recent draft U.N. Ship Registration Convention would elaborate on the
UNCLOS genuine link principles.31o Will or should these provisions impact
the "flag only" rule? Professor Wolfrum has stated that they do not?11 UNCLOS
also provides for the right of approach and visit, for pirates, slavers and narcotics
trafficking, except for warships and vessels "used only on government non-commercial service," which have complete immunity.312 These provisions, in terms
of procedures and immunities, appear congruent with the principles of naval
warfare except, of course, the right of belligerents to attack and destroy enemy
warships and naval auxiliaries, and the conditional right to attack enemy
merchant ships. Other UNCLOS provisions declare the right to fish on the high
seas subject to other treaty obligations, rights of coastal states, and the obligation
to conserve high seas resources. 313 There are also requirements for preserving
and protecting the marine environment.314 These parallel principles of the 1977
Environmental Modification Convention and Protocol 1,315 and these UNCLOS principles might be invoked by neutrals.316
The response to all ~hese questions, which might arise in the context of
nonbelligerent states' claims, is met by UNCLOS Article 87(1), which subjects
high seas usage to "conditions laid down by this Convention [UNCLOS] and
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by other rules of intemationallaw,,,317 i.e., the rules of anned conflict at sea,
among other norms; there is a parallel provision in the 1958 High Seas
Convention.318 To the extent that UNCLOS incorporates by reference other
treaties,319 UNCLOS is subject to the treaty law of naval warfare, e.g., the 1907
Hague Convention IX regarding capture during naval war. 320 Thus, UNCLOS
stands on the same footing as the 1958 High Seas Convention; it is a treaty for
those party to it - and important naval powers like the United States are not with important exceptions to it.321 To the extent that UNCLOS Article 87(1)
represents a customary nonn - and about 30 years ofpractice under the analogous
provision of the High Seas Convention would seem to have ripened the treaty
rule into a customary nonn - the result is the same for nations not party to
UNCLOS, such as the United States. The provision, in Article 88 ofUNCLOS,
that the high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes,322 must be read as
subject to the Article 87(1) limitation. This is congruent with UNCLOS Article
301, "Peaceful uses of the seas," which provides:
In exercising their rights and perfonning their duties under this Convention, States
Parties shall refrain from any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the princll'les of international law embodied in the Charter of the United
Nations.3

Thus the law of the sea and naval warfare stands on the same footing as the law
ofland warfare and the U.N. Charter. States are subject to the Charter, including
rights of self-defense under Article 51 and perhaps under customary law.
UNCLOS governs uses of the sea, subject to other rules of international law,
i.e., the law of naval warfare.324
Appearing in 1982, Professor O'Connell's IntemationalLAw of the Sea traced
the evolution of the rules evolving from World War II, and the traditional list
of exceptions from attack, e.g., fishing boats, hospital ships, etc.325 O'Connell
notes the military necessity principle, distinguishing between situations where
overt activity (e.g., killing survivors of a sinking) would be illegal, and passive
action (e.g., failure to pick up survivors of a sinking because oflegitimate fear of
being attacked by the enemy), which would be legal. He believes that "like other
mediating rules, 'military necessity' does not annul the principle [of humanity] ,
and must be stricdy construed and applied ifit is not to do so.,,326 He seems to
take no clear position beyond World War II practice on the issue of sinking
anned enemy merchant vessels, that submarines were exempted from the duties
imposed on surface raiders. 327 While restating the traditional rule that a ship's
"enemy character is indicated by the flag ... it is entided to fly [, t]hat is now
to be read with the modem rules for attributing nationality to ships[,]" i.e.,
apparendy with the genuine link theory,328 discussed and criticized earlier in the
peacetime law of the sea context.329 As long as an exclusion zone has been
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publicized and neutral shipping is not put unduly at risk, O'Connell would justify
an exclusion zone as a reasonable means of self_defense.33o
G. The Iran-Iraq War, 1980_88331
When Iraq invaded Iran on September 22, 1980, Iran declared Persian Gulf
waters up to 40 miles offher coasts a war zone (officially titled an "exclusion
zone"), announced new shipping lanes through the Strait of Hormuz,
prohibited all transportation of materials to Iraqi ports, and warned of retaliations
if Persian Gulf nations gave Iraq facilities. 332 Iraq responded in early October,
declaring that the Persian Gulfnorth of29°30'N was a "prohibited war zone."
This was the area for the Tanker War until March 1984.333 Iranian bomb attacks
closed Iraq's oil terminals and blocked all ofIraq's commercial ports at the start
of the war, thus forcing Iraq to use pipelines to non-Iraqi ports to send out oil
or accept war-sustaining goods through other means, i.e., nearby neutral
ports.334 "Whether classified as absolute or conditional contraband, oil and the
armaments which its sale or barter on international markets [brought], were
absolutely essential to the war efforts of the Persian Gulfbelligerents." Neither
side declared contraband lists, nor were high seas blockades instituted, although
the Iranian exclusion zone, covering the Shatt al-Arab littoral, was in affect a
blockade ofIraq's small coastline.335 No prize courts were established.336 Iran
did patrol the Gulf in 1981, interrogating ships thought to be carrying contraband. A Kuwaiti survey ship and a Danish freighter were seized on suspicion
of contraband, but both vessels were let go. Iraq protested seizure of the Danish
ship as a flagrant violation of international law. Iran was careful, however, to
avoid provoking its neighbors or major Western powers, being dependent on
trans-shipments from the United Arab Emirates and food imports through the
Gu1£337 The Danish vessel, the Elsa Cat, had been taken in the Strait ofHormuz;
Iran declared that its navy "guarantee[d] the security of all ships in the Strait
... but will not allow Iraq or anybody else to abuse this wartime situation to
carry war materials for Iraq. ,,338
In September 1980, the United States, after pledging "strict neutrality," had
declared that it intended to do what was necessary, including naval action, to
keep open the Strait ofHormuz. By October 15, at least 60 Australian, French,
U.K. and U.S. warships were in the Indian Ocean to protect the Strait oil route;
there were 29 Soviet vessels in the area. 339 The U.N. Security Council passed
Resolution 479, calling for cessation of hostilities, also in September 1980.340
In late 1981, President Reagan reaffirmed and expanded the Carter Doctrine
to include a U.S. interest in dealing with any threat to Saudi Arabia and a
readiness to keep the Strait ofHormuz open ifIran tried to stop shipping there.
The international aspect of this U.S. critical defense zone (CDZ) was undoubtedly lawful in its premise of defense from external aggression and the open nature
ofits communication.341 Moreover, the CDZ was definite in its boundaries and
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proportional to the interest protected, i.e., the flow of Gulf oil to the West and
to Japan. (Saudi Arabia produces about 20 percent of the Earth's oil consumption.)
By early 1982, Iraq could only export oil through the trans-Turkey pipeline;
Syria closed the Iraqi pipeline to the Mediterranean.342 OnJanuary 14, of that
year, Iraq issued a warning to international shipping "to keep clear of the western
part of the Gulf as any ships traveling in that area would be treated the same way
as three vessels which Iraq claimed to have sunk on Jan[uary] 11 as they were
leaving the Iranian port of Bandar Khomeni." On March 10, it was reported
that Iraq had mined the channel linking this port and the port ofBandar Mashahr
with the open sea. An Iranian tanker had been lost in February, probably due
to mines. 343
On August 12, 1982, Iraq announced its Gulf Maritime Exclusion Zone
(GMEZ) and two days later warned foreign shipping to stay clear of Iranian
waters in the upper Gulf, including waters around Kharg Island, from which
Iran was exporting up to 2 million barrels of petroleum a day to finance the war
effort. On August 29, Iran responded, declaring it would protect foreign shipping,
begin escorting foreign shipping, and deployed ships with surface-to-air missiles
at Kharg. Iran began giving naval protection to shuttle convoys of Iranian-flag
and neutral flag merchantmen that lifted oil from Iran's northern Gulf ports to
those farther down the shore for world export. Iraq conducted air strikes against
these convoys throughout 1982, 1983 and 1984.344 When Iraq bombed Iran's
Nowruz oil offihore installations 40 miles west ofKharg Island in March 1983,
a large oil slick resulted. Although early reports that the slick had equalled the
area ofBelgium were later discounted, it was big enough to threaten desalination
plants in Bahrain, Qatar and Saudi Arabia before strong winds blew it offihore
and partially dispersed it. Fish imports into the UAE were stopped because they
were oil-contaminated. Iraq rejected Iran's request for a partial truce so that oil
cappers could try to stop the 2,000 to 5,000 barrels per day flow. 345 Because of
the Iraqi attacks on Gulf oil shipping, the London-based War Risks Rating
Committee raised the rates for marine cargo insurance in 1982 and 1984.346
Early in 1982, Iraq bombed the Nowruz offihore oilfield installations, causing
an oil slick in the Gulf; previously Iraq had bombed Iran's Kharg Island
installations. An Iranian convoy of neutral flag tankers was hit by Iraqi aircraft.
Throughout 1983 and early 1984, Iranian Navy-escorted convoys were hit. 347
In September 1982 the Arab Summit urged an end to the war and compliance
with the Security Council resolutions. 348 In 1983 and 1984, the Council again
called for a ceasefire, condemning the Iranian attacks, and affirming the right to
free navigation and commerce in the Gul£349 By now the United States had
established its Central Command;350 France, Great Britain and the USSR were
also maintaining a presence in the Indian Ocean.351 The USSR and other nations
proposed a U.N. naval force to patrol the GuI£352 The United States announced
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new self-defense measures for its warships in Notices to Mariners and Notices
to Airmen in January 1984; the measures were justified on self-defense grounds
when Iran protested. 353
In 1984, the GMEZ was extended to 50 miles around Kharg Island; the war
was moving down the Gul£ Tankers were hit at Kharg. Iraq attacked neutral-flag
vessels by aircraft and mining outside the GMEZ. Iran attacked neutral flag
tankers on the high seas and in Saudi territorial waters; some were in ballast,
some were destined for or headed from Saudi ports, and others were carrying
Kuwaiti crude. Although there was a U.N.-sponsored ceasefire from June 1984
to March 1985, the attacks continued episodically. In May 1985 Iran again began
attacking tankers bound to or from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. In June and
September 1985, the Iranian Navy intercepted and detained two Kuwaiti ships;
in September Iran's visit and search procedures, looking for Iraq-bound strategic
materials, were stepped up. Ships stopped included Chinese, Danish, German,
Kuwaiti, U.K. and U.S.-flag merchantmen. Some vessels bound for the United
Arab Emirates were diverted by Iran to Bandar Abbas. A French warship began
the precedent of defense of French-flag merchant ships in October. It positioned
itself between the French merchantman Ville d'Angers and an Iranian warship,
warning the latter that it would use force if the Iranian tried to intercept Ville
d'Angers. (French rules of engagement declared that French warships would fire
on forces refusing to break off attacks on neutral merchantmen under attack; the
result had been a drop in attacks near French men-of-war.) Nevertheless, France
announced that its navy would not convoy French tankers. In Apri11986, aU.S.
destroyer similarly had warned an Iranian warship off what may have been a
planned boarding of the S.S. President McKinley, a U.S.-flag merchantman. By
Apri11987, Iran had searched 1200 ships over the previous 18 months and had
confiscated 30 cargoes. It was becoming clear that although Iran could not close
the Strait by military action, it might succeed in scaring off enough shipping to
make a difference. Iran began to shuttle oil, which it sold to finance the war,
down the coast from Kharg Island to the Sirri oil terminal.354 Despite the action
of the U.S. destroyer, the United States had recognized that "there is a basis in
international law for ship searches by belligerents" in March 1986.355 The United
Kingdom had stated inJanuary 1986 that a right of visit and search was an aspect
of self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.356 The Netherlands
similarly recognized a right of visit and search, but only as to ships proceeding
to and from belligerents' ports.357 Only in 1987 did Iran enact legislation
concerning prize law. By that time the GCC states - e.g., Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia - had been regarded as having "unbelligerent" status.358
In 1982, U.N. Secl!-rity Council Resolutions 514 and 522 called for an end
to the war. Resolution 540 (1983) approved "the right of free navigation and
commerce in international waters, call[ed] upon all States to respect this right
and also call[ed] upon the belligerents to cease ... hostilities in •.. the Gulf,
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including all sea-lanes, navigable waterways ... and to respect the integrity of
the other littoral States.... " Resolution 552 ofJune 1, 1984 repeated the call
for "the right offree navigation," specifically condemning recent (i.e., Iranian)
attacks on commercial ships en route to and from states not party to the
conflict.359
In the summer of 1984, mines detonated in the Gulf of Suez and the Strait
ofBab el Mandeb, damaging several ships. Although Iran along with Libya was
accused oflaying the mines, Iran denied the charges, and it is thought that the
Libyan cargo ship Ghat laid them. Egypt exercised its rights under the Constantinople Convention360 to inspect all shipping, and a half dozen nations' navies
cooperated in locating and destroying the mines, clearly illegally laid under
internationallaw?61
One more Security Council resolution called for a ceasefire in late 1986?62
In August Iraq bombed Iran's Sirri terminal for the first time; the war was moving
further down the Gulf toward the Strait ofHonnuz. A British-registered, Hong
Kong-owned tanker was badly damaged at Sirri. Iran's Lavan and Larak terminals
were then hit. In November Iran hit the United Arab Emirates' Abu al-Bakoush
oil installations.363 In September 1986, Iran had fired on, stopped and searched
the Soviet merchant ship Pyotr Emtsov, bound for Kuwait with arms ultimately
destined for Iraq. The USSR protested the incident. Both belligerents continued
to attack merchantmen in the Gulf, regardless ofcargo or destination. The USSR
sent a Krivak-class frigate to escort four Soviet vessels carrying arms to Iraq from
the Straits of Honnuz to Kuwait, signalling to the belligerents that the USSR
would protect Soviet-flag ships. The Kitty Hawk carrier battle group deployed off
Oman in the Indian Ocean, the United Kingdom and France increased their
ship activity, and the U.K. Indian Ocean (i.e., Annilla) squadron began to spend
half its time in the Gu1£364 The U.K. position on the Gulf shifted in 1986,
however, from statements ofBritish "neutrality" in the "war" to U.K. "impartiality" in "armed conflict," partly to attempt to ensure that the law of blockade
would not be applied to the detriment of British shipping.365
Besides traditional seaborne boardings, Iran began using helicopters for visit
and search.366 Some merchantmen began to carry chaff canisters to confuse
incoming missiles, while others were being repainted dull, non-reflective gray
for the same reason. Although most merchant ships remained unanned, a U.S.
helicopter reported coming under missile fire from a Greek ship. Iran reportedly
completed testing Chinese antiship Silkwonn missiles, and the United States
again expressed concern over keeping the Strait ofHonnuz open. Press reports
said that the Iranian Air Force had established a suicide plane squadron to attack
merchant shipping like the Japanese kamikazi flights of World War 11.367 Clearly
the Gulfwas becoming a more dangerous place as all actors prepared new tactics
and new technologies. In May 1987, Kuwait and the United States began
negotiations leading to transfer of 11 tankers from the Kuwaiti to the U.S. flag.
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An Iranian patrol boat fired on and damaged another Soviet merchantman, the
Ivan Koroteav. The United States and Kuwait completed reflagging arrangements,
having preempted the USSR, which had to settle for chartering three of its
tankers to Kuwait; the charters were renewed into 1988.368 Although assailed
in some quarters, the U.S. re-flagging comported with internationallaw.369 In
mid-May, one of the USSR tankers hit a mine, said by the Soviets to have been
placed by Iran. A day later, on May 17, U.S.S. Stark was hit by Iraqi fighterlaunched Exocet missiles. 370 The United States began revising its Rules of
Engagement for possible interactions between U.S. and Iraq's forces and,
incidentally, anyone else displaying hostile intent or committing hostile acts.
U.S. forces in the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulfwere augmented.
The President ordered a higher state of alert for u.s. naval forces in the area and
warned the belligerents that u.s. warships would fire if their aircraft approached
u.s. vessels in a manner indicating hostile intent, unless they provided adequate
notification of their intentions.
The warning was published to the international community through the issuance
of a Notice to Mariners and a similar Notice to Airmen, warning ships and aircraft
that u.s. Navy vessels in the Persian Gulf, Strait ofHormuz, Gulf of Oman, and
North Arabian Sea were taking additional defensive precautions in response to
the Stark attack and the continuing terrorist threat in the region. The Notice to
Mariners requested ships and other vessels to establish radio contact with u.s.
forces on prescribed international radio frequencies and to identify themselves and
state their intentions as soon as they were detected. It advised that, in order to
avoid inadvertent confrontation, ships and craft, including military vessels, might
be requested to change course to remain well clear of u.s. naval vessels. The
notice warned that failing to respond to requests for identification and intentions,
or to warnings or a request to remain clear, and operating in a threatening manner
could place the ship or craft at risk by u.s. defensive measures. It also advised that
illumination of u.s. naval vessels with weapons fire control radar would be
viewed with "suspicion" and could result in immediate defensive reaction. Finally,
it stressed the u.s. forces would remain mindful of navigational considerations of
ships and craft in their immediate vicinity, especially when operating in confined
waters.
With a few exceptions, the Notice to Mariners and the Notice to Airmen [were]
successful in reducing the risk of an inadvertent confrontation with other ships
and aircraft. The notices [struck] a reasonable balance between high seas freedom
of navigation and overflight and the inherent right of self-defense in protecting
371
U.S. naval vessels from a belligerent or terrorist attack.

InJuly, the United States began convoying re-flagged tankers. The United States
announced that its actions were consistent with international law, which
recognized the right of a neutral to escort and protect ships flying its flag which
did not carry contraband. The United States added that its ships would not be
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carrying oil from Iraq and that neither Iran nor Iraq would thus have any basis
for taking hostile actions against u.s. warships or the vessels they protected. If
a Gulfbelligerent attempted to conduct visit and search of a U.S.-flag vessel
under protection ofa u.s. man-of-war, the u.s. would examine the ship's cargo
and would certify absence of contraband, thereby paralleling the rules of the
unratified 1909 London Declaration. In August the re-flagged S. S. Bridgeton hit
a mine; the u.s. Navy began providing mine protection.372 On September 21,
1987, the u.s. Navy caught the Iran Ajr laying mines in the shipping lanes and
sank it, arguing that this was done in self-defense.373
The U.K. position on the war was different from that of France or the United
States:
Britain [did] not, on the whole, [refer] to the traditional law of war and neutrality
at sea. Instead, it [had] couched its pronouncements in terms of freedom of
navigation and the law of self-defense, based on Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.
So enthusiastic [was] the British Government about basing its statements on this
provision that the General Council ofBritish Shipping (GCBS), which distributes
guidance notes to its members, actually [reproduced] the text of Article 51 to be
passed on to masters of British merchant ships entering the Gul£ Emphasis on
Article 51 rather than the traditional law [was] particularly apparent in certain
statements concerning visit and search. When the British merchant ship Barber
Persells was stopped by Iranians in January 1986 and forced into an Iranian port,
the British Government explained its position in this way.
The United Kingdom upholds the general principle of freedom ofnavigation on the high seas. However, under Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter, a State, such as Iran, actively engaged in an armed conflict, is
entitled in exercise of its inherent right of self defense to stop and search a
foreign merchant ship on the high seas, if there is reasonable ground for
suspecting that the ship is taking arms to the other side for use in the conflict.
This is an exceptional right: if the suspicions prove to be unfounded and if
the ship has not committed acts calculated to give rise to suspicion, then the
ship's owners have a good claim for compensation for loss caused by the
delay.
The general advice given by the Foreign Office and reproduced in the GCBS
guidance notes of advice [was] that even if a ship [was] not carrying any
contraband, it [was] usually better to submit to visit and search by the Iranian Navy
and to point out to the Iranian officer conducting the search that ifhis suspicions
[proved] to be unfounded and unreasonable, then the ship's owners [would] have
'
a right to compensation.
The United Kingdom [had] protested against Iran's detention of ships on several
occasions, not so much for exercising the right to visit and search per se, but for
the delays that have occurred and, in some cases, on occasions where the Foreign
Office believed an exercise of visit and search could not have been occasioned
reasonably by suspicions ofa ship carrying prohibited goods. Nevertheless, unlike
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the French and U.S. Governments, the British Government [had] made no
attempt to say that its warships would certify whether ships were carrying
prohibited goods, and British warships [had] not intervened to prevent the exercise
of visit and search. Nor [had] British pronouncements referred to the exercise of
belligerent ri~ts by Iran. They [had] been couched instead in terms of reference
to Article 51. 74

The Annilla Patrol began "accompanying" U.K. shipping - i.e., those vessels of
U.K. registry or registered in a U.K. colony or dependent territory (e.g., Hong
Kong), but not Commonwealth-registered ships - (e.g., Singapore) - and flag of
convenience vessels whose majority ownership is British or in a British colony
or dependence-as far north as Bahrain. U.K. protection did not extend to ships
crewed by British mariners or to ships with no connection to the United
Kingdom, as France and the United States were later prepared to do. The U.K.
rules of engagement adhered to Britain's view that U.N. Charter, Article 51,
governed any U.K. response: "The rules ofengagement [were] intended to avoid
escalation, although the varied nature of potential threat and the possibility of
surprise attack are recognized and the inherent right of self-defence of Royal
Navy ships or British merchant vessels under their protection, is not circumscribed or prejudiced." The result would have posed "interesting questions"
as to whether a U.K. warship could have defended U.K. merchantmen, as
defined above, or British-crewed ships. One "practical solution" might be that
an atta~ on the merchant vessel "might reasonably be perceived as an attack on
the warship as well. In that situation, the warship [would] be able to defend itself
and in doing so defend the merchant vessel accompanying it. ,,375
All commentators seem to have agreed on the illegality of Iran's use of
unanchored mines, particularly in shipping lanes. The same is true for mines laid
in the Red Sea in 1984. While a state may mine a defense area along its coast
with due notice of the minefield, employment of drifting mines is not lawfu1.376
By mid-1987, Iran had attacked nearly 100 ships of 30 nationalities, using
aircraft, helicopters, small boats and warships as platforms. Iraq had attacked over
200 vessels, mostly those owned or chartered by Iran.377 In late May 1987, the
USSR had sent three minesweepers to join its two frigates that had been on
patrol in the Gulf since 1986.378 The June Venice Economic Summit of major
Western powers andJapan "agree[d] that new and concerted international efforts
[were] urgently required to bring the Iran-Iraq war to an end." Besides calling
upon the belligerents to end the war and supporting the U.N., the Summit
"reaffirmed that the principle of freedom of navigation in the Gulf is of
paramount importance for us and for others and must be upheld. The free flow
of oil and other traffic through the Strait ... must continue unimpeded." The
Summit pledged to consult on ways to pursue these important goals effectively.379 On July 20, the Security Council, calling for a cease-fire, "deplor[ed] ...
the . . . attacks on neutral shipping . . . , the violation of international
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humanitarian law and other laws of armed conflict," demanded that Iran and
Iraq "discontinue all military actions on land, at sea and in air." The Council
called on other nations "to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any
act which [might] lead to further escalation and widening of the conflict[.],,38o
In August Great Britain and France agreed to send minesweepers to the Gulf,
and by September Italian, Belgian and Netherlands ships were on the way.381
In October 1987, the United States responded to an Iranian Silkworm missile
attack on a U.S. re-flagged tanker, S.S. Sea Isle City, in Kuwaiti waters by
destroying offihore oil rigs used as an Iranian gunboat base. The United States
justified its attack on self-defense grounds, while others argued it was a "carefully
calculated reprisal," bringing the United States in on Iraq's side.382 The U.S.
strike was stated to be in specific response to the Iranian attack on Sea Isle City;
any connection with the Iranian attack on the S.S. Sungari, which had occurred
the day before Sea Isle City was hit, was avoided. Although Sungari was
beneficially U.S.-owned, it flew the Liberian flag. 383 This established some
precedent, at least for that stage of the war, that the United States did not consider
open registry ships, even if owned by U.S. interests, to have enough U.S.
connection to merit protection. That view changed as the war deepened.J 84 In
any event, in the destruction of the rigs, the U.S. response followed Charter era
criteria for self-defense: it was proportional, in that only the source of the attacks
- the host platforms - was destroyed and it was necessary, to remove a continued
· .
It was not a repns
. al·
. 385 A
d ·mCI·dent
treat
to neu tral sh Ippmg.
SItuatIOn.
secon
h
came the next month.
In November 1987, a U.S. Navy frigate fired on a small boat that approached an
American tanker. The boat did not fire at the tanker but ignored warning shots
and closed to within 500 yards. The boat turned out to be an unarmed Arab fishing
boat, not an Iranian patrol boat. The boat was hit and one person on board was
killed. The incident occurred between the coast of the United Arab Emirates and
Abu Musa Island, a small island from which Iranian speedboats had carried out
raids on Gulf shipping. The United States again relied on the inherent right of
self-defense under international law as the basis for its actions. 386

Fishing boats, if employed as such, are exempt from capture and destruction.387
This was not the issue here; it was a case of mistaken identity under suspicious
circumstances. The U.S. plea of self-defense was justified, particularly in view
of the warning shots that no one could ignore. 388
In November, the Arab League Extraordinary Summit Conference "expressed
anxiety at the continuation of the war and voiced ... indignation at [Iran's]
intransigence, provocations and threats to the Arab Gulf States." The Summit
"condemned Iran's ... procrastination in accepting ... Resolution 598 ...
[and] called on Iran to accept the Resolution and implement it in toto . ... " The
international community was asked to "shoulder its responsibilities, exert
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effective international efforts and adopt measures adequate to make [Iran]
respond to the calls for peace." Iraq's acceptance of Resolution 598 and its
positive response to peace initiatives were appreciated. The Summit confirmed
support for Iran's defense of its territory and "legitimate rights" and declared
solidarity with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. 389 That same month Iran adopted,
apparently for the first time, what amounted to a declaration of contraband:
On November 17, 1987, Iran adopted a law according to which all goods
belonging to states at war with Iran were liable to capture and condemnation.
Goods belonging to neutral states or to neutral or enemy nationals were liable to
capture if they fell into certain categories. The first of these categories concerned
goods the transport of which to enemy territory was prohibited altogether. The
second concerned goods destined, direcdy or indirecdy, for enemy territory, if
390
they effectively contributed to sustain the enemy's war effort.

This did not of course cover the circumstances of destruction, without warning,
of neutral merchantmen, or indeed of destruction of enemy merchant ships.
In December 1987, a U.S. warship helped rescue a Cypriot crew after an
Iranian gunboat attack set their tanker ablaze, one of many such attacks in the
renewed war in the Gul£ Tanker captains began tailing convoys or simulating
them during night steaming?91 On April 14, 1988, U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts hit
a mine in a field laid in international waters. In response the United States
attacked Iranian oil platforms that had been supporting attacks on neutral
shipping on April 18. Four days later Iranian naval units attacked U.S. naval
vessels, which destroyed or damaged most of the attackers?92 By this time five
European NATO allies - Belgium, Britain, France, Italy and the Netherlandshad sent more than 40 warships to the Gulf for escort and mine suppression
duty?93 The United States began extending protection to neutral ships in
distress, if those vessels were outside war/exclusion zones, were not carrying
contraband, and were not resisting legitimate visit and search by a Persian Gulf
belligerent, on April 29.394 This action also comported with internationallaw.395
In May, Iraqi aircraft hit Iran's Larak oil terminal in the Strait ofHormuz; Sea wise
Giant, Liberian-registered and the world's largest supertanker, was among five
ships hit. 396 In July 1988, a week after the Airbus incident of July 3, U.S.
ship-based helicopters attacked Iranian gunboats that had set afire a Panamanianregistered tanker owned by Japanese interests.397
On the diplomatic front, Saudi Arabia had broken diplomatic relations with
Iran in April 1988. In June the second Arab League Extraordinary Summit
reaffirmed its 1987 communique on the war. 398 By mid-June, however, Great
Britain and France had restored diplomatic relations with Iran. Saudi Arabia
announced a $12-$30 billion arms deal with Great Britain, which included 6 to 8
minesweepers. Iran announced acceptance of U.N. Security Council Resolution
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598 on July 18, and the U.N. Secretary-General announced a ceasefire effective
August 20, 1988.399
The United States announced the end of escorted convoy operations in the
Gulfin October 1988.400 In January 1989, "de-flagging" procedures for reverting the tankers to the Kuwaiti ensign began. 401 By that time, the Western naval
presence in the Gulf had been reduced sharply.402
(1) Appraisal
Commander Fenrick has summarized the Tanker War:
The Iran-Iraq conflict was a major war, not a small war. For the only time since
World War II, deliberate and sustained operations were carried out against
merchant ships. As a general statement, prior to March 1984, Iraq attacked all
vessels in a proclaimed exclusion zone at the northern end of the Gul£ From
March 1984 until the end of the conflict, Iraq switched the focus ofits anti-shipping campaign in an effort to attack the weak link in Iran's war economy and to
arouse world interest in the conflict. Iraq directed most ofits attacks against tankers,
most of them neutral and unconvoyed, sailing to or from Kharg Island, the very
heavily defended main Iranian oil terminal, located towards the northern end of
the Persian Gul£ All the Iraqi attacks were delivered by shore-based aircraft and
almost all involved the use of air launched missiles. Iraq appears to have devoted
minimal effort to obtaining visual identification of the target before missile launch,
with the result that accidents, such as the Iraqi attack on the USS Stark, did occur.
Iran does not appear to have begun attacking commercial shipping until Iraq
commenced its anti-tanker campaign in 1984. Since there was no sea traffic with
Iraq, Iran attacked neutral merchant shipping destined to and from neutral ports
in the Gulf, presumably in an effort to persuade Iraq's financial backers, the other
Gulf states, to dissuade Iraq from its campaign against the Kharg Island tankers.
Iran's attacks on merchant shipping were less numerous than those ofIraq and, in
general, less costly in lives and property damage because they were conducted
with rockets instead of missiles. In addition, it is understood that Iran devoted
more effort to target identification than did Iraq. On the other hand, Iran did not
conduct its attacks in declared exclusion zones and some ofits attacks were carried
403
out in neutral territorial waters.

The result was the largest loss of merchant ships and merchant seamen's lives
since W orId War II:
Throughout the eight year course of the Gulf War, Iran and Iraq [had] attacked
more than 400 commercial vessels, almost all ofwhich were neutral State flagships.
Over 200 merchant seamen [had] lost their lives because of these attacks. In
material terms, the attacks [had] resulted in excess of 40 million dead weight tons
of damaged shipping. Thirty-one of the attacked merchants were sunk, and
another 50 declared total losses. For 1987 alone, the strikes against commercial
shipping numbered 178, with a resulting death toll of 108. In relative terms, by
the end of1987, write-offlosses in the Gulf War stood at nearly half the tonnage
of merchant shipping sent to the bottom in World War II. In all, ships flying the
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flags of more than 30 different countries, including each of the pennanent
members of the United Nations Security Council, [had] been subjected to attacks.
Only about one or two percent of the ship voyages in the Gulfinvolved attacks,
however. 404 Nevertheless, in terms of percentage of losses due to maritime
casualties worldwide, the statistics were "staggering." During 1982, the first year
of the Tanker War, 47 percent ofall Liberian-flag tonnage losses due to maritime
casualty occurred in the Gul£ In 1986, the figure was 99 percent; in 1987, more
than 90 percent, and the final percentages may have gone higher due to late
declaration of constructive total losses. (Most of the Gulf tanker traffic flew flags
of convenience, and a third were owned by u.s. nationals, with another
substantial portion under charter to u.s. nationals.) Insured losses by marine
underwriters were heavy, reaching $30 million in one month, with resulting
tremendous increases in war risk premiums. If there were
any good things [that could] be said of this conflict, they [were] that the Gulf War
[became] the principal factor in reducing the overtonnaging of the world oil tanker
fleet and in aiding a recovery of the tanker market, and second, that tremendous
advances in marine firefighting equipment and techniques [were] directly attributable to recent experience in the GuI£
To a government expert, "this [was] too thin a silver lining to justify the
cloud. ,,405 Iran attacked ships of more 32 national flags, while Iraqi attacks mostly
concentrated on vessels flagged or chartered by Iran. Iraq concentrated on
attacking ships within the Iranian war zone, while Iran attacked vessels mostly
in the lower Gulf, outside its or Iraq's zones. Iraq tended to shoot first and identify
later, while Iran conducted careful vessel reconnaissance and specific vessel
identification. Iraq used aircraft for all its attacks, while Iran employed conventional aircraft, helicopters and surface warships or small boats, the latter manned
by Revolutionary Glfard forces. 406 Iraq was never able to produce a major
interruption in Iran's oil exports to finance the war. The Tanker War was the
most important part of the fighting at sea. 407
Writing in 1986, before the war had ended, Commander Fenrick noted that
"It [was] futile to discuss exclusion zones used in this conflict utilizing presumed
limited war standards, as both belligerents probably [had] gone beyond the
standards hitherto considered permissible in general war." Because it was
debatable that unconvoyed neutral tankers could have been considered as part
of Iran's war effort, Commander Fenrick asserted that "Iraqi practice in using
exclusion zones touche[d] the outer limits oflega! acceptability and may well
[have] overstep[ped] the boundary." Iran's conduct in attacking neutral ships
outside the declared war zones and occasionally in neutral waters "was so
flagrantly contrary to the laws of maritime warfare that nothing can be said in
defence ofit."
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Even if one concedes that the other Gulf states [were] providing financial support
to Iraq, it does not appear possible to consider the neutral ships engaged in traffic
with these states to be incorporated into the Iraqi war effort. Iran's desire to take
action to force Iraq to refrain from attacking the Kharg Island tanker traffic [did]
not legitimize its actions. It is somewhat surprising that the actions of Iran and
Iraq in the Persian Gulf[did] not generate a stronger, or at least more vociferous,
response on the part of other states. It is presumed the relative lack of response is
owing to the desire of the superpowers to avoid conflict with each other in a
sensitive area, and to the facts that there is a tanker surplus and an oil glut, that
the tankers attacked usually belong[ed] to flag of convenience states, and that the
408
loss of life [had] been relatively limited.

Another author believes that the Iranian war zone, being more "defensive" in
nature, was valid under international law.409 Professor Goldie's excellent analysis
would say, however, that both sides' zones were disproportionate and therefore
illegal.410 Professor Dinstein, while granting that war zones have been grafted
onto the law of maritime warfare, would say that "the so-called exclusion zones
[were] not proper war zones," because they were not mined or regularly
patrolled, and there were no safe sea lanes for regulated neutral shipping. 411
While it is true that neither belligerent had traditional naval forces sufficient to
conduct routine patrols, he does not account for the air surveillance.
Neither Iran nor Iraq published contraband lists. Nevertheless, it is clear that
both nations considered petroleum exports critical to financing the war. 412 The
war was also a "total war" insofar as the adversaries were concerned,413 and a
major conflict insofar as global standards can measure it. 414 The result is that Iraq
was justified in attacking enemy (i.e., Iranian) merchant ships, if loaded with
war-fighting/war-sustaining cargoes (e.g., oil) outbound from Iranian ports. 415
Iraq was also justified in attacking neutral merchantmen convoyed by Iranian
warships,416 particularly if those ships carried war-fighting/war-sustaining cargoes. Neutral vessels carrying such cargo for the Iranian war effort and steaming
alone were likewise subject to attack by Iraq.417 It has been argued that Iraqi
attacks on merchantmen within the Iranian exclusion zone were not indiscriminate:
Can the Iraqi air attacks on merchant shipping be labeled as indiscriminate because
they do not identify the targets visually before launching missiles? I believe not.
First, the Iranian exclusion zone ... made the Iraqi Air Force's target identification
easier. Iraqi Air Force pilots apparently assume[d] that any large radar return from
a ship located within the Iranian exclusion zone must be a tanker carrying, or
destined to carry, Iranian oil. And second, there ... [was] no evidence that any
41S
protected vessels •.. [were] found within the Iranian exclusion zone.

Fortuitously, Iraq pumped most ofits oil to sell and sustain its war effort through
pipelines to Syria, Saudi Arabia and Turkey and thence to the outside world, or
financed its war effort through Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. (Whether Kuwait and

170

Targeting Enemy Merchant Shipping

Saudi Arabia had anus-length bargains with Iraq, or acted out of fear of their
powerful neighbor, or otherwise, is less than clear.) The result was that Kuwait,
and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia, were selling oil and turning over some of
the proceeds to Iraq as loans. 419 Clearly the cash or its equivalent to Iraq could
have been seized as part of its war effort, but equally clearly the oil, sold to
neutrals and carried in neutral tankers, could not be attacked. Thus, the Iranian
attacks on neutral merchantmen were illegal; "[a]n attack upon a neutral
merchant ship known to be engaged in inter-neutral trade [in this war, e.g.,
between Kuwait and an oil-consumer nation] [was,] therefore, a violation of
~1
•
. ~_1
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law. ,,420 M oreover, warsh·IpS 0 f neUU"'dl
421
merchantmen.
Thus the United States was legally justified in convoying the
re-flagged tankers, and indeed other neutral nations' merchantmen. U.S. convoying carried with it the right ofself-defense,422 and thus the U.S. responses
(e.g., shooting back) were legally justified if they satisfied the criteria of proportionality, which was clearly the case. This was a continuation of trends in other
conflicts of the era. 423 The conflict included interactions with merchant ships in
coastal states' EEZs; since the EEZ is part of the high seas, such interactions (e.g.,
visit and search, etc.) were as legitimate as if the situation occurred on the high
seas. 424
The result may seem anomalous, in that Iraq received a net benefit from the
operation of the law of neutrality. Its war effort could be financed, albeit
indirecdy, by neutral tanker traffic carrying Kuwaiti and Saudi oil for sale on
world markets, while Iran could be condemned for its attacks on such vessels
while suffering legally-justified attacks on its tankers, and the tankers of other
neutrals carrying Iranian crude. Nevertheless, this is the result. As Professor
Tucker put it most apdy, "[t]he fact that the exercise made of these neutral rights
thereby places one of the belligerent at a disadvantage with respect to its
opponent does not provide the disadvantaged belligerent with a lawful basis for
· · th
h b·~ect 0 f d·Iscnnunatory
. .
cIaImIng
at 'It h as b een ma d e teo
measures. ,,425

(2) Other Trends
Several major research efforts appeared as the Tanker War ended: Professor
Levie's Code ciflntemational Anned C01iflict (1986); the Restatement (Third), Foreign
Relations LAw cifthe United States (1988), NWP 9A (1989), and roundtables under
the general aegis of the International Institute of Humanitarian Law (IIHL), 1987
to date. 426 Professor Ronzitti edited The LAw cif Naval Warfare (1988), in
connection with the IIHL meetings; it includes a general introductory analysis,
commentaries on treaties and other documents (e.g., the 1913 Oxford ManuaQ
and the texts of treaties and other documents; references to these have been
made throughout other parts of this article. What follows is an analysis of how
the Code, the Restatement (Third), NWP 9A, and the ongoing work of the IIHL
apply to the issue of targeting enemy merchant ships.
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a. The Levie Code. Professor Levie's Code restates the existing treaty and
documents-based principles. However, "[t]his Code does not include rules of the
customary international law of war which have never been formally stated in an
international document of some nature." He notes that many customary norms
- e.g., the practice of states - have been "codified" in binding international
agreements, e.g., the 1907 Hague Conventions; have been codified in international agreements that have never been ratified, e.g., the 1909 London Naval
Treaty; have been restated or expressed in other documents prepared by
international organizations but not in treaty format; or certain treaties such as
the 1972 Bacteriological Convention or Protocol I of 1977 that eventually will
become law. 427
Citing the 1930 London Naval Treaty and the 1936 London Proces-Verbal,
he states the rule as to attacks on enemy merchant ships:
1. In their action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must conform to the
rules ofInternational Law to which surface vessels are subject.

2. In particular, except in the case ofpersistent refusal to stop, or ofactive resistance
to visit or search, a warship, whether surface vessel or submarine, may not sink or
render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without having first placed
passengers, crew and ship's papers in a place of safety. For this purpose the ship's
boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers and
crew is assured, in the existing sea and weather conditions, by the proximity of
land, or the presence of another vessel which is in a position to take them on
board.
Professor Levie says that there is some evidence that these are the rules despite
428
contrary Allied practice during World War 11.
This restrictive view ofdestruction ofenemy merchantmen appears supported
by his Code provisions on neutrals performing unneutral service. Vessels on
one-shot service involving transport of enemy armed forces personnel, transmission of intelligence to the enemy, or persons who directly assist enemy
operations, are subject to condemnation as though carrying contraband. 429 On
the other hand, a neutral vessel will be condemned "and, in a general way,
receive the same treatment as would be applicable to her if she were an enemy
merchant vessel" if she
(a) "takes a direct part in hostilities;"

(b) "is under the orders or control of an agent placed on board by the enemy
Government;"
(c) "is in the exclusive employment of the enemy Government; "[or]
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(d) "is exclusively engaged at the time either in the transport of enemy troops or
in the transmission of intelligence in the interest of the enemy."

Thus a pennanently dedicated vessel may be subject to more severe sanctions "the same treatment as ... if she were an enemy merchant vessel"- which may
mean capture and condemnation. These principles are stated to be customary
law, based on the 1909 London Declaration. 43o Whether action against such
ships includes destruction, and under what circumstances, is less than clear, such
being up to "pure" state practice in the absence of treaty or other document. 431
Thus his Code does not necessarily stand for the proposition that enemy merchant
vessels are not subject to destruction in appropriate circumstances. Whether
those circumstances would include not placing passengers, crew and papers in
safety in event of surface or sub-surface attack is debatable, in view of the 1930
London Treaty and the 1936 Proces-Verbal. 432
The Code recognizes the traditional exceptions prohibiting attacks on small
coastal fishing or trading boats engaged as such, hospital ships, etc., and vessels
carrying cultural property for which due notification has been given. 433 Relying
on Protocol I and the 1977 Environmental Modification Convention, Professor
Levie states a rule of a general prohibition on methods or means of warfare
"intended, or [which] may be expected, to cause widespread, long-tenn and
severe damage to the natural environment. ,,434
b. The Restatement (Third), Foreign Relations. The Restatement (Third),
aside from noting the rule that war-coerced treaties are void and suggesting that
hostilities might be a basis for ending or withdrawing from an agreement under
fundamental change of circumstances principles,435 does not directly address the
enemy merchantman attack problem. However, the Restatement does repeat the
principles of the 1958 High Seas Convention, UNCLOS, the U.N. Ship
Registration Convention and the Restatement (Second) with respect to the
"genuine link" concept and duties of flag states to exercise effective authority
and control over vessels. 436 The traditional rules for freedom of the high seas are
repeated but subject to a "reasonable regard to the interests of other states in
their exercise of the freedom of the high seas." Conspicuously absent is the
qualifier, in UNCLOS Article 87(1), that high seas freedoms are subject to "other
rules ofintemationallaw.',437 The Restatement does acknowledge the right of
warship high seas transit and asserts that use of warships for aggressive purposes
would violate U.N. Charter nonns. The right of self-defense is available on the
high seas, but these principles are tucked away in the Comments and Reporters'
Notes. 438 The departure from UNCLOS Article 87(1) would render the Restatement less helpful in analyzing the relationship of the law of naval warfare to
UNCLOS, but in a roundabout way, through citation of the Charter principles,
the Restatement would seem to achieve the same result if it is considered that the
law of naval warfare, in its treaty aspects, is subject to the Charter,439 and that
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other principles, e.g., those derived from custom, are viable in the context of
the Charter.44o The Restatement (Third) cites the 1977 Environmental Modification Convention among many other treaties in finding a duty of states, "to the
extent practicable under the circumstances," to protect the natural environment,
with state liability for violations.441 The 1949 Geneva Conventions and other
law of armed conflict principles are not cited in the Restatement's human rights
provisions, and, although the major treaties are listed and analyzed,442 scant
attention is paid the public emergency clauses. 443 Restatement § 702 says:
A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices,
encourages, or condones
(a) genocide,

(b) slavery or the slave trade
(c) the murder or causing the disappearance ofindividuals,
(d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment,
(e) prolonged arbitrary detention,

(f) systematic racial discrimination, or
(g) a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human
rights.

These are stated to be customary norms in the Commentj444 and (a) through (f)
have jus cogens quality, such that a treaty - e.g., the public emergency clauses cannot override them, according to the Restatement Reporters. 445 This differs
from the express language of the human rights convention, to which many
nations are parties (but not the United States, except for its relatively recent
ratification of the Genocide Convention.44~ Since law ofarmed conflict treaties,
with one exception, are not cited in the Restatement,447 the usefulness of the
Restatement, except for its general analytical framework, e.g., on sources oflaw,
treaties, etc., is less than useful for armed conflict scenarios.
Given the relative paucity of treatment oflaw of armed conflict issues in the
Restatement, the impact of the genuine link theory for ships and the claims for
environmental protection and human rights in the armed conflict scenario
remains improbable. However, the ready availability of the Restatement with its
black-letter format, its prestigious authorship, and the similarity of treatment for
some peace-oriented issues, e.g., the environment, may provoke a spillover effect
into the law of naval warfare. Professor O'Connell, for example, would seem
to attempt to read the genuine link theory into prize law or private international
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law (i.e., conflict of laws) involving capture of belligerent merchantmen. 448
Nevertheless, the rule that nationality of a ship for purposes of visit and search
or capture, etc. of an enemy merchant vessel depends on its flag, and the flag
alone, remains well-established. The traditional rule was given additional support
in the practice of the United States and Kuwait in re-flagging the tankers during
the 1980-88 war. 449 However, the genuine link argument is liable to be raised
in future merchant ship visit and search, capture, diversion or destruction
situations. Genuine link may be a useful concept for the calm of a prize or
criminal case courtroom in the context of conflicts principles, but it is not a
helpful concept for the naval commander attempting to observe international
law at sea while defending the ship and protecting national interests.
c. NWP 9A. In 1989, NWP 9A's annotated supplement appeared.
Separate provisions state the rules for surface, submarine and air attacks.
For surface attack, enemy merchant ships may be attacked with or without
warning if the merchantman:
(1) actively resists visit and search or capture;
(2) persistently refuses to stop upon being duly summoned to do so;
(3) sails under convoy of enemy warships or military aircraft;
(4) is armed;
(5) is incorporated into, or assists in any way, the enemy's armed forces intelligence
system;
(6) acts in any capacity as a naval or military auxiliary to enemy.armed forces; or
(7) is integrated into the enemy's war-fighting or war-sustaining effort and
compliance with the 1936 Proces-Verbal to the 1930 London Protocol would,
under circumstances of the specific encounter subject the warship to imminent
danger or would otherwise preclude mission accomplishment.

Paragraph (4) does not distinguish between defensive and offensive armament,
a previous distinction, because "[i]n the light of modem weapons, it is impossible
to determine, if it ever was possible, whether the armament on merchant ships
is to be used offensively against an enemy or merely defensively." Paragraph (7)
is new and was:
added to cope with the circumstance [ofa ship] carrying militarily important cargo
that is not a naval or military auxiliary and to reflect the actual practice of nations,
at least in general wars. Although the term 'war-sustaining' is not subject to precise
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definition, "effort" that indirectly but effectively supports and sustains the
belligerent's war-fighting capability properly falls within the scope of the term.
The traditional rules applicable to surrenders and post-attack search and rescue
of the shipwrecked, etc., continue to apply,450 and all of these provisions are
premised on three fundamental principles of the law of armed conflict:
1. The right of belligerents to adopt means ofinjuring the enemy is not unlimited.
2. It is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian population as such.
3. Distinctions must be made between combatants and noncombatants, to the
effect that noncombatants be spared as much as possible.

These legal principles governing targeting generally parallel the military principles
of the objective, mass and economy offorce. The law requires that only objectives
of military importance be attacked but permits the use ofsufficient mass to destroy
those objectives. At the same time, unnecessary (and wasteful) collateral destruction must be avoided to the extent possible and, consistent with mission accomplishment and the security of the force, unnecessary human suffering must be
prevented. The law of naval targeting, therefore, requires that all reasonable
precautions must be taken to ensure that only military objectives are targeted so
that civilians and civilian objects are spared as much as possible from the ravages
of war.
Only combatants and other military objectives may be attacked. Military objectives are those objects which, by their nature, location, purpose, or use, effectively
contribute to the enemy's war-fighting or war-sustaining capability and whose
total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization would constitute a definite
military advantage to the attacker under the circumstances at the time of the attack.
Military advantage max involve a variety of considerations including the security
of the attacking force. 51

NWP 9A adds that neutral vessels acquire enemy character when operating
direcdy under enemy control, orders, charter, employment, or direction, or
when such vessels resist an attempt to establish identity, including visit and
452
search.
Thus, as noted earlier, NWP 9A would appear to approve of Iraqi
attacks on ships carrying oil outbound to sustain the Iranian war eff'ort. 453 The
self-defense aspects of United States responses is less clear. 454 The traditional list
of forbidden targets - hospital ships, coastal fishing and trading boats engaged as
such, etc. - follows, with the addition of civilian passenger liners at sea, unless they
are being used for military purposes or refuse to respond to a warship's directions. The
inevitable civilian deaths in such a sinking "would be clearly disproportionate
to whatever military advantage that might be gained" from their destruction. 455
Submarines may attack the same categories ofenemy merchantmen, although
the seven-point list has been compressed to four, and military exigencies and
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the practicalities of submarine configurations are said to excuse more readily
prior warning or the duty to recover shipwrecked, etc. 456 The same rules for
forbidden targets apply to submarines.457
Aircraft may attack under the same circumstances as surface warships and
submarines; the same forbidden target rules apply, and the same humanitarian rules
for surrender and survivors, etc., apply equally to aircraft, although the prac· to accept surrend er or reallyep
h lsUrvlvors
·
. d •458
. alitIes
. 0f
tIc
capaclty
may b e li mlte
Vessels operating under enemy charter possess enemy character, according to
NWP 9A;459 there is no examination (or refutation) of the "genuine link"
problems.46o NWP 9A adds that
There is no settled practice ... regarding the conditions under which the transfer
of enemy merchant vessels ... to a neutral flag may be made.... However, it is
generally recognized that, at the very least all such transfers must result in the
complete divestiture of enemy transfer and control. ... [A naval commander] is
entitled to seize any vessel transferred from an enemy to a neutral flag when such
transfer has been made either immediately prior to, or during, hostilities. 461
Thus NWP 9A would approve as legal the Kuwaiti-U.S. re-flagging procedures
during the Tanker War.462
NWP 9A approves as legal a temporary exclusion zone, although neutrals
cannot be denied access. 463 Although noting restrictions on chemical, biological
and nuclear weapons, 464 except as to collateral damage, NWP 9A does not appear
to include environmental damage in the calculus of attack, and protective
symbols used in the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention and 1977
Protocol 1 are supplied for informational purposes only. (As noted earlier, the
United States is not a party to either treaty.)465 And although protections for the
civil population are clearly discussed, including situations where the United
States supports positions in Protocol 1,466 the potential for claims of human rights
violations is not considered.
NWP 9A also recites the traditional customary rules for neutral commerce,
noting the difficulty in distinguishing between absolute and conditional contraband, the presumption for enemy destination, exemptions from contraband,
and aircert/clearcert/navicert procedures. 467 Visit and search rules, "similar" to
those for nonbelligerent visit and search, e.g., for drug interdiction, are set forth
in full.468 Principles for capture and destruction of neutral vessels and aircraft
take the traditional U.S. view, which includes forcible measures (i.e., possible
destruction) of aircraft or ships resisting proper capture and destruction of prizes
where the ship cannot be taken into port for adjudication or properly released,
distinguishing between prizes and ships sent to port for visit and search. 469 The
customary blockade rules are recited,470 as are the norms for personnel aboard
neutral platforms and those interned by neutral govemments. 471
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In summary, then, NWP 9A does an excellent job of presenting the law
related to attacks on enemy merchant ships. Query, however, whether a future
revision might combine the three recitations for surface, sub-surface and air
attacks, since the lists of permitted targets and the list offorbidden targets are the
same, the only differences being the circumstances of warning and post-attack
procedures. Query also whether the whole list approach might be scrapped in
favor of a general warning and navicert system plus use of temporary exclusion
and war zones. On the other hand, a naval commander may not wish to disclose
his presence, which is implicit in an exclusion zone warning. Moreover, in an
all-ocean long war, exclusion zones may not be feasible as a matter of law in
practice. Depending on development of the law of nonbelligerent interdiction
as well as principles for merchant ship interdiction during armed conflict, the
same methodologies for each procedure should be devised, to minimize confusion and simplify command and training problems. This, of course, is a
function oflaw development and practice and not a suggestion for revision of
NWP 9A, which reflects the law. Last, NWP 9A and other manuals should
reflect the potential for U.N. Security Council action, which occurred in 1950
during the Korean conflict, again in 1965 with respect to Rhodesia,472 and
tangentially in other situations.
d. The IIHL and Other Initiatives. Beginning with the Preliminary Round
Table ofExperts on International Humanitarian Law, held in 1987 at San Remo,
Italy, the International Institute of Humanitarian Law (IIHL) has sponsored a
series of conferences at which participants might express views on law of naval
warfare issues. 473 There has been discussion of the possibility of a draft treaty on
the subject, but later IIHL conversations have considered preparing a "Restatement" approach analogous to the American Law Institute's series of Restatements
if the LAw in the United States, of which the most relevant for this analysis have
been the Restatements (Second) and (Third), Foreign Relations if the United States. 474
The IIHL, founded in 1970, has a primary goal of promoting the application,
development and dissemination of international humanitarian law as well as
promoting human rights. Experts, from governments appearing in private
capacities, from the academic community, and from the private sector have been
invited to these conferences. A 1987 meeting resulted in an outline of basic
principles of humanitarian law and outlined areas needing discussion in light of
these principles. The 1988 meeting adopted a plan of action envisaging a series
of further annual meetings to draft part of the Restatement-style document to
serve "as a guide to accepted standards with possibly some compromise solutions
where necessary. ,,475 The last of the annual meetings was to be held in 1992.
Thus far only the 1987 meeting papers and proceedings,476 the preparatory work
for the 1988 meeting,4n and the principal papers and commentaries for the 1989
and 1990 meetings have been published. 478 Besides the IIHL initiative, other
groups of scholars have considered the subject, notably at the annual meetings
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of the American Society ofInternational Law,479 at Syracuse University, and at the
Naval War College,480 the latter of which sponsored the papers in this volume.
Participants in the Syracuse and Naval War College meetings were for the most
part members of the U.S. Planning Group, an informal association of U.S.
academicians interested in the subject.481 Although three ofthe III-IL roundtables and
publication of the predecessor volume in the War College International Law
Studies series482 have occurred after the convening of the Naval War College
symposium that resulted in publication of this book, it is appropriate to consider
the principal papers presented to the IIHL experts insofar as they relate to the subject.
The Restatement approach of the IIHL has been criticized as a "precipitous
move" to formulation of rules by a codification accomplished by private
individuals who are not state representatives. "The term restatement causes
confusion when the participants in the process are identified helter-skelter as
academics or representatives of governments. . . . [T]here is a great need to
identify state practice, but [there should be] restraint on the rush to codify.,,483
Despite these objections, the IIHL project is nearing completion, although its
final product had not been published by press time for this volume. Drafts ofits
work have been circulated, but these cannot be assessed because they are subject
to revision. Despite the criticisms of and limitations on the IIHL and other
studies, the result will contribute, albeit perhaps at a secondary level,484 to the
law of naval warfare.
(1) The 1987 IIHLMeeting at San Remo
In 1987, the UHL
Round Table identified the most difficult areas in the law of naval warfare today
as first, when arme.d force could be used at sea, including the concepts of
self-defense, necessity, and proportionality, and second, neuttality and belligerent
rights at sea. The group then decided to focus on humanitarian issues and
reaffirmed in a resolution the basic principles applicable to all kinds ofwar, namely,
that the choice of means of warfare is not unlimited, that there must be a balance
between military and humanitarian considerations, and that victims of war and
the rights ofneuttals must be respected. 485

The 1987 meeting at San Reina, Italy, had for its preparatory work The Law if
Naval Waifare. 486 Although only a published version of the preparatory essays,
and therefore only a secondary source for international law,487 the book may
gain considerable importance because it republishes international agreements
and other documents, e.g., the 1913 Oxford Manual cifNaval Warfare, together
with commentaries by scholars on each document. For that reason, the conclusions of the commentators on the law of naval warfare affecting the targeting
of merchant vessels are worth summarizing. Except for regional agreements 488
and an introductory essay, The Law cifNaval Waifare takes a chronological course,
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beginning with the 1856 Declaration ofParis.489 Not all agreements affecting the
law of naval warfare, e.g. the 1958 law of the sea conventions, are analyzed,490 and
some that only tangentially impact it, e.g., Protocol I to the Geneva Convention of
1949, are included. Nevertheless, The lAw ofNaval Warfare is overall a useful book.
Professor Ronzitti's introductory essay asserts that the conflicts between 1945
and 1990, analyzed in this chapter, have had a tendency to be fought close to
the belligerents' coasts and "even to their territorial waters. However, [he said]
it is difficult to say whether this practice is dictated by :i legal conviction to do
so or by consideration of advantage, as, [e.g.,] when belligerents have limited
naval capability.,,491 When the records of Korea and the Gulf War are added to
the situations cited, e.g., the 1971 India-Pakistan war and the 1980-88 Tanker
War, it is clear that state practice confirms the right of belligerents to conduct
naval operations far from home (e.g., the United Kingdom and the United States
in Korea, both belligerents in the India-Pakistan war, many nations in the Tanker
War and the Gulf War) on the high seas as well as in the territorial sea. Ronzitti
also questions the legality of the 1982 United Kingdom TEZ around the
Falklands as violating the U.N. Charter, Article 51, while not mentioning the
Argentine War Zone of the entire South Atlantic Ocean. Whether his view is
correct is debatable. 492
Professor Guttry sees the 1907 Hague Convention (VI) Relating to the Status
of Enemy Merchant Ships at the Outbreak of Hostilities as being somewhat
useful today in the protection ofprivate property at sea, citing state practice since
its signature. 493 Professor Venturini observes problems with practice since 1907
for the strict terms of Hague Convention (VII) Relating to the Conversion of
Merchant Ships into Warships, concluding that "it might be argued that State
practice shows a tendency to the recognition of the combatant status of any
merchant vessel integrated for all practical purpose[s] into a belligerent navy."
Whether Professor Venturini would agree with the United States view, stated
in NWP 9A, depends on how the phrase "integrated for all practical purpose[s]"
494
is interpreted. Professor Levie's analysis of Hague Convention (VIII) Relating to
the Laying ofAutomatic Submarine Contact Mines notes that the rule against laying
unanchored contact mines and the requirements ofnotice and for removal ofmines
remain valid law, but that these principles' applicability to other types ofmines could
be disputed. 495 Professor Shearer's analysis of Hague Convention (XI) Relating
to Capture in Naval War restates the customary rules flowing from that treaty.496
Professor Schindler's commentary on Hague Convention (XIII) Regarding
Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War begins with the important
point that since the founding of the United Nations:
lfthe Security Council of the United Nations decides on military or non-military
enforcement measures according to Articles 39 ff. of the Charter, member States
which are bound by such a decision have to deviate from the duties of neutrality.
Their position can be described as one ofqualified neutrality or non-belligerency.
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Neutrality in its strict sense, however, remains possible under the Charter if the
Security Council is not in a position to take any binding decision or if it takes
such a decision but does not call upon a particular State to take part in the
enforcement measures. Neutrality also remains untouched if the Security Council
decides on enforcement measures when there is only a threat to the peace but no
armed conflict, as it did in 1966 against South Rhodesia and in 1977 against South
Africa. The law of neutrality applies only in case of armed conflict. Up to now the
Security Council has never been able to decide on enforcement measures in case
of an armed conflict. Members of the United Nations therefore have never since
1945 been prevented from remaining neutral and applying the law ofneutrality. 497
He concludes that in the Charter era nations may either come to the aid of a
victim ofaggression under the self-defense principles ofArticle 51 of the Charter,
remain neutral, or adopt an intermediate position of "nonbelligerency, "i.e.,
assisting the victim by other than military means. States cannot aid the aggressor
nation. 498 The result is that the old law of neutrality can be divided into two
sets ofrules: those applying to all states not party to a conflict, including neutrals;
and those applying particularly to neutrals only. The rights of neutrals, as well
as the duty to tolerate certain belligerent measures, belong to all nations not party
to the conflict, while the duties of abstention, prevention and impartiality apply
only to neutrals in the strictest sense. 499 He concludes that with certain minor
exceptions, e.g., the impact ofUNCLOS on warship passage through neutral
territorial waters, the 1907 Convention provisions are part of the customary
law.soo
Professor Kalshoven's careful analysis of the 1909 Declaration ofLondon states
that customary rules prevail today, but that subsequent treaty norms confirm that
"neutral vessels should not be destroyed without cause."S01 The analysis of
Professors Nwogugu and Goldie on the 1930 agreements involving submarine
warfare are helpful recitations of practice that followed on them. s02 Professor
Prott's analysis of the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention notes the gaps
for modem naval warfare, given the discovery of underwater archaeological
discoveries and wrecks and the problems of the text, e.g., the military necessity
exception included at U.S. and U.K. instance (neither of which are parties to
the treaty), and that the subject may have lost its immediacy.s03 The rule for
sunken military aircraft or warships - i.e., that title to them remains in the flag
stateS04 - is not mentioned, nor is there a citation to the Roerich Pact, a Western
Hemisphere treaty on the same subject,SOs the 1970 convention on prohibition
of the transport, etc., of illicitly-taken cultural property,S06 or the 1972 convention concerning the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage,S07 all
ofwhich may have naval warfare implications. Professor Bothe's careful analysis of
1977 Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of1949 notes the general exemption
of air and naval warfare from the Protocol's terms while dismissing those parts
that do apply.sos Unfortunately, there is little discussion of general customary rules
enbedded in Protocol I and the possible impact of such customs, thus
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strengthened by repetition in the Protocol for land campaigns, on war at sea. The
United States is not a party to the Protocol, and has indicated it will not ratifY it.
Two regional treaties are also analyzed. The commentator for the 1928
Havana Convention on Maritime Neutrality, to which the United States is a
party, notes that the Convention repeats, and thereby strengthens, the rules of
Hague Convention (XIII) Concerning the &ights and Duties of Neutral Powers in
Naval War, being based on World War I experience.509 Professor Bring, commenting on the 1938 Stockholm Declaration Regarding Similar Rules of Neutrality,
observes that not all Nordic states would observe them today (Denmark and
Norway being NATO members, for example), but that the rules reaffirm in the
relevant Hague Convention principles and customary law but today do not
establish a specific regional or Nordic approach to the law ofneutrality.510
If it be taken as a handbook for its subject, The LAw oJNaval Warfare represents
a reasonably complete but not exhaustive collection of relevant agreements and
documents. There are gaps, as suggested above,511 and later editions will
doubtless correct these. The commentaries accompanying the documents must
be employed with care; they are but a secondary source of law, although
sometimes an important (or the only additional) source for study of a problem.
At the 1987 San Remo roundtable, Professor Ronzitti found the United
Kingdom's TEZ around the Falklands/Malvinas512 "difficult to reconcile" with
the concept of neutrality, insofar as nonbelligerent merchant ships are concemed.513 Both Professor Levie, writing for the conference, and Commander
Fenrick's earlier article, left open the issue of the TEZ and enemy merchant
vessels.514 Professor Ronzitti also tentatively concluded that:
the practice shows a tendency to confine naval operations to areas close to the
coast ofbelligerents, and even today, their territorial waters. However, it is difficult
to say whether this practice is dictated by a legal conviction regarding the coastline
or by considerations ofopportunity, as for instance, when belligerents have limited
· SIS
naval capabil Ity.

Participants subsequently questioned whether enough practice had developed
to support a customary norm,516 and whether a war zone was unlawful when
applied to neutrals.517
Professor Lowe, in another paper prepared for the San Remo conference,
spoke of war zones in the UNCLOS Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
context:
The precedents in the Gulf and South Atlantic suggest that the establishment on
the high seas during hostilities of war zones of reasonable size (having regard to
the scale of the conflict, the range and type ofweapons employed, and the number
and distribution of ships and other facilities to be protected, and also the interests
ofother users of the seas in that area) is acceptable to the international community,
as is the declaration that unauthorized ships in the zone may be presumed to
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threaten combatant ships and facilities therein and are accordingly liable to attack.
The latter provision obviates the need to setde the question of the right to exclude
foreign vessels from the zone.
He also concluded that neutral states had the right to forbid hostile military
activities in adjacent sea areas "out to such a distance as affords them reasonable
protection from the consequences of hostilities. " The weight of practice does not
support the view that military uses can be made of the entire EEZ. "The high seas
should be regarded as free for all military activities, including those mentioned. "
Coastal states may restrict such uses on the bases of necessity and proportionality.
He concluded by suggesting that "any ship, regardless ofits nationality, •.. under
the command, control or direction of combatant military authorities should be
assimilated to the status of a warship for the purposes of the foregoing rules. ,,518
Professor Robertson stated that modern naval warfare had made the 1907
Hague Convention IX, relating to naval bombardment,519 obsolete before its
entry into force, and noted the general rule of proportionality in Protocol 1520 and
the advent of modern over-the-horizon weapons. He asked whether the rules
for attack should be a seaborne version ofProtocoll's proportionality principle
or perhaps weapon-specific rules.521 The latter approach, he thought, would be
very difficult. 522 The ensuing discussion recognized the problem oflong-range
weapons, the difficulty of discrimination for certain weapons platforms, and the
general need to adhere to general rules of military necessity, military objective
and proportionality, perhaps on the model of the rules of air warfare, while
excluding certain vessels from attack, e.g., hospital ships and passenger liners.523
Professor Levie stated that Protocol I did not apply to war at sea and inquired
whether exclusion zones were a legal method ofwarfare and whether such zones
should be limited in scope, and whether state practice had crystallized enough to
declare themlegitimate.524 Commander Fenrick stated that persuasive arguments
for their legality could be made, and that common rules for aircraft and
submarine should be developed. 525 The ensuing discussion also raised issues of
environmental damage resulting from combat at sea. 526
The San Remo conference closed with papers on protected vessels, the
ensuing discussion noting the "neutral zone" for hospital ships established by the
United Kingdom,527 rules of engagement and their relationship to armed
conflict,528 and reprisals. 529
The General Report of the San Remo conference stated:
The Group of Experts:
Recalls that the principles and rules of international humanitarian law apply
impartially to international armed conflicts irrespective of the legality of the initial
resort to force or the justification given for any such conflict.
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Recognizes the relevance of the principles ofinternationallaw applicable in anned
conflict to anned conflict at sea, in particular:
1) Parties to a conflict and members of their anned forces do not have
an unlimited choice of methods and means of warfare. The employment of
weapons or methods of warfare of a nature to cause unnecessary losses or
excessive suffering is prohibited.
2) Parties to a conflict shall at all times distinguish between civilian objects
and military objectives. Attack shall be directed solely against military
objectives.
3) Parties to a conflict shall ensure that in cases not covered by explicit
legal provisions, those involved in an anned conflict remain under
the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as
they result from the law of humanity and the dictates of the public
conscience.
4) The rules on the conduct of hostilities are subject to the fundamental
principle of the need to balance military and humanitarian requirements.
5) Persons hors de combat and/or shipwrecked are entided to respect
for their lives and their physical and moral integrity.

Stresses that parties involved in an anned conflict at sea shall respect the rights of
States not involved in the conflict,
Notes that new technologies and methods of naval warfare, new developments in
the law of anned conflict and in the law of the sea and the increased possibilities
of grave hann to the environment as a result ofanned conflict at sea, require study
in the light of the principles recognized above,
Notes the various studies and recommendations on the law of anned conflict at
sea by the United Nations and the International Conferences of the Red Cross
and Red Crescent,
Urges the dissemination of the results of ICRC's and competent international
organizations' work on the technical identification of protected vessels at
sea,
Deddes:
1) To study the means of applying the above-mentioned principles to
the regulation of anned conflict at sea. The following should be taken into
consideration, in particular:
- new technologies, for instance, sea mines and long-range weapons;
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- means of warfare at sea, for instance, the use of "exclusion zones", ruses
of war, and submarine warfare;
- the use of maritime areas, for instance, neutralized zones, cartel ships,
identification of protected vessels and aircrafts;
- humanitarian considerations, for instance, neutralized zones, cartel ships,
identification of protected vessels and aircrafts;
- scope of application of the law of armed conflicts at sea, for instance,
low-intensity operations;
- enforcement of the law of anned conflict at sea, for instance, reprisals,
prosecutions of war crimes, fact-finding;
- armed conflict at sea adversely affecting the environment;
- the needs of shipping of States which are not taking part in the conflict.
2) To study and develop more effective means to secure the practical
implementation of the law of armed conflict at sea on a national level, for
instance, means of instruction to military personnel, including rules of
530
engagement....

The Report is but a secondary source, or evidence oflaw,531 but its themes laid
out the topics for subsequent IIHL meetings.

(2) The Madrid Meeting
At a meeting of the IIHL group in Madrid, Spain, in 1988:
it was decided that in future meetings the group's efforts should be focused on
identifying areas of agreement on what the law is, as meetings hitherto had
principally highlighted areas of disagreement. The participants at the Madrid
meeting adopted a plan of action that envisioned a series of yearly meetings of
experts on the law of naval warfare from around the world, including in particular
military lawyers. Each meeting would operate as a working group to identify
common areas of agreement and articulate those rules in a document that would
be similar to a "restatement" of the law of naval warfare.532
The first of the working groups met in Bochum, Federal Republic of Genna ny,
the next year.
(3) The Bochum Roundtable
At the 1989 Bochum roundtable, Commander Fenrick's paper, The Military
Objective and the Principle oJDistinction in the LAw oJNaval Warjare,533 i.e., objects
such as merchantmen that may be legitimately attacked, was presented. After
reviewing trends in the law, the influence of the 1977 Protocol 1534 to the

Walker

185

Geneva Conventions of 1949, and current preparations of military manuals,
Commander Fenrick concluded:
If one accepts the most pennissive provisions in the manuals referred to above as
a starting point, then, on one view, enemy merchant vessels may be attacked and
destroyed when they:
a) engage in acts ofwar on behalf of the enemy such as laying mines, minesweeping, cutting undersea cables, visiting neutral merchant ships or attacking merchant
ships on one's own side,
b) act as a de facto auxiliary to an enemy's armed forces by, for example, carrying
troops or acting as a replenishment vessel,
c) are incorporated into, or assist in any way, the intelligence system ofthe enemy's
armed forces,
d) are armed,
e) actively resist visit and search or capture,

f) refuse to stop upon being duly summoned,
g) sail under convoy of enemy warships or military aircraft, or
h) are integrated into the enemy's war-fighting/war-sustaining effort and compliance with the rules of the 1936 London Protocol would, under the circumstances of specific encounter, subject the attacker to imminent danger or otherwise
not be feasible.
Further, neutral merchant ships could be attacked and destroyed for the reasons
specified under heads (a), (b), (c), (e), (f) and (g) above. It is clear that head (d)
is not an adequate reason in and ofitselffor attacking a neutral merchant vessel.
The key question which remains, however, is: should neutral merchant ships be subject
to attack for the reasons specified in head (h)? Is there a valid legal reason why
neutral merchant ships should be immune from attack when they are employed
on tasks functionally indistinguishable from those where enemy merchant vessels are
subject to attack? If neutral merchant ships which are incorporated into the
enemy's war fighting/war sustaining effort are not, for that reason alone, subject to
attack then most of the attacks directed by Iraq against neutral tankers travelling to
and from Iran during the Tanker War were unlawful. It is not essential that
intemationallaw, to be valid, should always be compatible with state practice. If,
however, the law of naval warfare is to have an impact on the conduct ofwarfare,
there should be a crude congruence between law and practice so that it is marginal,
extreme conduct which is condemned, not activities which are routine operations
535
ofwar.
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The analysis does not answer the reciprocal question ofIranian attacks on vessels
proceeding to and from neutral Kuwaiti or Saudi ports, which would afortiori be
illegal, or the sub-issue of Iraqi attacks on vessels proceeding in ballast or with
cargoes that would not be considered part ofan opponent's warfightinglwar-sustaining effort. Ultimately, the Bochum conference found, according to Dr. van
Hegelsom:
••• [T]he general principles of military objective and of distinction, as codified in
the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions (Additional Protocol I)
are valid in the naval-environment.. The experts identified the obligation to
distinguish at all times between civilians and combatants and between civilian
objects and military objectives and the obligation to limit attacks stricdy to military
536
. .
ob~ect1ves.

As noted above, the precise formulation of the rules is still in draft form.
Additional IIHL conferences on the law of naval warfare have been held since
the Newport conference that is the subject of this book.537
(4) Appraisal of the IIHL Process
The discussions of the IIHL conferences have been entirely unofficial; military
and diplomatic officers have attended in a private capacity, along with academic
and International Committee of the Red Cross representatives. All the proposals
have been subject to revision by the conferees, and there has been feedback
revision in future meetings. Nevertheless, these discussions point toward possible
development of a "restatement" of rules, perhaps similar to Professor Levie's
Code, entirely unofficial, and therefore only a secondary source of law,538 or
perhaps evidence of primary sources of law - custom, treaties and general
principles - under the Restatement (Third) view.539 As noted above, there has
been opposition to this approach. 54o Whether the IIHL conferences' results, in
restatement form or otherwise, will have an impact on national manuals on the
law of armed conflict like NWP 9A, in citations of scholars, or in state practice,
remains for the future. To the extent that the IIHL work-product is congruent
with existing and developing custom and general principles or international
agreements and their interpretations, those primary sources will be reinforced.
To the extent that the IIHL rules are cited in court decisions or the product of
researchers, or perhaps incorporated in resolutions ofinternational organizations
such as the ICRC or the U.N. General Assembly,541 they will remain in the
huddle of secondary sources or evidences of primary sources. (If the U.N.
Security Council picks up the IIHL rules as binding norms, they will be elevated
to primary status. 542) Where the IIHL principles state only progressive development of the law, e.g., rules concerning attacks on liners that are not part of the
customary or conventional rules,543 theirinfluence will be the least. Even if the
IIHL process has no direct impact on the law, it will have had the beneficial
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function of raising issues and stimulating debate, and thereby bring broader
attention to bear on the law of naval warfare.544

III. Summary and Conclusions
Although there have been at least ten naval conflicts that have involved enemy
merchant shipping or neutral vessels that have acquired enemy character between 1945 and 1990, the change in the practice of states has been relatively
incremental since World War II. The rule book has been thrown out the
porthole on occasions, e.g., during the 1971 India-Pakistan and the Tanker Wars,
but not enough to establish a new rule or that there are no rules. One of the
difficulties in surveying the period has been lack of hard evidence, due to security
classifications545 and the fact that governments do not publish diplomatic papers
for many years after the event, and then only selectively. Thus this chapter's
Discussion and the resulting Summary may be lacking in critical details that could
alter a view of state practice radically. The reason for this caveat lies in the way
international law looks at state practice, or custom. Not only must there be a
sustained practice, but it must be accepted as law by nations affected, under the
majority view.546 Whether one or two claims would be enough to support a
trend may be doubtful to some; in almost all recent cases opinion juris - acceptance
of the practice as law - the record may be meager. The exceptions may be the
Falklands/Malvinas War (1982) and the Tanker War (1980-88), but even here
the picture may be less than complete.
The Korean conflict would seem to have stretched to the line the rule that
small coastal fishing vessels when plying their trade are not subject to capture or
attack,547 but the attacks might be justified under another theory generally - but
not universally - approved today, i.e., destruction ofvessels as part of the enemy's
war-sustaining effect.548 Pretty clearly the small fishing boats and coastal traders
carrying weapons during the Vietnam War were part of the North Vietnam war
effort, and attacks were justified.549 The United Kingdom's attack on Nanva!
was justified on one officially-stated ground, Nanva!'s supporting Argentine
intelligence, but attack might have been also vindicated because Nanva! was a
1600-ton trawler and obviously not a coastal boat.55o
Hospital ships - another forbidden target - were respected during the
Falklands/Malvinas War through the medium of the "Red Cross box" neutral
zone - a new wrinkle, borrowed from the law ofland warfare.55t
The record is mixed on belligerents' attacks on traditional oceangoing ships
steaming alone. During the Arab-Israeli conflicts, there were attacks on neutral
vessels and an Israel-bound tanker, and an Egyptian-declared blockade of tankers
coming from Eilat.552 Whether the Israel-bound tanker was carrying war-sustaining petroleum (probably it was) or whether Sinai oil was helping finance the
Israeli war effort is not clear from the research. During the 1971 India-Pakistan
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conflict, India instituted naval control of shipping, which would have subjected
those vessels to Pakistani attack if the Indian vessels were convoyed or were
involved in the war effort. India declared a blockade of what was then East
Pakistan (now Bangladesh), and captured Pakistani merchantmen. Whether
these were supporting the enemy war effort and therefore subject to capture or
were wrongfully seized is less than clear; one commentator has asserted that India
.
d tees.
h rul 553
Ignore
During the Vietnam conflict the United States published notice ofits mining
North Vietnamese harbors, thus warning all ships, in accordance with internationallaw, whether they would have been classified as enemy merchantmen on
war service or neutrals performing unneutral service. This might be compared
with the illegal use ofmines in the Red Sea and Persian Gul£ U.S.-flag merchant
vessels were the subject of shoreside attacks, with no evidence that warnings
were given. Two were sunk, one loaded with cement. There is no evidence of
a claim by North Vietnam of the cement hauler's being on war service.554 Both
RFA and STUFT ships were attacked during the Falklands/Malvinas War while
on war-sustaining missions, and there is no evidence of protests.555 Under
established principles, both classes of vessels were legitimate targets.
During the Tanker War, Iraq attacked enemy merchant ships, and was legally
entided to do so, when these vessels carried Iranian petroleum that would be
sold or bartered to support the war effort.556 Neutral-flag tankers carrying
belligerents' petroleum, the sale of which would support the war effort, were
also subject to attack when convoyed by Iranian warships.557 (If a belligerent
chose to attack, and was subjected to necessary, proportional defensive responses,
those responses were also consonant with international law.) On the other hand,
neutral vessels carrying neutral goods were not subject to attack, and attacks by
Iran or Iraq on foreign-flag ships of this nature were clearly illegal under
international law, whether convoyed by neutral nation warships or steaming
alone.558 Neutral nations could respond proportionally in self-defense to such
attacks, whether the response came from convoying warships, warships in the
area, or by other means of self_defense.559
Blockades in the traditional sense were declared in several of the conflicts
(Korea, 1950; India-Pakistan, 1971; Arab-Israel, 1973; Iran-Iraq, 1980;
Lebanon, 1982),560 and the traditional rules seem to have been applied, despite
the contentions of some that the rules had become functionally obsolete.561
Quarantine - in which merchantmen supplying an adversary are stopped and
diverted in a nonwar context "- was an innovation. This practice was first
developed in the Algerian civil war under a self-defense rationale, and was
employed by the United States during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, by the
United Kingdom in the Rhodesian interdiction operation with U.N. Security
Council approval, and by the United States in mining operations in North
Vietnamese territorial waters and South Vietnam in the South China Sea.562
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Some have questioned the legal validity of such operations when the claim has
been based on self-defense in the wake of the 1986 Nicaragua Case,563 but there
has been no authoritative guidance on the issue beyond state practice to the
contrary and the Security Council's decisions in the case of Rhodesia. Under
the circumstances, a conditional conclusion is that such quarantines are legal
under a self-defense theory, so long as they are necessary and proportional in
response and otherwise conform to international norms - e.g., a quarantine
cannot obstruct freedom of navigation of third-nation warships, nor can it bar
a hospital ship from a port.
The period 1945-90 also witnessed a re-emphasis on the exclusion zone used
perhaps in the Korean War,564 and certainly in the Falklands/Malvinas War,565
and the Tanker War. 566 The principle that has emerged is that such zones are
legal, so long as they are published and reasonable in area and duration, i.e., that
they obey the general principles of necessity and proportionality.567 Wartime
. Is may pernut
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Besides the developing rules from practice, however, decision makers must
consider the impact of treaty law clearly applicable to naval warfare.569 Two
post-World War II examples are the GWSEA prohibition on attacks on small
coastal rescue craft,570 and the 1977 Environmental Modification Conven. 571 N ew gene r apnnClp
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human rights norms,573 may further complicate the picture.
Then there is the problem of "radiations" from other bodies oflaw that may
affect the rules of practice in maritime warfare. One recent example is the "Red
Cross box" concept in the Falklands/Malvinas War, a procedure borrowed from
the law ofland warfare by the United Kingdom and respected by Argentina. 574
That was a good idea, but consider commentators' attempts to incorporate the
UNCLOS "genuine link" concept into the rule that enemy character is
determined by the flag flown,575 or attempts to incorporate 1977 Protocol I
wholesale into the law of naval warfare. 576 Both appear to be erroneous
conceptions of the current state of the law, but these analyses point the way for
attempts at possible inclusion of concepts, in whole or in part, from these and
other sources in future considerations oflaw of naval warfare issues: as established
practice human rights;577 the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention, not
in force for the United States but with potential overtones for legitimation of
state practice;578 the High Seas Convention and UNCLOS;579 the 1977 Protocol
I additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions;580 the 1981 Conventional
Weapons Convention;581 and resolutions of the U.N. Security Council or other
.mternatlOna
. I orgamzatIons.
..
582
Throughout the 1945-1990 period, commentators assessed the subject matter
of this paper. These sources, and indeed the new military manuals such as NWP 9A,
have their place in the analysis, either as secondary sources583 or as expositors of
state practice to date. It is for this reason that they have been included too, and

190

Targeting Enemy Merchant Shipping

must be considered along with state practice, treaties, general principles oflaw,
and other sources.
In sum, the place of state practice in the law of naval warfare is much more
complicated today than before advent of the U.N. Charter in 1945. Perhaps it
is for this reason that the IIHL and others have begun a series of roundtables to
attempt to "restate" the law of naval warfare. 584 Whether this is a wise
methodology, and whether the results will be acceptable to states, is not clear
today because of the ongoing nature of the project. What is fairly certain is that
more than state practice will be considered in its deliberations, and should be
considered by national decisionmakers assessing law of naval warfare issues
related to projected or ongoing situations.
There has been discussion of a general treaty on the law of naval warfare. 595
A treaty offers certain advantages:
(1) If congruent with custom, the rule is strengthened;586
(2) Treaties may be the preferred source for some states;587
(3) Custom can be elusive in content, relying on the happenstance practice
of states during a naval war, and the particulars of a particular practice may be
sealed in archives for decades;
(4) State practice for wartime rules during armed conflict can be an awfully
expensive way to write law;
(5) For naval decision makers, there is the advantage ofa "black letter" format,
e.g., the 1949 Geneva Conventions' provisions;
(6) Training in the subject can be simpler; the black letter format of treaties
lends itself to easier learning.
These propositions could be countered:
(1) Inconsistent custom can eventually obliterate an outmoded treaty;588
(2) If a treaty is tied to current technology, it may be out of date before the
ink is dry,589 and the problems of arguing by analogy or under the principle
inclusio unius exclusio may arise;
(3) Custom has the advantage of adapting to new situations that cannot now
be contemplated;590
(4) Treaties are always subject to reservations or understandings by the
signatories, which can result in as much confusion as to the state of the law as
in the case of custom, an example being Soviet bloc and other reservations to
the 1949 Geneva Conventions;591
(5) If issues over which there is sharp disagreement arise during the treaty
negotiation process, the result can be protracted negotiations, a breakup of the
negotiations with no treaty resulting, states may refuse to sign, as in the case of
U.S. refusal to sign UNCLOS, states may decline to ratify the agreement, as in
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the case of the United States and SALT II, or a treaty that reflects the lowest
common denominator on the subject may result, which accomplishes little;
(6) The internal ratification process for many nations can result in outright
rejection of the treaty, considerable delays, further reservations by the legislative
body (e.g., the Senate under the U.S. Constitution), or lack oflegislative support
for implementing statutes;592
(7) Carefully-written "black letter" rules for custom can be incorporated into
military manuals, to be employed by decisionmakers or in an instructional
setting.593 Indeed, it has been necessary to condense the detail of treaties such
as the 1949 Geneva Conventions to make them more understandable for
users;594 thus a treaty can suffer from ambiguity ofwords, even as custom carries
a risk of ambiguity of rules.
With the demise of the Soviet Union and a resulting unipolar world with the
United States as the only true military superpower, the inclination to engage in
multilateral agreement negotiations may be decreasing. State practice may be
the rising modality for determining internationallaw. 595 The continued trends
in fragmentation of nations - Czechoslovakia, the USSR and Yugoslavia being
the most recent examples - would suggest that the babble of claims and
counterclaims596 as to what is the law, or should be the law, further militates
. b egmmng
. . th e treaty process now. 597 Y et t his very process 0 fd·lSlntegra.
agamst
tion and the resultant relative weakness of nations to counter threats from within
and without argues for establishment of some norms to guide what may be the
beginning of a new season of conflict. For now, the patchwork of traditional
custom and general principles, treaties perhaps modified by practice or interpretation, and the often-conflicting urgings of scholars and groups such as the
IIHL, plus the modifications in state practice that have characterized naval
conflicts since World War II, will be the principal guide to naval powers as they
confront relatively new bodies oflaw pressing from the periphery. The latter
include the U.N. Charter, UNCLOS, the 1977 Protocols, and the law of human
rights. The result may be the dawn of a new world order or a fresh descent into
international chaos.
Notes
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13. /d., arts. 33-38. For further analysis, see Leland M. Goodrich et al., supra note 11, ch. 6.
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United States and Other Views, 1991 DukeJ. Compo & Int'l L. 57, 65-84,122; W. Michael Reisman, Criteria
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Walker

193
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******
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36. For a general discussion of the intricacies of private ownership interests in commercial shipping, see
generally Grant Gilmore & Charles L. Black, The Law of Admiralty, cbs. 2-4, 9, 11 (2d ed., 1975); Thomas
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44. Malcom W. Cagle & Frank A. Manson, The Sea War in Korea 281-83 (1957); see also id. at 299-300,
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campaign would have been etrective. Inshore blockading was an ROK responsibility. ld. at 58-59. &e id. at
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4 Japanese-flag merchantmen participated in the Inchon landing. !d. at 181. The Wonsan invasion involved
30 SCAJAP ships and "MSTS shipping as assigned," which included Japanese marns, i.e., merchantmen. ld.
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Status cif the Gulf cif Aqaba, 53 id. 412 (1959); Leo Gross, TIle Geneva COliference on Ille lAw cif the Sea and the
Right cif Innocent Passage 17Irough Ille Gulf cifAqaba, id. 565 (1959).
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ports, and belligerent warships must follow opponents through the Canal at 24-hour intervals. Charles B.
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Inge Tott, 31 I.L.R. at 512-15. Part of the Tcift court's rationale was a finding in Navios Corp. v. The Ulysses
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167. Protocol Concerning Relations of the Parties, Annex III to Treaty of Peace, Mar. 26, 1979,
Egypt-Israel, art. 8, 18 Int'l Legal Mat'Is 391.
168. 1 Anthony H. Cordesman & Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War 104-08 (1990);
Chaim Herzog, supra note 157 at 263-69.
169. 1 Anthony H. Cordesman & Abraham R. Wagner, supra note 168, at 216, dting Richard A. Gabriel,
Operation Peace for Galilee 142, 148 (1984).
170. &e supra notes 125-37, 162-64, 168-69 and accompanying text.
171. &e supra note 165 and accompanying text. &e also sllpra notes 138-45 and accompanying text.
172. &e supra note 157 and accompanying text.
173. &e supra note 158 and accompanying text.
174. Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499
U.N.T.S. 311; Convention on Fisheries and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, Apr.
29,1958 [hereinafter 1958 Fisheries and Conservation Convention], 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559
U.N.T.S. 285; Territorial Sea convention, supra note 159, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S.
205; 1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 20.
175. NWP 9A, supra note 4, para. 1.1, at 1-2 n.4.
176. 1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 20, art. 2,13 U.S.T. 2314, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450U.N.T.S.
82-84. See Francis V. Russo, Jr., Neutrality at &a in TrallSition: State Practice in the Gulf War as Emergillg
International Customary Law, 19 Ocean Devel. & Int'l 1. 381, 384 (1988) for the point that the law of the sea,
as partly stated in the High Seas Convention and other agreements, exists alongside the law of naval warfare
and other applicable rules ofinternational law. This view is confirmed by the commentary ofthe International
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Law Commission (ILC) on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 73, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 350, in &port oJtk Commission to th~ General Ass~mbly, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev. 1 (1966)
[hereinafter ILC Rq>Ort], reprinted in 1966(2) Y.B. Int'l L. Conun'n 267-68:
Different considerations appeared to the Commission to apply to the case of an outbreak of
hostilities between parties to a treaty. It recognized that the state offacts resulting from an outbreak of
hostilities may have the practical effect ofpreventing the application of the treaty in the circumstances
prevailing. It also recognized that questions may arise as to the legal consequences of an outbreak of
hostilities with respect to obligations arising from treaties. But it considered that in the international
law of today the outbreak of hostilities between States must be considered as an entirely abnormal
condition, and that the rules governing its legal consequences should not be regarded as fonning part
of the general rules ofinternationallaw applicable in the normal relations between States. Thus, the
Geneva Conventions codifYing the law of the sea contain no reservation in regard to the case of an
outbreak of hostilities notwithstanding the obvious impact which such an event may have on the
application of many positions of those Conventions; nor do they purport in any way to regulate the
conuqumas oJsuch an ~nI. It is true that one article in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
(article 44) and a similar article in the Convention on Consular Relations (article 26) contain a reference
to cases of "armed conflict." Very special considerations, however, dictated the mention of cases of
armed conflict in those articles and then only to underline that the rules laid down in the articles hold
good even in such cases. The Vienna Conventions do not otherwise putport to regulate the
consequences of an outbreak of hostilities; nor do they contain any genetal reservation with regard to
the effect ofthat event on the application of their provisions. Accordingly, the Commission concluded
that it was justified in considering the case of an outbreak of hostilities between parties to a treaty to
be wholly outside the scope of the general law of treaties to be codified in the present articles; and that
no account should be taken of that case or any mention made of it in the draft articles. (emphasis
added).
The ILC was established in 1947 by U.N. General Assembly resolution. Its 25 members, all distinguished
scholars, are representative ofthe world conununity and are elected by the Assembly on the basis ofgovernment
nominations. The view of Herbert W. Briggs, then the U.S. member, coincided with the ILC position; other
sources must be examined in conflict situations. Herbert W. Briggs, Unilateral Denunciation oj Treaties: The
Vimna Convention and the International Court oJ]ustice, 68 Am.]. Int'l L. 51 (1974).
177. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 159, art. 24(1), 15 U.S.T. at 1612, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516
U.N.T.S. at 220; Frederick C. Leiner, Maritim~ Security Zones: Prohibited Y~t Perpetuated, 24 Va.]. Int'l L. 967,
980-81 (1984). The assertion contained in Id. at 980 that the 1958 conventions "conclusively rejected the
legality of peacetime maritime security zones" is not correct. As Bernard H. Oxman, supra note 159, at 811,
demonstrates for UNCLOS, supra note 2, and by inference for the 1958 Convention these agreements are
concerned with peacetime uses of the seas but are subject to other bodies of international law, e.g., the law of
maritime warfare. A security zone is a feature of the latrer, and as will be developed irifra, is lawful so long as
it is necessary and proportional for its putposes under the law of self-defense.
178. 1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 20, arts. 4-5, 13 U.S.T. 2315, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450
U.N.T.S. 84-85. Scholars had debated the approach, derived from the Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.),
1955 I.CJ. 4. Se~, ~.g., Myres S. McDougal et al, ~ Maintenana oj Public Order at Sea and the Nationality oj
Ships, 54 Am.]. Int'l L. 25,114-16 (1960) (vehemendy opposed), citing Philip C.]essup, ~ United Nations
ConJerena on the Law oj th~ Sea, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 234, 256 (1959); A.D. Warts, ~ Protection oj Merchant
Ships, 33 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 52, 84 (1957) (favoring the concept). Paradoxically, the World Court chose a more
traditional concept for cotporations in the Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg.
v. Spain), 1970 I.CJ. 3, analyzed in HerbertW. Briggs, Barrelona Traction: The]us Standi oJBelgium, 65 Am.
]. Int'l L. 327 (1971). The "genuine link" debate persists. See irifra notes 183, 198,308-13,328-29,374,441,
465 and accompanying text.
179. Se~ generally Boleslaw A. Boczek, Flags of Convenience: An International Legal Study (1962),
updated by Rodney P. Carlisle, Sovereignty for Sale: The Origins and Evolution of the Panamanian and
Liberian Flags of Convenience (1981).
180. 1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 20, arts. 8-9, 13 U.S.T. 2315, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450
U.N.T.S. 86.
181. !d. arts. 24-25, 13 U.S.T. 2319, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 96.
182. 1958 Fisheries and Conservation Convention, supra note 174, arts. 1-2, 17 U.S.T. 140, T.I.A.S. No.
5969,559 U.N.T.S. 286-88.
183. Restatement (Second), Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 28 (1965).
184. But if. id. § 64.
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185. Rudigar Wolfrum, Rej1agging and Escort Operation in the Persian Gulf: An InlemationalLAw PersJX"ive,
29 Va.J. Int'l L. 386, 391-92 (1989) [hereinafter Rudigar Wolfrum], dtingConstitution ofthe Maritime Safety
Comm. of the Inter-gov'tal Marit. Consultative Org., 1960 I.CJ. 150, 170.
186. Rudigar Wolfrum:supra note 176, at 393.
187. Myres S. McDougal & Florentino P. Feliciano, supra note 18, at 587-96.
188. Ross Leckow, The Iran-Iraq Conflict in the Gulf: The LAw if War Zones, 37 Int'l & Compo L. Q. 629,
635 n.27 (1988), citing Myres S. McDougal & Forentino P. Feliciano, supra note 18, at 494, which is part of
the authors' discussion of neutrality.
189. Myres S. McDougal & Florentino P. Feliciano, supra note 18, at 587-96, which is part oftheir chapter
on combat situations, e.g., "regions of war" or "theaters of war." Cf. id. at 568-72, which is more concerned
with land warfare and areas excluded from attack.
190. Compare id. at 501-09 with id. at 597.
191. C.John Colombos, The International Law of the Sea 548-55, 559-60, 586-626 (1967).
192. [d. at 695-99, 786-94.
193. [d. at 528-31.
194. NWIP 10-2, supra note 57, para. 503(b)(3), discussed supra note 57 and accompanying text.
195. W. Thomas Mallison, Studies in the Law of Naval Warfare: Submarines in General and Limited War
106-29 (1968).
196. See id. at 55-56,89-90,93,129-30.
197. Myres S. McDougal & William T. Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans 805 (1962).
198. Id. at 1035. See also supra notes 178, 183 and accompanying text.
199. 2 Daniel P. O'Connell, supra note 11, at 805-06.
200. [d., dting inter alia Daniel P. O'Connell, supra note 19, at 123 and Daniel P. O'Connell, Inlematiollal
LAw and Contemporary Naval Operations, 44 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 18,36 (1970); WolJfvon Heinegg, supra note
147, at 34; 4 Marjorie M. Whiteman, supra note 64, at 513-14, reprinting telegram of u.S. Ambassador to
France Amory Houghten to Secretary of State Dulles, Jan. 26,1958; telegram of the U.S. Embassy, Paris, to
Secretary Dulles, Nov. 6, 1959; Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 28, 1960, at 2. See also Note, Inteiftrena with
Non-National Ships on the High Seas: Peacetime Exceptions to the Exclusivity Rule ifFlag-StateJurisdiction, 22 Vand.
J. Transnat'l L. 1161, 1218 (1989); Anna van Zwanenberg, Inteiference with Ships on the High Seas, 10 Int'l &
Compo L.Q. 785, 791 (1961).
201. Daniel P. O'Connell, supra note 200, at 38-39.
202. WolJfvon Heinegg, supra note 147, at 34.
203. 10 Keesing's Contemporary Archives 15277 (1956); 11 id. 16080, 16184 (1958).
204. In 1958 Iceland unilaterally extended her exclusive fishing zone limit from 4 to 12 miles. Regulations
Conceming the Fishing Limits OffIceland,June 30, 1958, quoted in 4 Marjorie M. Whiteman, supra note 64, at
1157-58. A seven-nation conference, including Britain, protested and announced they would continue to fish in
the eight-mile belt. Britain had announced it would send armed escorts to protect U.K. trawlers, if necessary,
onJuly 4. [d. at 1160, quoting N.Y. Times,July 21,1958, at 12. The Royal Navy began to intervene to protect
trawlers and their crews, although other states' trawlers remained outside the 12-rnile limit. Icelandic Ministry for
Foreign Affairs, British Aggression in Icelandic Walel:s 5-13 (June 1959), quoted in 4 Marjorie M. Whiteman, supra
at 1163-69. British trawler owners voluntarily withdrew from the disputed area in 1960, pending the
then-ongoing Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea. Id. at 1174, dting dispatch of the u.S. Embassy,
London, to U.S. Department of State, Apr. 29, 1960, and N.Y. Times, May 13, 1960, at 3, and id., Aug. 12,
1960, at 2. The Conference broke up in disagreement over the breadth of the territorial sea. See Robert D.
Powers & Leonard R. Hardy, How Wide the Territorial Sea? ill Carl M. Franklin, The Law of the Sea: Some
Recent Developments 304 (1961). The dispute was resolved in 1961 by Exchange of Notes Between Great
Britain and Iceland, Mar. 11,1%1,397 U.N.T.S. 275. In 1972 Iceland asserted a SO-rnile fishing zone, assault on
British and German trawlers began, and Britain filed suit against Iceland in the International Court ofJustice,
which indicated interim measures and ultimately held that Iceland could not unilaterally exclude Great Britain
from historic fishing waters. The litigants were admonished to negotiate differences. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K.
v. Ice.), 1972 I.CJ. 12 (request for interim measures); 1973 I.CJ. 3; 1974 I.CJ. 4 (merits);James Cable, supra note
77, at 249-50. The U.S. reaction to similar seizures, occurring primarily off the west coast of Latin America and
in the Gulf ofMexico by nations claiming territorial seas or economic zones in excess of those claimed by the
United States, was an insurance compensation system to secure release of crews and boats, coupled with
diplomatic protests. Theodor Meron, The Fisherman's Protellive Act: A Case Study ill Contemporary uga/ Strategy
ifthe United Stotes, 69 Am.J. Int'l L. 290 (1975). Although the Act is still on the books, 22 U.S.C. §§ 1971-80
(1980), its efficacy has been limited by the broader view the United States has taken today of offihore
jurisdictional claims, e.g., for the EEZ through the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1801-82 (1988, Supp. II 1990), unless the seizure otherwise violates international law as recognized by the
United States. There is a further proviso, however, that would appear to broaden the Protective Act's coverage.
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&e StevenJ. Burton, The 1976 Amendments to Ihe Fishermen's ProltClive Act, 71 Am.J. Int'l L. 740 (1977). For
other more explosive confrontations with fishing vessels, see Daniel P. O'Connell, supra note 200, at 73-75.
205. Proclamation No. 3504, 3 C.F.R. 232 (1959-1963), referring to SJ. Res. 230, Pub. L. No. 87-733, 76
Stat. 697 and an October 23, 1962 resolution passed under the Inter-American Treaty ofReciprocal ~ce (Rio
Treaty), Sept. 2, 1947, arts. 6, 8, 62 Stat. 1681, 1701, T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 21 U.NJ.S. 77, 97, 99. For
commentator analysis, sugenerally Abram Chayes, The Cuban Missile Crisis (1974); Robert A. Divine, The
Cuban Missile Crisis (1971); Louis Henkin, supra note 19, at 279-302. Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A
Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (1969); 10 Marjorie M. Whiteman, supra note 43, at 8-20,874 (1968);
Abram Chayes, lAw and lhe Quarantine cifCuba, 41 Foreign Aff. 550 (1963); Carl Q. Christol & C.R. Davis,
Maritime Quarantine: The Naval In~diction cifQffmsive Weapons and AssMated Material to Cuba, 56 Am.J. Int'l L.
525, 527 (1963); W. Thomas Mallison, Limited Naval Blockade or Quarantine - Interdiction: National and Collective
Dt:ftnse Claims Valid under IntemationalLAw, 31 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 355, 387-88 (1962); Sally V. Mallison &
W. Thomas Mallison, A Surveycifthe InternationalLAwcifNaval Blockade, 102 U.S. Nav. Inst. Proc. 44, 49-50 (No.
2,1976); Brunson MacChesney, Some Comments on Ihe "Quarantine" cifCuba, 57 Am.]. Int'l L. 592, 593
(1963); Joseph B. McDevitt, The UN Charter and lhe Cuban Quarantine, 17 JAG J. 71 (1963); Myres S.
McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Se!f-Dt:ftnse, 57 Am.J. Int'l L. 557 (1963); John H. McNeill,
Neutral Rights and Maritime SalUtions: The Ejfec/S cifTwo Wan, 31 Va.J. Int'l L. 631, 633 (1991); Leonard C.
Meeker, Dt:ftnsive Quarantine and lhe LAw, 57 Am.J. Int'l L. 515 (1963); William O. Miller, Collective Intervention
and the LAwcifthe Charter, Nav. War CoIl. Rev. 71 (Apr. 1970); William O. Miller,LAwcifNaval Warfare, id.
35 (Feb. 1972); Covey T. Oliver, IntemationalLAw and Ihe Quarantine cifCuba: A Hopeful Pre.scriptionfor Legal
Wriling, 57 Am. J. Int'l L. 373 (1963); Quincy Wright, The Cuban Quarantine, id. 546, 554-56 (1963).
206. E.g., Vaughan Lowe, supra note 19, art. 128, 137 referring to Nicaragua Case, supra note 1, which
held, inter alia, that a customary right of self-defense existed alongside those rights arriculated in the U.N.
Charter, art. 51, but that the United States was not entitled to rely on collective self-defense because Nicaragua's
providing rebels in El Salvador with arms or logistical or other support was not an "armed attack," so that the
right of self-defense was not triggered. 19861.CJ. at 94-100,103-05, citing, inter alia, the Rio Treaty, supra
note 205, art. 3, 62 Stat. at 1700, T.I.A.S. No. 1838,21 U.N.T.S. at 95-97, which articulates the inherent
right of self-defense of U.N. Charter, art. 51. The quarantine response was under article 6 and 8, which
involved "aggression •.. not an armed attack."
207. S.C. Res. 216, 217, U.N. Docs. S/RES/216, 217 (1965), reprinted in 5 Int'l Legal Mat'ls 167-68
(1966).
208. Daniel P. O'Connell, supra note 19, at 174-75, referring to S.C. Res. 221, U.N. Doc. S/RES1221
(1965), reprinted in 5 Int'l Legal Mat'ls 534 (1966). See also James Cable, supra note 77, at 123-26; Daniel P.
O'Connell, supra at 137-38. The United States generally complied. Exec. Order No. 11322, 3 C.F.R. 243
(1967 Compil.). Congress made an exception for Rhodesian chrome ore exports to the United States. See
Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461, 465-67 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1972). The chrome ore exception
was removed by 1977 legislation. See 22 U.S.C. § 287c (1988) and Act of Mar. 18, 1977,91 Stat. 22.
209. 16 Keesing's Contemporary Archives 22525 (1968).
210. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 232, U.N. Doc S/RES/232 (1966) and S.C. Res. 253, U.N. Doc. S/RES/253
(1968), terminated by S.C. Res. 460, U.N. Doc. S/RES/460 (1979), reprinted in Karel C. Wellens, supra note
42,at84-89,104-05.
211. See irifra notes 569-73 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 89, 92-93, infta notes 373-77, 399,425-27, and accompanying text.
213. Cj. U.N. Charter, art. 42. See also NWP 9A, supra note 4, paras. 4.3.2, 7.7, and irifra note 229 and
accompanying text.
214. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
215. Government of Pakistan v. R.S.N. Co., Ltd., 40 I.L.R. 472 (High Ct. of Dacca, Pakistan,
1965).
216. &egmerally P. Sharma, The Indo-Pakistan Maritime Conflict, 1965: A Legal Appraisal (1970). For an
abbreviated discwsion of Charter issueS, Sie supra notes 11-32 and accompanying text. The Indian Navy effort
during the Goa campaign of the early sixties was "confined to territorial waters." D. K. Palit, The Lightning
Campaign: The Indo-Pakistan War 1971, at 145 (1972). Goa generated heated debate in the U.N. Security
Council and a World Court decision that in effect supported India's occupation of the Portuguese enclave.
See Status of Goa, 16 U.N. SCOR (987dt mig) at 10-11, 16; id. (988dt mtg.) at 7-8; Case Concerning Right of
Passage Over Indian Territory (port. v. India), 1960 I.CJ. 6. The initial Pakistani list of absolute contraband
included:
(a) All kinds of arms, ammunitions and explosives, and all kinds of materials or appliances suitable
for use in chemical, biological or atomic warfare; machines for the manufacture or repair ofany of the
foregoing; component parts thereof, articles necessary or convenient for their use; materials or
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ingredients used in their manufacture; articles necessary or convenient for the production or use of
such materials or ingredients.
(b) Fuel of all kinds; all contrivances for, or means of, transportation on land, in water or air,
and machines used in their manufacture or repair, component parts thereof; instruments, articles
and animals necessary or convenient for their use; materials or ingredients used in their
manufacture, articles necessary or convenient for the production or usc of such materials or
ingredients.

(c) All means of communication, tools, implements, instruments, equipment, maps, pictures,
papers and other articles, machines, or documents necessary or convenient for carrying on hostile
operations; articles necessary or convenient for their manufacture or usc.
(d) Precious metals and objects made thereof, coin bullion, currency, evidence of debts, debentures, bonds, coupons, materials, dies, plates, machinery, or other articles necessary or convenient for
their production, manufacture.
Schedule II on conditional contraband comprised:

All kinds offood, foodstuffi, feed, forage and clothing and manufactured textile products; tobacco,
articles and material necessary or convenient for their production, manufacture or use.
A later list did not distinguish between absolute and conditional contraband:
(a) All kinds of arms and ammunitions and explosives; their components and ingredients,
radio-active materials.
(b) Crude oil and fuel and lubricants of all kinds.

(c) All means of transportation on land, in water or air, and components thereof.
(d) Electronics and telecommunication equipment.
(e) Optical equipment specially designed for military use.

(f) Precious metals and objects made thereof, coin bullion, currency, evidence ofdebts, debentures,
bonds, coupons, stocks, and shares or any negotiable or marketable security; precious or semi-precious
stones, jewels.
WoIffvon Heinegg, supra note 147, at 30, dting All Pak. Legal Decisions 437, 472 (1965). In September 1965
India copied the initial Pakistani list ofabsolute contraband. No list was officially ratified. Wollfvon Heinegg,
supra, at 30.
217. 15 Keesing's Contemporary Archives 21327 (1966).
218. Panel, supra note 19, at 171 (Remarks by Professor Lagoni), referring to U.N. General Assembly
Resolution 2162 of Dec. 5,1966.
219. &e supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
220. A U.S. naval task force, sent to facilitate evacuation of U.S. nationals from Bangladesh, arrived
after hostilities were over. D. K. Palit, supra note 216, at 144-50; Wolff von Heinegg, supra note
147, at 31. Both belligerents published contraband lists, including materials traditionally considered absolute
contraband. NWP 9A, supra note 4, para. 7.4.1, at 7.25 n. 98, citing Belligerent Interference with Neutral
Commerce, in Contemporary Practice cifthe United States Relating to International Law, 66 Am.]. Int'l L.
386-87 (1972). Pakistan issued a contraband list almost identical with that of1965, supra note 216, with these
additions:

(g) Implements and apparatus for manufacture or repair ofall types ofmilitary hardware equipment.
(h) All other types of goods and equipment, and parts and accessories thereof, that can be used or
may assist in the conduct of war.

&esupra note 216.
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India tr:msmitted this contraband list to the New Delhi diplomatic community:
1. arms of all kinds, including arms for sporting purposes, and their distinctive component parts,
2. projectiles, charges, and cartridges of all kinds, and their distinctive component parts,
3. powder and explosives specially prepared for use in war,
4. gunmountin~, limber boxes, limbers, military wagons, file forges, and their distinctive
component parts,
5. clothing and equipment of a distinctively military character,
6. all kinds of harness of a distinctively military character,
7. saddle, draught, and pack animals suitable for use in war,
8. armour plates,
10. warships, including boats, and their distinctive component parts of such nature that they can
only be used on a vessel of war,
11. aeroplanes, airships, balloons, and aircraft ofall kinds and their component parts, together with
accessories and articles recognizable as intended for use in connection with balloons and aircraft,
12. implements and apparatus designed exclusively for the manufacture ofwar, for the manufacture
or repair of arms, or war material for use on land and sea,
13. surface to surface missiles, surface to air missiles, air to surface rockets and guided missiles and
warheads for any ofthe above weapons, mechanical or electronic equipment to support or operate the
above items,
14. any other class of materials or items as may assist the army in the prosecution of the armed
conflict against the Union ofIndia.
Eight Indian ports were declared subject to control on December 8, and on December IS, 1971 the Bengal
Chamber of Commerce advised neutral shipping it would not risk attack in the Bay of Bengal if these
instructions were obeyed:
(a) No ship should approach Sandheads to a distance less than 40 miles between dusk and dawn.

(b) Masters should be warned that they are liable whilst on passage in the Bay, to be challenged
by Units ofIndian Navy to establish their bonafides; they should cooperate and they \vill get courtesy
and considerate treatment.
(c) For such ships as have left Calcutta having been detained here on account of their contraband
cargo, which they had to discharge in accordance with official instructions it is strongly suggested that
masters should obtain an endorsement from customs to the effect that all contraband cargo has been
discharged. In addition, it is further recommended that agent should obtain an endorsement from the
Indian Navy to the same effect and the officer to be contacted in this respect is.•..
The next day the Indian Parliament adopted the Naval and Aircraft Prize Act, 1971, which declared in part:
"Prize" [IS defined as] anything which ••. may be subjected to adjudication .•• including a ship
or an aircraft and goods carried therein irrespective of whether the ship is captured at sea or seized in
port or whether the aircraft is on or over land or sea at the time of capture or seizure. [According to
Section 3 (3) the Act is applicable] during war or as a measure of reprisal during an armed conflict or
in the exercise of the right of self-defense" [and according to Section 4(3) the Prize Court] ..• shall
adjudge and condemn all such ships, vessels, aircraft and goods belonging to any country or state or
the nationals, citizens or subjects thereof.
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The Act had no practical relevance, but the Indian navy stopped and searched more than 100 neutral merchant
vessels during the conflict that lasted only two weeks. On December 21, 1971, India suspended visit and search
of neutral vessels. WoIffvon Heinegg, supra note 147, at 31-33.
221. Daniel P. O'Connell, supra note 19, at 86-87,129; 2 Daniel P. O'Connell, supra note 11, at 1099.
222. See supra footnote 220.
223. WoIffvon Heinegg, supra note 147, at 33.
224. Fred Greene, The Indian-Pakistan War and the Asian Power Balana, 25 Nav. War Coil. Rev. 16 (No.
3,1973).
225. These dates have been chosen because 1962 marked the first major infusion of u.s. forces into
Vietnam; Pte last u.s. service people left in 1973, although U.S. aid continued through 1975. Seegenerally
Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History 247-69, 655-56, 661, 678, 684 (1983); Louis Henkin, supra note 19, at
303-12.
226. R.L. Schreadly, The Naval War in Vietnam, 1950-1970, in Frank Uhlig, Jr., Vietnam: The Naval
Story 274, 280-87 (1986); James A. Hodgman, Market Time in the Gulf of Thailand, id. 308; see also 2 D.P.
O'Connell, supra note 11, at 1097-99, 1122-23, and Daniel P. O'Connell, supra note 19, at 176-77.
227. W J. Fenrick, supra note 62, at 18; Fenrick, supra note 62, at 256. Cf. Hague XI, supra note 55, art.
3,36 Stat. 2408-09, T.S. No. 544; Institute ofInternational Law, Oxford Manual of Naval War, arts. 3, 12,37,
(1913), in Law of Naval Warfare, supra note 1, at 2n, 280, 282, 293; The Pacquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677
(1900); W. Thomas Mallison, supra note 195, at 15-16, 126-28 (1968). See also supra notes 61-96 and
accompanying text.
228. 2 EdwardJ. Marolda & Oscar P. Fitzgerald, The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict 518
(1986). The original defense zone was promulgated in Republic of Vietnam Decree on Sea Surveillance, Apr.
27, 1965, in 4 Int'l Legal Mat'ls 461 (1965).
229. 2 EdwardJ. Marolda & Oscar D. Fitzgerald, supra note 228, at 118-20.
230. !d. at 228-39.
231. !d. at 309. Like much of the rest of the RVN Navy, it was supplied by the United States. !d. at 311.
232. Daniel P. O'Connell, supra note 19, at 325; von Heinegg, supra note 147, at 34.
233. Lane C. Kendall, U.S. Merchant Shipping and Vietnam, in Frank Uhlig, Jr., supra note 226, at 482,
491, 499-500.
234. W J. Fenrick, supra note 62, at 18; id at 256, riting Daniel P. O'Connell, supra note 19, at 110.
235. 1 Edwin Hooper et al., supra note 88, ch. 12; Daniel M. Redmond, Getting Them Out, 116 U.S.
Nav. Instit. Proc. 44 (No.8, 1990). About a million Vietnamese went south, 560,000 by ship, 240,000 by
airlift, and over 140,000 on foot or by boat.
236. Horace B. Robertson,Jr., New Technologies and Armed COI!f/ic/$ at Sea, 14 SyracuseJ. Int'l L. & Comm.
699,703 (1988).
237. WJ. Fenrick, supra note 62, at 18; WJ. Frenrick supra, note 62, at 256-57; Swayze, Traditional
Prindples of Blockade in Modern Practice: United States Mining of Internal and Territorial Waten of NOr/I, VIetnam,
29 JAG J. 143 (1977); Bruce A. Clark, Recent Evolutionary Trends Concerning Naval Interdiction of Seabome
Commerce as a VIable Sanctioning Device, 27 id. 160 (1973). See also Daniel P. O'Connell, supra note 19, at 94-95.
NWP 9A, supra note 4, para. 7.7.5 at 7-38, for the premise that this method ofinterdiction is "useful" despite
a trend away ftom belligerents' practice of establishing a blockade according to the traditional rules. Earlier,
inland waters and rivers of North Vietnam had been mined. For other political and operational aspects of the
campaign, see Ulrik Luckow, VIctory Over Ignorance and Fear: The U.S. Mine/aying Attack on NOr/h VIetnam, 35
Nav. War Coil. Rev. 17 (No.1, 1982).
238. 2 EdwardJ. Marolda & Oscar P. Fitzgerald, supra note 228, at 320-25.
239. 18 Keesing's Contemporary Archives 25338 (1972).
240. Cf. NWP 9A, supra note 4, para. 8.2.3, at 8-21 n. 65.
241. Seegenerally id., para. 7.7.5; Frank B. Swayze and Bruce A. Clark, supra note 237.
242. See supra note 103 and accompanying teAt
243. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
244. GWSEA, supra note lOS, arts. 22-35, 6 V.S.T. at 3234-40, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 V.N.T.S. at
100-06.
245. Daniel P. O'Connell, supra note 19, at 10-12; Bruce Swanson, supra note 86, at 268-69. The PRC
had mounted a similar but unsuccessful effort in 1950. 1 Edwin B. Hooper et aI., supra note 88, at 339-41.
246. Eleanor C. McDowell, supra note 166, at 13-15, 423-26, 766, m-83, 879-86; Arthur W. Revine
and Eleanor C. McDowell, Contemporary Practice ofthe Unitcd States Relating /0 IntemationalLAw, 69 Am.J. Int'l
L. 861-63, 874-79 (1975); U.S. Recoven Merchant Ship Seized by Cambodian Navy, 72 Dep't St. Bull. 719-22
(1975); Thomas E. Behuniak, n,e Seizure and Recovery of tile S.S. Mayaguez: A Legal Analysis of United States
Claims, 82 Mil. L. Rev. 41 (1978),83 id. 59 (1979).
247. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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248. 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 159, arts. 14-17, 15 U.S.T. 1610-11, T.I.A.S. No. 5639,
516 U.N.T.S. 214-16; UNCLOS, supra note 2, arts. 17-26.
249. 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 159, art. 24, 15 U.S.T. 1612-13, T.I.A.S. No. 5639,
516 U.N.T.S. 220; UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 3l.
250. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass
Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Roor and in the Subsoil Thereof, Feb. 11, 1971, art. 1,23 U.S.T.
701,704-07, T.I.A.S. No. 7337.
251. CJ. Luigi Migliorino, Commentary, in Law of Naval Warfare, supra note 1, at 615,620; Horace B.
Robertson,Jr., A Legal Regimefor the Resources if the Seabed and Subsoil if the Deep Sea: A Brewing Problemfor
International Lawmakers, Nav. War Col. Rev. 61 (Oct. 1968); Tullio Treves, Military Installations, Structures,
and Dtvim on the Seabed, 74 Am. J. Int'l L. 808 (1980); RexJ. Zedalis, A Response,75 id.926 (1981), and
Tullio Treves, Reply, id. 933 (1981); discuss these issues in the context of the UNCLOS, supra note 2,
negotiations. For analysis of UNCLOS in the context of merchant ship issues, see il!fta notes 304-30 and
accompanying text..
252. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972 [hereinafter 1972 Bacteriological
Convention], arts. 1-4,26 U.S.T. 583, 587-88, T.I.A.S. No. 8062.
253. CJ. Vaughan Lowe, Commentary, in The Law of Naval Warfare, supra note 1, at 640,648.
254. 1972 Bacteriological Convention, supra note 252, art. 8, 26 U.S.T. 589, T.I.A.S. No. 8062, riferring
to Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, and U.S. reservation, Dec. 16, 1974,26 U.S.T. 571,
T.I.A.S. No. 8061, 94 L.N.T.S. 65.
255. Howard S. Levie, Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons, in Horace B. Robertson,Jr., supra note
19, at 331,335-45. NWP 9A, supra note 4, paras. 10.3.2.1, 10.4.2, states the U.S. position that first use of
chemical weapons and any use of biologicals would violate customary intemationallaw.
256. Vaughan Lowe, supra note 253, at 641,647-48.
257. U.N. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques, May 18, 1977 [hereinafter 1977 Environmental Modification Convention], arts.
1-2,31 U.S.T. 333, T.I.A.S. No. 9614.
258. Luis Rodriguez, Commftltary, in The Law of Naval Warfare, supra note 1, at 661); see also Comment,
Weather Genesis and Weather Nelllralization: A New Approach 10 Weather Modijication, 6 Cal. W. Int'l LJ. 412
(1976).
259. Michael Bothe et al., New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflict 290-91 (1982); Michael Bothe,
Commentary, in The Law of Naval Warfare, supra note 1, at 760; Yves Sandoz et al., Commentary on the
Additional Protocols of8 June 1979 to the Geneva Conventions of12 August 1949, at 605-06 (1987); W.F.
Fenrick, supra note 62, at 41; Howard S. Levie, Means and Methods if Combat at Sea, 14 Syracuse J. Int'l L. &
Comm. 727, 729-30 (198B). As Yves Sandoz et aI., .,upra at 606, and Michael Bothe, supra at 761, note,
however, other parts of the Protocol- not directly germane to this analysis - are not thus limited and do apply
to sea warfare.
260. Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims ofIntemational Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977 [hereinafter Protocol I], art. 49(3), in The Law of
Naval Warfare, supra note 1, at 673, 725-26.
261. E.g., Louise Doswald-Beck, The P,;ndples if Humanity in the Law if Sea Warfare: The Protection if
Civilian.' and the Hors de Combat, in Panel, Neutrality, Ihe Rights ifShipping and the Use ifForce in the Persian Gulf
War (part 11),1988 Am. Soc'y Int') L. Proc. 599, 600-01 (1990), arguing for one standard. See also Natalino
Ronzitti, Remarks, in id. 603, 604. Protocol I is in force for 108 nations, as compared with 168 parties to the
1949 Geneva Conventions. RatijicatiollS and Aaes.,iollS, supra note 104, at 5.
262. Protocol I, supra note 260, art. 52, in The Law of Naval Warfare, supra note 1, at 727-28. See also
W J. Fenrick, The Rule ifProportionality and Protocol I in Conventional Warfare, 9B Mil. L. Rev. 91 (1982); Louise
Doswald-Beck, supra note 261, at60l.
263. Protocol r, supra note 260, art. 53, in The Law of Naval Warfare, supra note 1, at 728, referring to
the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention, analyzed supra notes 113-24.
264. See supra notes 1, 2 and accompanying text.
265. Protocol r, supra note 260, art. 54, in The Law of Naval Warfare, supra note 1, at 728-29.
266. 1977 Environmental Modification Convention, supra note 257, 31 U.S.T. 333, T.I.A.S. No. 9614.
267. Protocol I, supra note 260, art. 55(1), in The Law of Naval Warfare, supra note 1, at 729). See also
id., art. 35(3), in The Law of Naval Warfare, supra, at 729.
268. See supra notes 257-58 and accompanying text.
269. Protocol r, supra note 260, art. 56, in The Law of Naval Warfare, supra note 1, at 729-30.
270. Id., art. 57, in The Law of Naval Warfare, supra note 1, at 730-3l.
271. George H. Aldrich, New Ufofor the Laws if War, 75 Am.J. Int'l L. 764, 778 (19Bl).
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272. Protocol I, supra note 260, art. 58, in The Law of Naval Warfare, supra note 1, at 732.
273. &e NWP 9A, supra note 4, para. 8.3.1, referring to id., para. 8.2.2.2, noting the shift from principles
stated in, inter alia, Treaty Relating to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare, Feb. 6, 1922,
art. 1(1), The Law of Naval Warfare, supra note 1, at 347,348, which never came into force; London Treaty
for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armaments, Apr. 22, 1930, art. 22, 112 L.N.T.S. 65, 88;
Proces-Verbal Relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare Set Forth in Part IV of the Treaty of London,
Nov. 6, 1936, Rules 1, 2,173 id. 353; to the practice during World War II, detailed in Robert W. Tucker,
supra note 62, at 55-70, and W. Thomas Mallison, supra note 195, at 106-23.
274. Protocol I, supra note 260, arts. 51(4), 51(5), in The Law of Naval Warfare, supra note 1, at 727.
275. Id., arts. 35(1), 35(2), in The Law of Naval Warfare, supra note 1, at 719.
276. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which
May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Apr. 10, 1981 [hereinafter
1981 Conventional Weapons Convention], reprinted in Dietrich Schindler &Jiri Toman, The Laws ofArmed
Conflicts 179 (3d ed. 1988).
2n. 1981 Conventional Weapons Convention, supra note 276, Protocol I, in Dietrich Schindler &Jiri
Toman, supra note 276, at 185. For analysis of the Convention and Protocol I, see J. Ashley Roach, Certain
Conventional Weapons Convention: Anns Control or Humanitarian Law?, 105 Mil. L. Rev. 3 (1984).
278. 1981 Conventional Weapons Convention, supra note 276, Protocol III, in Dietrich Schindler &Jiri
Toman, supra note 276, at 190.
279. James Ennes, supra note 158, at 67-68, 70, 81, 92, 152. &e also supra note 158 and accompanying
text.
280. Cf. 1981 Conventional Weapons Convention, supra note 276, Protocol Ill, art. 1(2), ill Dietrich
Schindler & Jiri Toman, supra note 276, at 190.
281. Id., Protocol II, art. 1, in Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman, supra note 276, at 185. For further analysis,
see Burris M. Carnahan, The Law oj Land Waifare: Protocol II to tile United Nations Convention on Certain
Conventional WeapollS, 103 Mil. L. Rev. 73 (1984).
282. 1981 Conventional Weapons Convention, supra note 276, collI, arts. 3(3), 4(2), 5, 7-8, ill Dietrich
Schindler &Jiri Toman, supra note 276, at 186-88.
283. NWP 9A, supra note 4, paras. 8.2.3, at 8-19, citing Max Hastings & Simon Jenkins, The Battle for
the Falklands 158 (1983); Martin Middlebrook, Operation Corporate: The Falklands War 186-87 (1985); 1
Howard S. Levie, The Code of International Armed Conflict 186 (1985). &e also Howard S. Levie, TIlt
Falklands Crisis alld the Laws oj War, ill Alberto R. ColI & Anthony C. Arend, supra note 41, at 64,67. USSR
surveillance ships and aircraft, plus satellites, could monitor the task force movement, but it is not clear whether
the ships could or did enter the MEZ or the DSA; USSR aircraft could approach Ascension Island, the British
staging area, but could not reach the Falklands/Malvinas. 3 Anthony H. Cordesman & Abraham R. Wagner,
The Lessons of Modern War 280 (1990). On May 10, Britain declared a l00-mile controlled airspace around
Ascension. [d. at 250.
284. &e general/y, 3 Anthony H. Cordesman & Abraham R. Wagner, supra note 283, at 330-31. Max
Hastings & Simon Jenkins, supra note 283, at 88-89, 161, 214, 227-28, 2n-84, 292, 349-51; Martin
Middlebrook, supra note 283, at 79-80, 178,243-51,400-01. Roger Villar, Merchant Ships at War: The
Falklands Experience (1984) is an additional, excellent study.
285. Anthoine A. Bouvier, Humanitariall Protection atld Armed Co,!f1icts at &a: Mealls and Met/lods oj
Identifying Protected Cr'!ft, 14 SyracuseJ. Int'l L. & Comm. 759, 765 (1988); Commetllary, id. 765 (Remarks of
Commander Fenrick, Mr. Eberlin).
286. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in
the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 23, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 3130, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 46.
287. 3 Anthony H. Cordesman & Abraham R. Wagner, supra note 283, at 242-44,249. Max Hastings
& Simon Jenkins, .<upra note 283, at 105,119,124-25,133,143,147,157; Martin Middlebrook, supra note
283, at 97,98, 126. United Nations lawmaking had minimal effect on the war. On April 3, 1987 the Security
Council determined that there was a breach of the peace, demanded immediate cessation of hostilities and
withdrawal ofArgentine forces, and called on the belligerents to seek a diplomatic solution. The USSR, China,
Poland and Spain abstained. S.C. Res. 502, U.N. Doc. S/RES/502, 21 Int'l Legal Mat'ls 679 (1982). The
rationale for Soviet noninvolvement is explored in Vojtech Mastny, The Soviet Unioll and the Falklallds War,
36 Nav. War ColI. Rev, 46, 47 (No.3, 1983). The Organization of American States (OAS) resolution of
April 28 urged Argentina and the United Kingdom to cease hostilities within the region defined by the Rio
Treaty, Sept. 2,1947, art. 4, 62 Stat. 1699, 1700-01, T.I.A.S. No. 1838,21 U.N.T.S. n, 97, and to refrain
from any act that might affect inter-American peace and security. The OAS advocated a truce and peaceful
settlement of the problem. OAS Resolution I, Serious Situation in the South Atlantic, Apr. 28, 1982, O.A.S.
Doc. OEAlSer. F/II.20, Doc. 28/82 rev. 3 (Apr. 28,1982),21 Int'l Legal Mat'ls 669 (1982). The European
Community had suspended imports from Argentina on April 16. E.C. Council Regulation 8n/82 Swpending
Imports of All Products Originating in Argentina, Apr. 16, 1982, 19820.]. (L 102) 1, E.C.S.C. Council
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Decision 821228/ECSC Suspending Imports ofAll Products Originating in Argentina, Apr. 16, 1982, 21 Int'l
Le~ Mat'ls 547-48 (1982). These were extended on May 18, 1982. &e id. at 549-50. The United States
suspended military exports, security assistance and export credits to Argentina on April 30. &e Statements
Con«ming Assistance to and Salts to Argentina, id. 682-84. Security Council Resolution 505 of May 26, 1982
urged the belligerents to accept the U.N. Secretary-General's good offices. S.C. Res. 50S, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/505, rqninted in Karel C. Wellens, supra note 42, at 404. An OAS resolution then took an anti-E. C.,
U.K. and U.S. position on May 29, 1982,21 Int'l Le~ Mat'ls 672-74. The E.C. and U.S. measures were
rescinded inJune andJuIy 1982 respectively. !d. 1210. John Norton Moore, The Inter-American System Snarls
in Falk1ands War, 76 Am.J. Int'l L. 830 (1982) states that the May 29 OAS resolution was ultra virts. For analysis
ofevents leading up to the 1982 war, see Michael P. Socarras, The Argentine Invasion ofthe Falk1ands: International
Means of Signaling, in W. Michael Reisman & Andrew R. Willard, International Incidents: The Law that
Counts in World Politics 115 (1988). &e also Marshall Hall, Argentine Policy Motivations in the Falklands War
and the Aftermath, 36 Nav. War. Coli. Rev. 21 (No.6, 1983). For general accounts of the conflict, see 3
Anthony H. Cordesman & Abraham R. Wagner, supra note 283 at 238-361; Harry D.Train III, An Analysis
of the Falk1and/Malvinas Islands Campaign, 41 Nav. War. Coli. Rev. 33 (No. I, 1988). For analysis of the
territorial claims and claims ofself-defense in international law, see James F. Gravelle, The Falklands (Malvinas)
Islands: An International LawAnalysis ofthe Dispute Between Argentina and Great Britain, 107 Mil L. Rev. 5 (1985).
288. W J. Fenrick, The Exclusion Zone Device in the Law of Naval Wa!fOre, 1986 Canad. Y.B. Int'l L. 91,
109-12; see also Max Hastings & SimonJenkins, supra note 283, at 147,157; Martin Middlebrook, supra note
283, at 151; Howard S. Levie, supra note 283 at 65; Howard S. Levie, supra note 259, at 735-38; Vojtech
Mastny, supra note 287, at 49.
289. &e Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 431-33 (1989), reversing
830 F.2d 421, 423 (2d Cir. 1987); Sally V. Mallison & W. Thomas Mallison, supra note 62, at 269.
290. 3 Anthony H. Cordesman & Abraham R. Wagner, supra note 283, at 260; 2 Daniel P. O'Connell,
supra note II, at 1112.
291. 3 Anthony H. Cordesman & Abraham R. Wagner, supra note 283, at 250-51,334,336.
292. W J. Fenrick, supra note 288, at 124-25; aaord Vaughan Lowe, The Impact of the Law of the &a on
Naval Wa!fOre, 14 SyracuseJ. Int'l L. & Comm. 657, 673 (1988).
293. W.J. Fenrick, supra note 288, at 125, dting, inter alia, NWIP 10-2, supra note 57, paras. 430(b),
520(a).
294. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 423-24 (2d Cir. 1987), rev'd,
488 U.S. 428 (1989). The Supreme Court thus agreed with the U.S. District Court, which dismissed, on
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act grounds, Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 638 F.
Supp.73 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), and dissenting Judge Kearse in the Second Circuit, 830 F.2d at 429-31. &e also
supra note 289 and accompanying text.
295. W J. Fenrick, supra note 288, at 116.
296. L.F.E. Goldie, Maritime War Zonts & Exclusion Zonts, in Horace B. Robertson,Jr., supra note 19, at
156, 174. Leckow, supra note 188, at 635-36, agrees as to the British zone. He does not consider legality of
the Argentine South Atlantic zone, but presumably would say it was illegal because, in his view, "war zones
can be justified only in very restricted circumstances, where inconvenience to neutral vessels is kept to a
minimum." !d. at 635.
297. CJ. 2 Daniel P. O'Connell, supra note 11, at 1111-12; W J. Fenrick, supra note 288, at 94, 113, 121;
L.F.E. Goldie, supra note 296, at 194; Pro£ Lagoni, in Panel, supra note 19, at 163, argues that a "defensive
protection zone is admissible only ifit is adjacent to the coast of the state establishing it," a position seemingly
contrary to other commentators. Ifhis view is taken, the U.K. DSA, or "defensive bubble," supra note 287
and accompanying text, was illegal under international law. Lagoni's is a minority position among commentators.
298. L.F.E. Goldie, supra note 296, at 160-74, 183-94; Miller, Belligerency and limited War, Nav. War
Coli. Rev. 19 (Jan. 1969).
299. &e also sllpra notes 11-39 and accompanying text.
300. &e supra notes 61-62, 91, 94, 225-31, 248, 283 and accompanying text.
301. Compare supra notes 50-60, 129-34, 157, 168-69, 199-202,215-16,233-44,247, and accompanying
text with supra note 284 and accompanying text.
302. &e supra notes 286-87 and accompanying text.
303. Compare supra note 289 and accompanying text with supra notes 54-60,82-86, 199-201,221-23.
304. UNCLOS, supra note 2, arts. 88, 301.
305. For analysis ofUNCLOS, primarily in the context of the peacetime environment, see, e.g., 2 Daniel
P. O'Connell, supra note 11, ch. 25.
306. &e supra note 2.
307. UNCLOS, supra note 2, arts. 87, 89.
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308. &e 1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 20, art. 2, 13 U.S.T. at 2314, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450
U.N.T.S. at 82-84.
309. Compare UNCLOS, supra note 2, arts. 91-92, 94 with 1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 20,
art. 5, 13 U.S.T. 2315, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 84-86.
310. U.N. Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships, Feb. 7, 1986,26 Int'l Legal Mat'ls 1236
(1987). The European Conununity has begun attacking the problem through the Rome Treaty. Note,
Common Maritime Transport Policy for the EEC: The Commission Does &ttle with Flags oj Con~tniena, 13 B.C.
Int'l & Compo L. Rev. 447 (1990). The problem of unsafe ships under open registty has also been the subject
of treaty negotiations. Ebere Osieke, Flags oJCon~eniena Vessels: Recent DevelopmtnlS, 73 Am. J. Int'l L. 604
(1979).
311. UNCLOS, supra note 2, arts. 95-96, 110.
312. &e supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
313. UNCLOS, supra note 2, arts. 116-20.
314. ld. arts. 192-96.
315. &e supra notes 257-58,266-68, and accompanying text.
316. Vaughan Lowe, supra note 292, at 664, raises some of these issues from the UNCLOS perspective.
317. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 87(1).
318. 1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 20, art. 2,13 U.S.T. 2314, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S.
82-84. &e also supra note 176 and accompanying text.
319. E.g., UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 116{a) (obligations under treaties an exception to the right to
engage in fishing).
320. Hague XI, supra note 62, art. 3, 36 Stat. 2408-09, T.S. No. 544 (coastal fishing and trading boats
exempt from capture so long as they do not take part in hostilities).
321. Compare UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 87(1) with 1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 20, art. 2,
13 U.S.T. 2314, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S 82-84. &e also supra notes 174-67, and accompanying text.
322. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 88.
323. !d. art. 301. For analysis of the right ofseU:defense and other Charter issues, see supra notes 11-39
and accompanying text.
324. Vaughan Lowe, supra note 13, at 132; Professor Oxman agrees with this analysis. u[T]he rules of
armed conflict are not addressed by the Convention." Bemard H. Oxman, supra note 159, at 811. &e also
Boleslaw Boczek, Peaceful Purposes Provisions oj the United Nations Con~ntion on the Law oj the &a, 20 Ocean
Devel. & Int'l L. 359 (1989); Herbert W. Briggs, supra note 176, at 51; ILC Report, supra note 176, 1966(2)
Y.B. Int'l L. Conun'n at 267-68; Francis V. Russo,Jr., supra note 176, at 384.
325. 2 Daniel P. O'Connell, supra note 11, at 1106-26.
326. !d. at 11 05-06.
327. ld. at 1108-09. &e also id. at 1131-37.
328. !d. at 1112-13, referring to id. at 747-69.
329. &e supra notes 174-84 and accompanying text.
330. 2 Daniel P. O'Connell, supra note 11, at 1109-12.
331. For an overview of the history of the Persian Gulf and prior naval involvement in the region, see
Samuel P. Menefee, Gunboat Diplomacy in the Persian Gu!f? An Altemati~e E~aluation oj a Contemporary Naval
Conflict, 31 Va. J. Int'l L. 566 (1990).
332. Elaine P. Adam, Chronology 1980,59 Foreign AfT. 714, 725, 729-32 (1981); David L. Peace, MaJor
Maritime E~nlS in the Persian Gulf War, in Panel, supra note 19, at 146, 147 (1990); David L. Peace, M,!jor
Maritime E~nlS in the Persian GUlf&tU1etn 1984 and 1991: AJuridicalAnalysis, 31 Va.J. Int'l L. 545, 547 (1991);
J. Ashley Roach, Missiles on Target: Targeting and Deftnse Zones in the Tanker War, id. 593, 600-02 (1991). A
U.N. initiative to evacuate 70 neutral vessels anchored at the Shattal-Arab tenninals and trapped by the Iranian
decree under the International Committee of the Red Cross flag was given up as a failure by March 1982,
because Iraq refused to allow them to depart. Boleslaw Boczek, Law oj Waifare and Neutrality: Lessonsfrom the
Gulf War, 20 Ocean Devel. & Int'l L. 239, 244, 257 (1989), who argues that this may have been violative of
the law of blockade, which allows neutrals a grace period to depart at the beginning of a blockade.
333. J. Ashley Roach, supra note 332, at 604-05.
334. 2 Anthony H. Cordesman & Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War 90-91,101-02,
(1990); Frankcis V. Russo,Jr., -,upra note 176, at 393, reports that Kuwait and Saudi Arabia also made substantial
cash grants to Iraq to help finance its war effort. &e also Farhaug Mehr, Neutrality in the Gulf War, 20 id. 105
(1989).
335. NWP 9A, supra note 4, para. 7.4.1, at 7-25 n.98, citing, inter alia, Milton Viorst, Iran at War, 65
Foreign AfT. 349, 350 (1986); see also 2 Anthony H. Cordesman & Abraham R. Wagner, -,upra note 334, at
92; J. Ashley Roach, Missiles on Target: The Law oj Targeting and the Tanker War, in Panel, supra note 19, at
154, 156-57;J. Ashley Roach, supra note 332, at 596-97, 600-01. Captain Roach has stated that even though
Iraq did not follow the formalities ofblockade - announcement and effectiveness - an argument could be made
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that Iraq was enforcing an air blockade ofIran, and that neutral ships assumed the risk of attack if they chose
to carry Iranian oil during the conflict. J. Ashley Roach, supra, at 157; id at 607-08. Yoram Dinstein,
Commentary, in Panel, supra note 261, at 606, 608 says that "[n]o blockade [was] proclaimed ••• , and had it
been ••• , it would have been a 'paper blockade.' Consequently, the law of blockade [was] inapplicable."
Paper blockades are by definition ineffective. 2 Daniel P. O'Connell, supra note 11, at 1150-51, dting Paris
Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, Apr. 16, 1856, art. 4, The Law of Naval Warfare, supra note 1, at 61;
65; London Declaration Concerning the Laws of Naval War, Feb. 26, 1909, art. 2, The Law of Naval Warfare,
supra at 223, 227-28. Professor Dinstein also stated that oil shipped out of the Gulf could not have been
contraband, since the right to capture "is limited to import goods and does not cover export items. The
Declaration of London makes it abundantly clear that a cargo cannot constitute contraband ifit is not destined
for the enemy ••• [O]il shipped out of the Gulfdoes not come within the purview of contraband." Yoram
Dinstein, supra, at 608. While the argument is technically correct, it might be noted that goods characterized
as contraband that are exported from one enemy port to another enemy port are subject to capture and
condemnation. Declaration of London, supra, arts. 30-39, in The Law of Naval Warfare, supra at 238-41. 2
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accompanying text. John H. McNeill, supra note 205, at 633-34, asks whether the seventh category represents
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452. NWP 9A, supra note 4, para. 7.5.
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LAw if/he Sea, 18 Ocean Devel. & lnt'l L. 125, 156 (1987) also urged a codification conference. For analysis
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